After the ousting of former Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak in February 2011, much debate surrounded the reasons for the former regime's longevity and its collapse. Here, Safinaz El Tarouty provides an original contribution to the study of authoritarianism in Egypt by focusing on the role of businessmen in authoritarian survival. As the regime intensified neoliberal economic reforms that led to social deprivation and frustration among increasing numbers of Egyptian citizens, they co-opted businessmen in order to defuse challenges and buttress the regime, constructing a new political economy of authoritarianism. Extending the existing literature on clientelism, El Tarouty creates a typology of regime-businessmen relations to describe the multiple mechanisms of co-option in the context of economic liberalization. Ultimately, though, these businessmen proved too narrow a constituency to provide legitimacy to the regime and, in fact, formed one of the reasons for its collapse.

The nature of personal authoritarian rule in Egypt has remained virtually unchanged for over five decades. Maye Kassem traces the shaping of contemporary Egyptian politics, considering why authoritarian rule has been so resilient and assessing why it hassurvived.

Examines how and why the Mubarak regime managed to maintain control of Egypt for 30 years despite an ongoing fiscal crisis, and considers the relationship between public finance, politics, and the possibility for social and political change.

A conceptually rich, historically informed study of the contested politics emerging out of decades of authoritarian neoliberalism in Egypt.

This book addresses two important matters of current concern to Middle East scholars: firstly, the nature of the Egyptian state and society and the interactive process between them and secondly, how change, which would finally lead to development, can be initiated. The book argues that the Egyptian case represents a weak authoritarian state, which through its coercive and repressive policies towards various societal forces, political parties, professional associations and organisations and individuals, creates a weak society. Individual behaviour in urban and rural communities, sometimes viewed as signs of the strength of societal forces, is seen here as a symptom of a weak and fragmented society. The existence of a weak society in turn impedes government objectives and hinders the implementation of developmental policies and programmes, further weakening the state. This being the case, change has to be initiated externally in both the political and economic spheres.