In recent decades, the development of very large buyers in previously more fragmented industries makes buyer power a recurrent issue in competition law cases. Buyer power can simultaneously be a boon and a menace for markets and competition. It may provide a countervailing force to enhanced seller power, and unless it leads to successive power, it can lead to lower prices in the downstream market. However, buyer power may also be socially detrimental, when it is not in the presence of strong seller power. It may undermine the long-term viability of suppliers and their willingness for innovation. Thus, the impact of buyer power in the economy is ambiguous. Analysis of buyer power should be on a case-by-case basis and involve an assessment of the likely distortion in both the upstream and the downstream markets. There should be no presumption that buyer power per se is infringing competition law.This article will focus both on analysing countervailing buyer power and anticompetitive buyer power (or buyer market power). The article will address the issue of market definition and analyse the measures for assessing buyer power. It will also analyse cases involving buyer power under Articles 81 and 82 of the EC Treaty as well as under the European Control Merger Regulation (ECMR). This article has been shortlisted for the 1st World Competition Young Writer Award.

This book provides a comprehensive overview of the economic and competition policy issues that buyer power creates. Drawing on economic analysis and cases from around the world, it explains why conventional seller side standards and analyses do not provide an adequate framework for responding to the problems that buyer power can create. Based on evidence that abuse of buyer power is a serious problem for the competitive process, the book evaluates the potential for competition law to deal directly with the problems of abuse either through conventional competition law or special rules aimed at abusive conduct. The author also examines controls over buying groups and mergers as potentially more useful responses to risks created by undue buyer power.

The trend of retail concentration across the European Union has raised concerns on the buyer power that retailers may have in the relation with their suppliers. Following calls that the changing nature of competition demands a change in EU competition policy, this book investigates whether there is a 'gap' in current EU competition law concerning the potential harmful effects of buyer power from an economic efficiency perspective. Using a Law and Economics approach, the book identifies the potential concerns and assesses whether they can be addressed under the existing rules. While some critical comments are in place with regard to the consumer welfare standard that is applied, the book's analysis does not indicate that the current substantive legal framework of EU competition law is unfit to address the (potential) harmful effects of buyer power. *** Librarians: ebook available on ProQuest and EBSCO [Subject: EU Law, Competition Law, Commercial Law, Trade Law, Law and Economics]

The thesis presents a comprehensive and cross-sectional discussion of buyer power to determine the legal regulation of buyer conducts under EU competition law. It focuses on four main research areas: understanding buyer power; analysing the legal treatment given to the exertion of anticompetitive buyer power under EU competition law; exploring theories of harm applicable to buyer power abuse, and ascertaining the welfare standard employed for buyer power cases.

Buyer Power in EU Competition Law by Ignacio Herrera Anchustegui presents a comprehensive and cross-sectional discussion of buyer power. This analysis helps to have a better understanding of the legal regulation of buying conducts under EU Competition law. The study focuses on four main research areas: understanding buyer power; analysing the legal treatment given to the exertion of anticompetitive buyer power under EU competition law; exploring theories of harm applicable to buyer power abuse, and ascertaining the welfare standard employed for buyer power cases. The author compares the treatment of such conduct under selected EU Member States and US antitrust law, and contrasts the outcomes with the EU competition law solutions to present a contribution that is novel and valuable due to its approach, depth, and scope.

Although it is commonly assumed that consumers benefit from the application of competition law, this is not necessarily always the case. Economic efficiency is paramount; thus, competition law in Europe and antitrust law in the United States are designed primarily to protect business competitors (and in Europe to promote market integration), and it is only incidentally that such law may also serve to protect consumers. That is the essential starting point of this penetrating critique. The author explores the extent to which US antitrust law and EC competition law adequately safeguard consumer interests. Specifically, he shows how the two jurisdictions have gone about evaluating collusive practices, abusive conduct by dominant firms and merger activity, and how the policies thus formed have impacted upon the promotion of consumer interests. He argues that unless consumer interests are directly and specifically addressed in the assessment process, maximization of consumer welfare is not sufficiently achieved. Using rigorous analysis he develops legal arguments that can accomplish such goals as the following: replace the economic theory of 'consumer welfare' with a principle of consumer well-being; build consumer benefits into specific areas of competition policy; assess competition cases so that income distribution effects are more beneficial to consumers; and control mergers in such a way that efficiencies are passed directly to consumers. The author argues that, in the last analysis, the promotion of consumer well-being should be the sole or at least the primary goal of any antitrust regime. Lawyers and scholars interested in the application and development and reform of competition law and policy will welcome this book. They will find not only a fresh approach to interpretation and practice in their field - comparing and contrasting two major systems of competition law - but also an extremely lucid analysis of the various economic arguments used to highlight the consumer welfare enhancing or welfare reducing effects of business practices.

Competition authorities use ex post evaluation of enforcement decisions to help determine if an intervention (or non-intervention) has achieved its objectives – and, if not, the reasons it failed to do so – thus allowing for improvement in the design and use of techniques used in the analysis underpinning the decision. In this essential volume, expert contributors use this procedure to provide a neutral and extensive assessment of cases that have significantly shaped European Union (EU) competition law enforcement. With in-depth analysis of foundational cases of EU competition law and the methodologies that have been developed over time to predict how enforcement decisions will affect competition, for each case the authors respond thoroughly to such questions as the following: Did the decision have an impact on the affected market? Did it improve consumer or social welfare? With the benefit of hindsight, were the factual assertions true? Were all the relevant theories of harm (and efficiency justifications) properly investigated? Was the decision able to deter similar anticompetitive behaviour? Did the decision provide clear guidance on which types of conduct should be deemed illegal? Industries covered include information technology (the Microsoft cases), payment cards (the Visa Europe 2010 Commitments Decision), pharmaceuticals, and conditional rebates (Michelin I, Michelin II and BA/Virgin). Also investigated are the role of buyer power in concentration cases and the relative strength of competition law enforcement versus regulation, where appropriate. In its accumulation of evidence from individual cases that have gradually improved our ability to grasp the connections between policy choices and the outcomes they lead to, this matchless volume has no peers. It constitutes an invaluable resource for competition authorities in performing ex post evaluations and will be welcomed by practitioners and academics concerned with European competition law.