The Global Financial Crisis overturned decades of received wisdom on how financial markets work, and how best to keep them in check. Since then a wave of reform and re-regulation has crashed over banks and markets. Financial firms are regulated as never before. But have these measures been successful, and do they go far enough? In this smart new polemic, former central banker and financial regulator, Howard Davies, responds with a resounding ‘no’. The problems at the heart of the financial crisis remain. There is still no effective co-ordination of international monetary policy. The financial sector is still too big and, far from protecting the economy and the tax payer, recent government legislation is exposing both to even greater risk. To address these key challenges, Davies offers a radical alternative manifesto of reforms to restore market discipline and create a safer economic future for us all.

In reaction to the international financial crisis of 2007, a network of social scientists from seven countries analyzed the various changes in the regulation of financial markets, and this book presents their results. The articles published herein show patterns of institutional change that were triggered by the economic crisis on different political levels, of their implementation and effectiveness, as well as their results. An indispensible tool for political scientists, Crisis and Control contributes significantly to the theory of institutional change.

"In the wake of the global financial crisis that began in 2008, offers a systematic overview of recent developments in regulatory frameworks in advanced and emerging-market countries, outlining challenges to improving regulation, markets, and access in developing economies"--Provided by publisher.

Financial services regulation tends to be costly and unsympathetic to consumers. This book examines why that is the case and proposes and regulatory regime that would be more efficient and more responsive to consumer interests.

Exploring issues from big-data to robotics, this volume is the first to comprehensively examine the regulatory implications of AI technology.

The Global Financial Crisis overturned decades of received wisdomon how financial markets work, and how best to keep them in check.Since then a wave of reform and re-regulation has crashed overbanks and markets. Financial firms are regulated as neverbefore. But have these measures been successful, and do they go farenough? In this smart new polemic, former central banker andfinancial regulator, Howard Davies, responds with a resounding‘no’. The problems at the heart of the financial crisisremain. There is still no effective co-ordination of internationalmonetary policy. The financial sector is still too big and,far from protecting the economy and the tax payer, recentgovernment legislation is exposing both to even greater risk. To address these key challenges, Davies offers a radicalalternative manifesto of reforms to restore market discipline andcreate a safer economic future for us all.

Financial services, financial firms and financial markets are regulated to a greater extent than most other products and services. In this radical book Professor George Benston provides a comprehensive critique of the justifications for financial services regulation, and provides an innovative proposal for reform. Executive Summary: Financial services, financial firms and financial markets are regulated to a greater extent than most other products and services. Financial service regulation goes back centuries. It provides benefits to governments (for example, from direct and indirect taxation of banks) and to regulated financial institutions (which gain where entry is restricted). Consumer protection is a common reason given for financial regulation. But consumers in financial markets are probably less subject to fraud, misrepresentation, discrimination and information asymmetry than consumers of other products. Concern about 'negative externalities' (costs born by others) is another argument for regulation. However, on examination it is clear there are few genuine externalities. Regulations on externality grounds is justified only for financial institutions which hold government-insured deposits; for insurance companies which provide government-mandated non-contracting third party insurance ) for instance, for cars); and for companies which underwrite long-term life insurance and annuities. Financial regulation incurs costs, borne by consumers and taxpayers, which probably exceed the benefits they receive. There are substantial unintended costs (such as reduced diversification of financial institutions and the absence of less costly and more innovative products because of restrictions on entry to financial markets). An 'optimal' regulatory system' for banks would involve substantial capital requirements, periodic reporting of assets, liabilities and capital and a 'structured early intervention' system for the authorities. For government-mandated third party liability insurance, life insurance and annuities, insurance companies should be subject to capital requirements similar to those for banks. If governments wish to protect consumers of financial products the best procedure is to establish an Ombudsman to which consumers who feel they have been mistreated can go. The proposed regulatory system 'would be almost costless to taxpayers, the regulated companies and consumers of their products and services.' Compared with existing regimes, it has the great advantage of not restricting entry to financial markets nor the introduction of new products