This history of American armored warfare through the twentieth century “boasts some of the best available analysis of mobile war as practiced by the US" (Publishers Weekly). Camp Colt to Desert Storm is the only complete history of US armed forces from the advent of the tank in battle during World War I to the campaign to drive Iraq out of Kuwait in 1991. With comprehensive analysis, it traces the development of doctrine for operations at the tactical and operational levels of war and assesses how this fighting doctrine translates into the development of equipment. Beginning with the Army’s first tank school, Camp Colt in Gettysburg, Pennsylvania, this volume examines how armored warfare effected and was influenced by the evolution of twentieth-century combat. The tank revolutionized the battlefield in World War II. In the years since, developments such as nuclear weapons, ballistic missiles, computer assisted firing, and satellite navigation have continued to transform armored warfare’s role in combat.

The tank revolutionized the battlefield in World War II. In the years since, additional technological developments—including nuclear weapons, ballistic missiles, computer assisted firing, and satellite navigation—have continued to transform the face of combat. The only complete history of U.S. armed forces from the advent of the tank in battle during World War I to the campaign to drive Iraq out of Kuwait in 1991, Camp Colt to Desert Storm traces the development of doctrine for operations at the tactical and operational levels of war and translates this fighting doctrine into the development of equipment.

The first full study of the US Army’s World War I Tank Corps—and how it inspired future American generals. Tanks caused havoc among the Germans when they first appeared on the battlefields of Europe in 1917. These metal monsters broke up the trench warfare stalemate and thus hastened the armistice. Because of production delays and political maneuvering, no American tanks made it into the war, and American tankers had to use French machines instead. But a new breed of army officers, of which Eisenhower and Patton are the most famous, saw the promise of this new technology and staked their careers on it. Ike trained the first generation of tankers at Camp Colt at Gettysburg, and Patton led them into battle in France. Dale E. Wilson, a Vietnam veteran and former West Point history professor, brings these early days of the Tank Corps to life. Using eyewitness accounts from the archives at the Army War College and elsewhere, he details the design and building of the first tanks, the training of crews, the monstrous problem of transport in an age when roads were built for horse-drawn carriages, the evolution of armored combat doctrine, and the three great battles in which tanks revolutionized modern warfare: St. Mihiel, Meuse-Argonne, and St. Quentin. “Breathes life into the early days of the Tank Corps by drawing from extensive research, including firsthand accounts.” —Toy Soldier & Model Figure

The U.S. Cavalry, which began in the nineteenth century as little more than a mounted reconnaissance and harrying force, underwent intense growing pains with the rapid technological developments of the twentieth century. From its tentative beginnings during World War I, the eventual conversion of the traditional horse cavalry to a mechanized branch is arguably one of the greatest military transformations in history. Through Mobility We Conquer recounts the evolution and development of the U.S. Army’s modern mechanized cavalry and the doctrine necessary to use it effectively. The book also explores the debates over how best to use cavalry and how these discussions evolved during the first half of the century. During World War I, the first cavalry theorist proposed combining arms coordination with a mechanized force as an answer to the stalemate on the Western Front. Hofmann brings the story through the next fifty years, when a new breed of cavalrymen became cold war warriors as the U.S. Constabulary was established as an occupation security-police force. Having reviewed thousands of official records and manuals, military journals, personal papers, memoirs, and oral histories—many of which were only recently declassified—George F. Hofmann now presents a detailed study of the doctrine, equipment, structure, organization, tactics, and strategy of U.S. mechanized cavalry during the changing international dynamics of the first half of the twentieth century. Illustrated with dozens of photographs, maps, and charts, Through Mobility We Conquer examines how technology revolutionized U.S. forces in the twentieth century and demonstrates how perhaps no other branch of the military underwent greater changes during this time than the cavalry.

This book recounts the history of the US Special Operations Forces (SOF) after the failure of Operation Eagle Claw in 1980, examining the events that led to and followed a series of organizational and operational reforms in the American military system. Operation Eagle Claw’s damage to America’s image was a critical moment in American miliary history that extended beyond the exclusive purview of the military. The establishment of the Special Operations Command in 1987 would mark the only time to date that Congress has ever directed the executive branch to establish a military command. This book surveys the decades leading up to and proceeding Operation Eagle Claw, beginning with the SOF in the years after Vietnam and ending with the SOF’s performance in Operations Just Cause and Desert Storm. With thoughtful analysis and supplementary primary source documents, From Desert One to Desert Storm: Operation Eagle Claw as a Critical Movement is a useful resource for courses on American military history, the Cold War, and the United States and the Middle East.

This volume examines the thirty-year transformation in American military thought and defence strategy that spanned from 1973 through 2003.

An analysis of the performance of medium-armored forces across the range of military operations since World War I yields insights with significant implications for U.S. Army decisions about fielding these units in the future. The authors find that medium-armored forces fare poorly against competent, heavily armored opponents, and that the Stryker and Future Combat Systems will not fill the void created by the retirement of the M551 Sheridan.