A letter dated December 21, 2011, to National Academy of Sciences President Dr. Ralph Cicerone from the Chief of Naval Operations, ADM Jonathan W. Greenert, U.S. Navy, requested that the National Research Council's (NRC's) Naval Studies Board (NSB) conduct a study to examine the issues surrounding capability surprise—both operationally and technically related—facing the U.S. naval services. Accordingly, in February 2012, the NRC, under the auspices of its NSB, established the Committee on Capability Surprise for U.S. Naval Forces. The study's terms of reference, provided in Enclosure A of this interim report, were formulated by the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) in consultation with the NSB chair and director. The terms of reference charge the committee to produce two reports over a 15-month period. The present report is the first of these, an interim report issued, as requested, following the third full committee meeting. The terms of reference direct that the committee in its two reports do the following: (1) Select a few potential capability surprises across the continuum from disruptive technologies, to intelligence inferred capability developments, through operational deployments and assess what U.S. Naval Forces are doing (and could do) about these surprises while mindful of future budgetary declines; (2) Review and assess the adequacy of current U.S. Naval Forces' policies, strategies, and operational and technical approaches for addressing these and other surprises; and (3) Recommend any changes, including budgetary and organizational changes, as well as identify any barriers and/or leadership issues that must be addressed for responding to or anticipating such surprises including developing some of our own surprises to mitigate against unanticipated surprises. Capability Surprise for U.S. Naval Forces: Initial Observations and Insights: Interim Report highlights issues brought to the committee's attention during its first three meetings and provides initial observations and insights in response to each of the three tasks above. It is very much an interim report that neither addresses in its entirety any one element of the terms of reference nor reaches final conclusions on any aspect of capability surprise for naval forces. The committee will continue its study during the coming months and expects to complete by early summer 2013 its final report, which will address all of the elements in the study's terms of reference and explore many potential issues of capability surprise for U.S. naval forces not covered in this interim report.

From a military operational standpoint, surprise is an event or capability that could affect the outcome of a mission or campaign for which preparations are not in place. By definition, it is not possible to truly anticipate surprise. It is only possible to prevent it (in the sense of minimizing the number of possible surprises by appropriate planning), to create systems that are resilient to an adversary's unexpected actions, or to rapidly and effectively respond when surprised. Responding to Capability Surprise examines the issues surrounding capability surprise, both operational and technical, facing the U.S. Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard. This report selects a few surprises from across a continuum of surprises, from disruptive technologies, to intelligence-inferred capability developments, to operational deployments, and assesses what the Naval Forces are doing (and could do) about them while being mindful of future budgetary declines. The report then examines which processes are in place or could be in place in the Navy, the Marine Corps, and the Coast Guard to address such surprises. Today's U.S. naval forces continue to face a wide range of potential threats in the indefinite future and for this reason must continue to balance and meet their force structure needs. The recommendations of Responding to Capability Surprise will help to ensure more responsive, more resilient, and more adaptive behavior across the organization from the most senior leadership to the individual sailors, Marines, and Coast Guardsmen.

Forty years ago the Naval Studies Board was created at the request of then Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Elmo R. Zumwalt, Jr. As stated in his request to the National Academy of Sciences, he thought it important for the Navy to have an outside resource to which it could turn "for independent and outside counsel on any area of its responsibilities involving the interplay of scientific and technical matters with other national issues." Admiral Zumwalt, together with Under Secretary of the Navy Honorable David S. Potter and President of the National Academy of Sciences Dr. Philip Handler, recognized the importance of not only continuing but also focusing and strengthening the relationship that had existed between the National Academy of Sciences and the Department of the Navy since the Academy's creation in 1863. To commemorate this special anniversary, Naval Studies Board 40th Anniversary provides an overview of the history, mission, and accomplishments of the Board. In the coming years, the Naval Studies Board will continue to serve as a source of independent, long-range, scientific and technical planning advice for the nation's naval forces. It will also work to ensure that the relationships between the operational, science, engineering, and technical communities remain as strong and productive as ever to ensure that progress continues in areas most critical to meeting future naval forces' needs.

Surprise has always been an element of warfare, but the return of great power competition—and the high-level threat that it poses—gives urgency to thinking about surprise now. Because the future is highly uncertain, and great powers have not fought each other for over 70 years, surprise is highly likely in a future great power conflict. This study, therefore, examines potential surprises in a great power conflict, particularly in a conflict’s initial stages when the interaction of adversaries’ technologies, prewar plans, and military doctrines first becomes manifest. It is not an attempt to project the future. Rather, it seeks to do the opposite: explore the range of possible future conflicts to see where surprises might lurk.

Tells the story of the growing Chinese Navy - The People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) - and its expanding capabilities, evolving roles and military implications for the USA. Divided into four thematic sections, this special collection of essays surveys and analyzes the most important aspects of China's navel modernization.

This volume describes how technological and geo-political trends are rapidly transforming maritime affairs. A mix of original and previously published material, this volume describes how the 21st-century great power competition is changing the face of naval operations in general, and U.S. Navy operations in the Western Pacific in particular. The rise of an assertive China and its new anti-access and area-denial capabilities threaten the aircraft carrier-based maritime dominance of the U.S. Navy. Military and political trends in the Western Pacific and beyond suggest that the world is encountering a pivotal moment when existing weapons, tactics, and operations might be rendered obsolete by techno-strategic change. This volume considers these developments from three perspectives by describing: (1) the techno-strategic setting; (2) the institutional constraints that impede the ability of the U.S. Navy to respond to these changes; and (3) a new approach to naval force planning and strategy to cope with these developments. The volume culminates in a discussion of sophisticated strategies and operational concepts that position the U.S. Navy and its maritime allies and partners to prevail in today’s techno-strategic churn. This book will be of much interest to students of naval policy, strategic studies, Asia-Pacific politics, and International Relations.