First Published in 2004. Throughout the half-century between the Crimean War and the outbreak of the First World War, few countries confronted successive British governments with the complexity of problems posed by the Ottoman Empire. This study attempts to attain three main objectives. The first is an analysis of the growth and development of British policy at two levels: the Embassy and the Foreign Office. The second is an assessment of the influence of various embassies on decision-making in the Foreign Office. The third is an estimate of the influence of European and Imperial considerations upon the formulation of Britain's policy towards the Ottoman Empire.

First Published in 2004. Throughout the half-century between the Crimean War and the outbreak of the First World War, few countries confronted successive British governments with the complexity of problems posed by the Ottoman Empire. This study attempts to attain three main objectives. The first is an analysis of the growth and development of British policy at two levels: the Embassy and the Foreign Office. The second is an assessment of the influence of various embassies on decision-making in the Foreign Office. The third is an estimate of the influence of European and Imperial considerations upon the formulation of Britain's policy towards the Ottoman Empire.

Nearly fourteen million people died during the First World War. But why, and for what reason? Already many contemporaries saw the Great War as a "pointless carnage" (Pope Benedict XV, 1917). Was there a point, at least in the eyes of the political and military decision makers? How did they justify the losses, and why did they not try to end the war earlier? In this volume twelve international specialists analyses and compares the hopes and expectations of the political and military leaders of the main belligerent countries and of their respective societies. It shows that the war aims adopted during the First World War were not, for the most part, the cause of the conflict, but a reaction to it, an attempt to give the tragedy a purpose - even if the consequence was to oblige the belligerents to go on fighting until victory. The volume tries to explain why - and for what - the contemporaries thought that they had to fight the Great War.

Why did the Ottoman Empire enter the First World War in late October 1914, months after the war's devastations had become clear? Were its leaders 'simple-minded,' 'below-average' individuals, as the doyen of Turkish diplomatic history has argued? Or, as others have claimed, did the Ottomans enter the war because War Minister Enver Pasha, dictating Ottoman decisions, was in thrall to the Germans and to his own expansionist dreams? Based on previously untapped Ottoman and European sources, Mustafa Aksakal's dramatic study challenges this consensus. It demonstrates that responsibility went far beyond Enver, that the road to war was paved by the demands of a politically interested public, and that the Ottoman leadership sought the German alliance as the only way out of a web of international threats and domestic insecurities, opting for an escape whose catastrophic consequences for the empire and seismic impact on the Middle East are felt even today.

All too often Albania has been considered a relatively minor player in late-19th and early-20th century history. By contrast, this book highlights the significance of this nation and the Albanian question at this time through a detailed analysis of the relationship between Albania, Britain and the Ottoman Empire from 1876 to 1914. Making use of a wide range of archival source materials – some of which are published here in English for the first time – this book explores British foreign policy towards the development of the Albanian national movement and parallel demise of the Ottoman Empire. In doing so it illuminates the objectives of the British government, as well as shining a spotlight on the public opinion of both the British people towards Albanian nationalism and on the reaction of the Albanians towards the British diplomatic position. By looking through such a unique lens, here Daut Dauti is able to provide fresh insight into why the Albanians were not supported by the Great Powers in their national quest in the way that other Balkan countries were and draws significant new conclusions on British, Balkan and Ottoman relations. As such, this nuanced study is vital reading for all scholars interested in modern Albanian history, turn-of-the-century British international relations and the fall of the Ottoman Empire more broadly.

Shortly after the end of the First World War, General Sir George Macdonagh, wartime director of British Military Intelligence, revealed that Lord Allenby's victory in Palestine had never been in doubt because of the success of his intelligence service. Seventy-five years later this book explains Macdonagh's statement. Sheffy also adopts a novel approach to traditional heroes of the campaign such as T E Lawrence.

This collection examines the role of Britain in the Islamic world. It offers insight into the social, political, diplomatic, and military issues that arose over the centuries of British involvement in the region, particularly focusing on the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. British involvement can be separated into three phases: Discovery, Colonization and Decolonization, and Post-Empire. Decisions made by individual traders and high governmental officials are examined to understand how Great Britain impacted the Islamic world through these periods and, conversely, how events in the Islamic world influenced British decisions within the empire, in protection of the empire, and in the wake of the empire. The essays consider early perceptions of Islam, the role of trade, British-Ottoman relations, and colonial rule and control through religion. They explore British influence in a number of countries, including Somalia, Egypt, Palestine, Iran, Iraq, the Gulf States, India, and beyond. The final part of the book addresses the lasting impact of British imperial rule in the Islamic world.