"Changes in Jihadi Discourse in the Wake of the "Islamic State" explores how the transnational jihadi discourse changed with the development of the "Islamic State" terrorist group and resulted in the fragmentation of the jihadi movement. From the Middle East, through Africa to South East Asia, today's jihadi movement is more fragmented than ever. Al-Qaida and the "Islamic State" do not only compete with each other, but also with local jihadi groups. Despite the fact that, in the wake of the "Islamic State", international jihadi groups are in fierce competition for supporters, little has been said on how the process of competition as well as external events changed the ideology of these groups and the topics relevant to them. Countering dominant research focusing on the differences between jihadi strains, this book explores how the appearance and temporary strength of the "Islamic State" changed the topics and talking points of other jihadi actors, such as al-Qaida. By analyzing primary sources in Arabic and English, the author sheds light on the inner- and inter-jihadi discourse and its development over the years. The book does not simply describe changes in topics; it traces these changes quantitatively and relates them to external events. This book is aimed at academics, researchers, and postgraduate students interested in political science, security studies, jihadism, jihadi discourse, al-Qaida, "Islamic State", and Salafism, as well as practitioners and decision-makers in government agencies who wish to understand how transnational jihadi discourse has developed over the previous two decades"--

This report analyzes jihadi discourse in the wake of the "Arab Spring" in order to address two related questions: (1) why have global jihadi leaders been struggling to advance a coherent and effective response to the events of the Arab Spring, and (2) why, despite strong rhetoric of militancy, have we witnessed little action on the part of new jihadi groups that have emerged in countries that underwent regime change (i.e., Tunisia, Egypt and Libya) as a result of the Arab Spring? To answer these questions, this study focuses on original Arabic sources in the form of public statements released by global jihadi leaders in response to the Arab Spring and by new groups projecting a jihadi worldview that have emerged in Tunisia, Egypt and Libya. Regional jihadi groups that were established prior to the Arab Spring are not the focus of this study. This study reveals that global jihadi leaders are struggling to define clearly and consistently their ideological framework in the aftermath of the Arab Spring. More precisely, the factors that are causing the current ideological incoherence of jihadism are the same factors that had once served as the cornerstone of its plausibility in the eyes of its adherents. This study identifies several weaknesses in the discourse of global jihadi leaders that highlight the nature of the challenges they face in the wake of the Arab Spring. These include the paradoxical position of the deed of spectating: the jihadis have always prided themselves on action, i.e., on the deed of jihad; and in so doing, they gained the attention of the world community. Yet, in the initial phase of the Arab Spring, the jihadis found themselves not as actors in, but as spectators of the drama of fallen dictators. Another related challenge is the once powerful grievance narrative that "jihad is the only solution" to rid Muslims of their dictators that jihadi leaders and ideologues had propagated. This narrative, however, is shaken in the wake of the Arab Spring as non-violent protest toppled some iconic dictators like Husni Mubarak of Egypt and Zein al-'Abidin bin 'Ali of Tunisia. The most glaring weakness of current jihadi discourse has to do with the fact that after the fall of dictators, people have chosen a political path that is irreconcilable with the jihadi worldview and have become the object of jihadi resentment. Thus the jihadis' once-powerful grievances articulated against dictators are now reduced to soliloquies criticizing the people.

The fall of dictators brought about by the initial wave of the "Arab Spring" is an aspiration many Arabs dreamed about, prayed for or attempted to pursue through political channels - an exercise that for decades seemed futile. The jihadis did not settle for dreaming or praying - although there is no shortage of either in the jihadi cultural universe. Convinced by the futility of peaceful reforms, they set out on the path of jihad intent on bringing down dictators and fighting against the Western countries that they believed supported these dictators.1 For decades jihadis - despite their differences - have been in agreement that jihad is the only solution to rid Muslims of their dictators to pave the way for establishing a just society in which God's Law reigns supreme. In the words of Ayman al-Zawahiri, who has been declared by jihadi websites to be Usama Bin Ladin's successor, "there is no solution except through jihad, all other solutions are futile. Rather, other solutions would only worsen the state of dilapidation and submissiveness in which we live; [purported solutions that exclude jihad] are equivalent to treating cancer with aspirin." In doing so, unlike Islamist groups that are also driven by Islamic religious teachings of social justice but chose the electoral path to advance their agenda, jihadis have rejected the world order of nation-states and the state's monopoly on the legitimate use of physical force. Instead, jihadis have embraced jihad as the primary means of political change. But if peaceful protests could bring down Presidents Zayn al-Din bin 'Ali of Tunisia (January 2011) and Husni Mubarak of Egypt (February 2011) in the seismic phenomenon known as the "Arab Spring," where does this leave jihadism? In view of the unpredictable nature of the events that have characterized the onset and subsequent developments of the Arab Spring, a serious attempt to anticipate its future in general, and its impact on jihadism in particular, is fraught with risks. This report therefore avoids addressing ambitious questions, such as whether the Arab Spring is a success or a failure and whether it will lead to the demise of jihadism. Instead, this report analyzes jihadi discourse since the onset of the Arab Spring in order to address two related questions: (1) why have global jihadi leaders been struggling to advance a coherent and effective response to the events of the Arab Spring, and (2) why, despite strong rhetoric of militancy, have we witnessed little action on the part of new jihadi groups that have emerged in countries that underwent regime change as a result of the Arab Spring? The pertinence of these questions lies in the consequential effects of both the Arab Spring and jihadism on the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region. Some analysts expressed concern that the instability brought about by the Arab Spring is engendering a fertile ground for jihadis to operate in the region. Among others, Bruce Hoffman worries that it "may create new opportunities for al-Qa`ida and its allies to regroup and reorganize," and even this instability "endowed" al-Qa'ida "with new relevance." In a similar vein, others have remarked that there is a causal link between the Arab Spring and the rise of new jihadi groups, warning that this may lead to a violent conflict that would destabilize the newly elected regimes. Such concerns invariably point to cohesion on both the ideological and operational levels that jihadism is said to enjoy, suggesting the possibility that the Arab Spring serves not only to strengthen, but also to enhance its violent output.

