The war in Afghanistan has been a major policy commitment and central undertaking of the Canadian state since 2001: Canada has been a leading force in the war, and has spent hundreds of millions of dollars on aid and reconstruction. After a decade of conflict, however, there is considerable debate about the efficacy of the mission, as well as calls to reassess Canada's role in the conflict. An authoritative and strongly analytical work, Empire's Ally provides a much-needed critical investigation into one of the most polarizing events of our time. This collection draws on new primary evidence – including government documents, think tank and NGO reports, international media files, and interviews in Afghanistan – to provide context for Canadian foreign policy, to offer critical perspectives on the war itself, and to link the conflict to broader issues of political economy, international relations, and Canada's role on the world stage. Spanning academic and public debates, Empire's Ally opens a new line of argument on why the mission has entered a stage of crisis.

In 2007-08, Dr. Ray Wiss, a former infantry officer, served with the Canadian Forces at forward operating bases in Khandahar's Panjwayi valley, the area experiencing the most intense combat in Afghanistan. He spent more time in the combat area than any other Canadian physician, and his successful first book, FOB Doc, was the diary of his time "outside the wire" during that tour of duty. Captain Wiss' experience in Afghanistan convinced him that this conflict was a rare example of a moral war. When asked to return for an even longer tour of duty in the combat zone, he readily agreed. Once again, he kept a diary, writing with passion about the efforts, sacrifices and achievements of those Canadians who served with such distinction. Illustrated with over 100 colour photographs, A Line in the Sand tells us about virtually every kind of soldier fighting in Afghanistan: the bomb technician, the engineer, the combat medic, the "grunt" as well as about the Afghans, from whom we are seemingly so different yet with whom we share so much. It is an impassioned insider's view of the war in Afghanistan and a convincing testament to why it matters.

When the Canadian government committed forces to join the military mission in Afghanistan following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, little did it foresee that this decision would involve Canada in a war-riven country for over a decade. The Politics of War explores how, as the mission became increasingly unpopular, Canadian politicians across the political spectrum began to use it to score points against their opponents. This was “politics” with a vengeance. Through historical analysis of the public record and interviews with officials, Jean-Christophe Boucher and Kim Richard Nossal show how the Canadian government sought to frame the engagement in Afghanistan as a “mission” rather than what it was – a war. They examine the efforts of successive governments to convince Canadians of the rightness of Canada’s engagement, the parliamentary politics that resulted from the increasing politicization of the mission, and the impact of public opinion on Canada’s involvement. This contribution to the field of Canadian foreign policy demonstrates how much of Canada’s war in Afghanistan was shaped by the vagaries of domestic politics and political gamesmanship.

From the Canadian in charge of the joint military command in Kandahar Province in Afghanistan, this is the real on-the-ground story of one of NATO's bloodiest, most decisive and misunderstood operations: The battle of Panjwayi, the defining moment of "Operation Medusa." In the summer of 2006, David Fraser was the Canadian general in charge of NATO's Regional Command South, a territory spanning six Afghan provinces surrounding the Arghandab Valley. Birthplace of the Taliban decades earlier, this fertile region had since become Afghanistan's most deadly turf. It would soon turn deadlier still. Advised in the night by his intelligence officers that the Taliban had secretly amassed for a full-scale military assault, Fraser knew it would fall to him, his Canadians and their allies to avoid the wholesale slaughter of NATO troops, keep the Taliban from laying siege to Kandahar and restore control of the south of the country to a newly formed, democratic Afghan government. The odds were solidy against Fraser's forces. The Taliban knew every millimetre of their own terrain. During the months of secret manoeuvres they had stocked every farmhouse, school, grape hut and tunnel with weapons and ammunition. They had drilled Soviet-era landmines into all of the marijuana and poppy fields, and dug IEDs into every roadway. Protected from detection by corrupt officials, their sophisticated warfare schools had successfully readied an army of zealous fighters to attack and fight to the death. And now their top commanders were poised to launch decisive military operations against freshly arrived troops who had never seen combat. The bloodiest battle in NATO's history was about to begin.

No Lack of Courage is the story of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization's first battle. It is a revealing account of Operation Medusa, the largely Canadian action from 1 to 17 September 2006, to dislodge a heavily entrenched Taliban force in the Pashmul district of Afghanistan's Kandahar Province. At stake, according to senior Afghan politicians and NATO military commanders, was nothing less than the very existence of the reconstituted state of Afghanistan, as well as the NATO alliance itself. In a bitterly fought conflict that lasted more than two weeks, Canadian, Afghan, and Coalition troops defeated the dug-in enemy forces and chased them from the Pashmul area. In the end, the brunt of the fighting fell on the Canadians, and the operation that saved Afghanistan exacted a great cost. However, the battle also demonstrated that Canada had shed its peacekeeping mythology and was once more ready to commit troops deliberately to combat. Moreover, it revealed yet again that Canadian soldiers have no lack of courage.

This book reveals tough realities about how public servants and politicians dither and avoid hard decisions in Ottawa and about how our senior public service needs a deep shake-up.

"Building on interviews with military officers, civilian officials, and politicians, Saideman shows how key actors in Canada's political system, including the prime minister, the political parties, and parliament, responded to the demands of a costly and controversial mission. Some adapted well; others adapted poorly or--worse yet--in ways that protected careers but harmed the mission itself."-