This historical analysis of the problems faced by the British navy during the War of 1739-1748 also sheds light on the character, limitations, and potentialities of eighteenth-century British administration. Originally published in 1965. The Princeton Legacy Library uses the latest print-on-demand technology to again make available previously out-of-print books from the distinguished backlist of Princeton University Press. These editions preserve the original texts of these important books while presenting them in durable paperback and hardcover editions. The goal of the Princeton Legacy Library is to vastly increase access to the rich scholarly heritage found in the thousands of books published by Princeton University Press since its founding in 1905.

Recent work on the growth of British naval power during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries has emphasised developments in the political, constitutional and financial infrastructure of the British state. Naval Power and British Culture, 1760-1850 takes these considerations one step further, and examines the relationship of administrative culture within government bureaucracy to contemporary perceptions of efficiency in the period 1760-1850. By administrative culture is meant the ideas, attitudes, structures, practices and mores of public employees. Inevitably these changed over time and this shift is examined as the naval departments passed through times of crisis and peace. Focusing on the transition in the culture of government employees in the naval establishments in London - in the Navy and Victualling Offices - as well as the victualling yard towns along the Thames and Medway, Naval Power and British Culture, 1760-1850 concerns itself with attitudes at all levels of the organisation. Yet it is concerned above all with those whose views and conduct are seldom reported, the clerks, artificers, secretaries and commissioners; those employees of government who lived in local communities and took their work experience back home with them. As such, this book illuminates not only the employees of government, but also the society which surrounded and impinged upon naval establishments, and the reciprocal nature of their attitudes and influences.

Shows how the system of supply was perfected during the later part of the Napoleonic Wars, enabling fleets to stay at sea on a permanent basis. After the Battle of Trafalgar, the navy continued to be the major arm of British strategy. Decades of practice and refinement had rendered it adept at executing operations - fighting battles, blockading and convoying - across theglobe. And yet, as late as 1807, fleets were forced from their stations due to an ineffective provisioning system. The Transformation of British Naval Strategy shows how sweeping administrative reforms enacted between 1808and 1812 established a highly-effective logistical system, changing an ineffective supply system into one which successfully enabled a fleet to remain on station for as long as was required. James Davey examines the logistical support provided for fleets sent to Northern Europe during the Napoleonic War and shows how this new supply system successfully transformed naval operations, enabling the navy to pursue crucial objectives of national importance, protect essential exports and imports and attack the economies of the Napoleonic Empire. The Transformation of British Naval Strategy is a detailed study of national policy, administrative and political reform and strategic viability. It delves into the nature of the British state, its relationship with the private sector and its ability to reform itself in a time of war. Bureaucratic restructuring represented the last stage in a century-long process of logistical improvement. As a result of the reforms, the navy was able to conduct operations beyond the realms of possibility even twenty years earlier and saw the reach of its power transformed. Military and Napoleonic historians will find this book invaluable. JAMES DAVEY is Research Curator at the National Maritime Museum and Visiting Lecturer at the University of Greenwich, where he teaches British naval history.

Explores networks of lawyers, legislators and litigators, and how they shape legal development in Britain and the world.

Considers naval leadership and management very widely, moving beyond a focus on leading admirals. Many works on naval history ascribe success to the special qualities of individual leaders, Nelson being the prime example. This book in contrast moves away from focusing on Nelson and other leading individuals to explore more fully how naval leadership worked in the context of a large, complex, globally-capable institution. It puts forward important original scholarship around four main themes: the place of the hero in naval leadership; organisational friction in matters of command; the role of management capability in the exercise of naval power; and the evolution of management and technical training in the Royal Navy. Besides providing much new, interesting material for naval and maritime historians, the book also offers important insights for management and leadership specialists more generally. HELEN DOE is a Fellow of the Centre for Maritime Historical Studies, University of Exeter and author of Enterprising Women and Shipping (Boydell, 2009). RICHARD HARDING is Professor of Organisational History at the University of Westminster and author of The Emergence of Britain's Global Naval Supremacy (Boydell, 2010), Amphibious Warfare in the Eighteenth Century (Royal Historical Society, 1991) and six other books. Contributors: GARETH COLE, MIKE FARQUHARSON-ROBERTS, MARY JONES, ROGER KNIGHT, ROGER MORRISS, ELINOR ROMANS, DAVID J. STARKEY, PETER WARD, OLIVER WALTON, BRITT ZERBE.

An analysis of how Britain developed a superb supply system for the navy, with beneficial consequences both for victory in war and for Britain's economic development.

This volume investigates the shape and the development of scholarly and popular opinion about the British Empire over the centuries.