Changes in Jihadi Discourse in the Wake of the "Islamic State" explores how the transnational jihadi discourse changed with the development of the "Islamic State" terrorist group and resulted in the fragmentation of the jihadi movement. From the Middle East, through Africa to South East Asia, today’s jihadi movement is more fragmented than ever. Al-Qaida and the "Islamic State" compete not only with each other but also with local jihadi groups. Despite the fact that, in the wake of the "Islamic State", international jihadi groups are in fierce competition for supporters, little has been said on how the process of competition as well as external events changed the ideology of these groups and the topics relevant to them. Countering dominant research focusing on the differences between jihadi strains, this book explores how the appearance and temporary strength of the "Islamic State" changed the topics and talking points of other jihadi actors, such as al-Qaida. By analyzing primary sources in Arabic and English, the author sheds light on the inner- and inter-jihadi discourse and its development over the years. The book does not simply describe changes in topics; it traces these changes quantitatively and relates them to external events. This book is aimed at academics, researchers, and postgraduate students interested in political science, security studies, jihadism, jihadi discourse, al-Qaida, "Islamic State", and Salafism, as well as practitioners and decision-makers in government agencies who wish to understand how transnational jihadi discourse has developed over the previous two decades.

Jihadist narratives have evolved dramatically over the past five years, driven by momentous events in the Middle East and beyond; the death of bin Laden; the rise and ultimate failure of the Arab Spring; and most notably, the rise of the so-called Islamic State. For many years, al-Qaeda pointed to an aspirational future Caliphate as their utopian end goal - one which allowed them to justify their violent excesses in the here and now. Islamic State turned that aspiration into a dystopic reality, and in the process hijacked the jihadist narrative, breathing new life into the global Salafi-Jihadi movement. Despite air-strikes from above, and local disillusionment from below, the new caliphate has stubbornly persisted and has been at the heart of ISIS's growing global appeal. This timely collection of essays examines how jihadist narratives have changed globally, adapting to these turbulent circumstances. Area and thematic specialists consider transitions inside the Middle East and North Africa as well as in South Asia, sub-Saharan Africa and Europe. As these analyses demonstrate, the success of the ISIS narrative has been as much about resonance with local contexts, as it has been about the appeal of the global idea of a tangible and realised caliphate.

The International Politics of Logos provides the first systematic analysis of logos and the role they play in international politics. Whilst there is growing scholarly interest in visual politics, logos have largely remained hidden in plain sight despite being the most important symbol of a variety of organizations. Visual artefacts, such as logos, play an increasingly central role in politics. Candidates running for office carefully choose the images they share on social media, political parties devise effective brands, and NGOs use visual artefacts for advocacy and advertisement. Visual artefacts are also vital for violent non-state actors, ranging from private military and security companies (PMSCs) to terrorists. This book provides a wealth of data on the logos chosen by a variety of organizations, examining how they vary between actors, across types of organizations, and over time. It offers methodological innovations to the study of logos and visual politics, highlighting the potential of combining quantitative and qualitative methodologies to study the colours, symbols, and types of logos and other visual artefacts. The book examines the role of colours as cues and the causal connection between chromatic choices and ideology, the influence of socialization and norm diffusion dynamics in the choice to showcase (or scrap) specific symbols, and the relationship between branding decisions and the structure and strategies of specific organizations. This book will appeal to students and scholars of visual politics and visual communication, as well as those researching political parties, PMSCs, and terrorist groups. It will also be of interest to political, security, and marketing professionals.