The first detailed description and analysis of the European Union Emissions Trading Scheme.

A leading economist develops a supply-side approach to fighting climate change that encourages resource owners to leave more of their fossil carbon underground. The Earth is getting warmer. Yet, as Hans-Werner Sinn points out in this provocative book, the dominant policy approach—which aims to curb consumption of fossil energy—has been ineffective. Despite policy makers' efforts to promote alternative energy, impose emission controls on cars, and enforce tough energy-efficiency standards for buildings, the relentlessly rising curve of CO2 output does not show the slightest downward turn. Some proposed solutions are downright harmful: cultivating crops to make biofuels not only contributes to global warming but also uses resources that should be devoted to feeding the world's hungry. In The Green Paradox, Sinn proposes a new, more pragmatic approach based not on regulating the demand for fossil fuels but on controlling the supply. The owners of carbon resources, Sinn explains, are pre-empting future regulation by accelerating the production of fossil energy while they can. This is the “Green Paradox”: expected future reduction in carbon consumption has the effect of accelerating climate change. Sinn suggests a supply-side solution: inducing the owners of carbon resources to leave more of their wealth underground. He proposes the swift introduction of a “Super-Kyoto” system—gathering all consumer countries into a cartel by means of a worldwide, coordinated cap-and-trade system supported by the levying of source taxes on capital income—to spoil the resource owners' appetite for financial assets. Only if we can shift our focus from local demand to worldwide supply policies for reducing carbon emissions, Sinn argues, will we have a chance of staving off climate disaster.

The Scheme is one of the Government's policy measures designed to help meet its commitments under the 1997 Kyoto Protocol to secure significant reductions in UK greenhouse gas emissions, in order to address the causes of global warming. Under the Scheme, companies are issued with allowances equal to their target emissions for the year, and at the end of the year must hold enough allowances to cover its actual emissions. A company can choose to reduce its actual emissions below its target (enabling it to sell excess allowances to other companies, or to save them for use in future years), to meet its target, or to buy extra allowances to cover any emissions in excess of its target amount. Following on from a National Audit Office report on this topic (HCP 517, session 2003-04; ISBN 0102927804) published in April 2004, the Committee's report examines the risk management procedures associated with the Scheme, the way baselines for greenhouse emissions were set, the effectiveness of the auction and the market, and the wider benefits to the UK economy.

An authoritative overview of the requirements and costs of monitoring, reporting and verifying emissions from industry to regional and national levels.

The 1997 Kyoto Conference introduced emissions trading as a policy instrument for climate protection. Bringing together scholars in the fields of economics, political science and law, this book, which was originally published in 2005, provides a description, analysis and evaluation of different aspects of emissions trading as an instrument to control greenhouse gases. The authors analyse theoretical aspects of regulatory instruments for climate policy, provide an overview of US experience with market-based instruments, draw lessons from trading schemes for the control of greenhouse gases, and discuss options for emissions trading in climate policy. They also highlight the background of climate policy and instrument choice in the US and Europe and the foundation of systems in Europe, particularly the EU's directive for a CO2 emissions trading system.

Emissions trading schemes figure prominently among policy instruments used to tackle the problem of climate change, and the European Union Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS), begun in 2005, is the largest cap-and-trade market so far established. In the EU ETS, firms regulated by the scheme are provided with emissions allowances (each a one-time right to emit one ton of greenhouse gases) and can sell their unused allowances to firms that have higher rates of emissions. In this volume, leading economists offer empirical and theoretical perspectives on the early phases of the EU ETS implementation. The contributors discuss the features of the EU ETS market; and regulatory uncertainty stemming from rule changes; the political economy context of the trading scheme, including allowance allocation and the influence of lobbying on abatement decisions; the coexistence of such overlapping instruments for climate policy as pricing and taxation; the relationship between spot and futures markets for allowances, and firms' responses to various features of the EU ETS, including fluctuating allowance prices, free allocation, and links to the Kyoto process. They show that, although the basic theory behind emissions permit markets is straightforward, design features, market structure, and interactions with other policy instruments can influence the efficiency of the scheme.--