In the aftermath of World War I there was furious agitation throughout Islam against the dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire. Coupled with the powerful effect of the principle of self-determination, British indifference to Muslim sentiments gave rise to militant nationalism in Islam-which became de facto anti-Western. This detailed and convincing account describes British indecisiveness, policy contradictions, and how militant nationalism was aggravated by the Greek invasion of Smyrna and its ambition to create a Hellenic Empire in Anatolia with Britain's connivance. Immediately after World War I there was a fair chance of mutual coexistence and good relations between Arabs and Jews in Palestine. This possibility was nipped in the bud by the military administration (1918-1920) responsible for the anti-Jewish riots in Jerusalem in April 1920. High Commissioner Herbert Samuel supported the Arab extremists in his misguided policy, and complicated the situation further. The appointment of Hajj Amin al-Husseini to the exalted post of Grand Mufti of Jerusalem, and subsequently to the presidency of the Supreme Moslem Council of the Palestinians, proved fatal to Arab-Jewish relations and to the possibility of peace. As Friedman shows, the British administration of Palestine bears a considerable share of responsibility for the Arab-Zionist conflict in Palestine. Against this diplomatic background Arab-Jewish hostilities thrived, with consequences that endure today.

In the aftermath of World War I there was furious agitation throughout Islam against the dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire. Coupled with the powerful effect of the principle of self-determination, British indifference to Muslim sentiments gave rise to militant nationalism in Islam—which became de facto anti-Western. This detailed and convincing account describes British indecisiveness, policy contradictions, and how militant nationalism was aggravated by the Greek invasion of Smyrna and its ambition to create a Hellenic Empire in Anatolia with Britain’s connivance. Immediately after World War I there was a fair chance of mutual coexistence and good relations between Arabs and Jews in Palestine. This possibility was nipped in the bud by the military administration (1918-1920) responsible for the anti-Jewish riots in Jerusalem in April 1920. High Commissioner Herbert Samuel supported the Arab extremists in his misguided policy, and complicated the situation further. The appointment of Hajj Amin al-Husseini to the exalted post of Grand Mufti of Jerusalem, and subsequently to the presidency of the Supreme Moslem Council of the Palestinians, proved fatal to Arab-Jewish relations and to the possibility of peace. As Friedman shows, the British administration of Palestine bears a considerable share of responsibility for the Arab-Zionist conflict in Palestine. Against this diplomatic background Arab-Jewish hostilities thrived, with consequences that endure today.

This book studies the unprecedented decision of 23 June 2016, which saw the UK electorate vote to leave the EU, turning David Cameron’s referendum gamble into a great miscalculation. It analyzes the renegotiation that preceded the vote, before examining the campaign itself so as to understand why the government’s strategy for winning foundered. It then evaluates the implications that this decision has for the country’s international relations as well as for its domestic politics. The author’s final reflections are on the political philosophy of Brexit, which is founded on a critique of representative democracy. Yet the use of direct democracy to trigger EU withdrawal leaves the supposedly sovereign British people at an impasse. For it is up to the people’s representatives to negotiate the terms of Brexit. By engaging with a highly charged political debate in an accessible and non-partisan manner this book will appeal to a broad readership of academics, policy-makers, journalists, and interested citizens.

Winner of the George Washington Prize Winner of the Barbara and David Zalaznick Book Prize in American History Winner of the Excellence in American History Book Award Winner of the Fraunces Tavern Museum Book Award From the bestselling author of the Liberation Trilogy comes the extraordinary first volume of his new trilogy about the American Revolution Rick Atkinson, author of the Pulitzer Prize-winning An Army at Dawn and two other superb books about World War II, has long been admired for his deeply researched, stunningly vivid narrative histories. Now he turns his attention to a new war, and in the initial volume of the Revolution Trilogy he recounts the first twenty-one months of America’s violent war for independence. From the battles at Lexington and Concord in spring 1775 to those at Trenton and Princeton in winter 1777, American militiamen and then the ragged Continental Army take on the world’s most formidable fighting force. It is a gripping saga alive with astonishing characters: Henry Knox, the former bookseller with an uncanny understanding of artillery; Nathanael Greene, the blue-eyed bumpkin who becomes a brilliant battle captain; Benjamin Franklin, the self-made man who proves to be the wiliest of diplomats; George Washington, the commander in chief who learns the difficult art of leadership when the war seems all but lost. The story is also told from the British perspective, making the mortal conflict between the redcoats and the rebels all the more compelling. Full of riveting details and untold stories, The British Are Coming is a tale of heroes and knaves, of sacrifice and blunder, of redemption and profound suffering. Rick Atkinson has given stirring new life to the first act of our country’s creation drama.

A new look at how Britain’s defence establishment learned to engage Japan’s armed forces as the Pacific War progressed. Douglas Ford reveals that, prior to Japan’s invasion of Southeast Asia in December 1941, the British held a contemptuous view of Japanese military prowess. He shows that the situation was not helped by the high level of secrecy which surrounded Japan’s war planning, as well as the absence of prior engagements with the Imperial Japanese Navy and Army. The fall of ‘Fortress Singapore’ in February 1942 dispelled the notion that the Japanese were incapable of challenging the West. British military officials acknowledged how their forces in the Far East were inadequate, and made a concerted effort to improve their strength and efficiency. However, because Britain’s forces were tied down in their operations in Europe, North Africa and the Mediterranean, they had to fight the Japanese with limited resources. Drawing upon the lessons obtained through Allied experiences in the Pacific theatres as well as their own encounters in Southeast Asia, the British used the available intelligence on the strategy, tactics and morale of Japan’s armed forces to make the best use of what they had, and by the closing stages of the war in 1944 to 1945, they were able to devise a war plan which paved the way for the successful war effort. This book will be of great interest to all students of the Second World War, intelligence studies, British military history and strategic studies in general.

This book analyses the principal aspects of the relations between Soviet Russia (USSR) and Britain in the crucial phase of their formation, namely the period from 1917 to 1924. Using previously unavailable and largely unknown archival records and memoirs published by statesmen, diplomats and military commanders directly involved in the events, Evgeny Sergeev not only reconstructs the dynamics of the interaction between Moscow and London, but also strips its key episodes of common myths and stereotypes. The most debatable issues, to which this study draws its primary attention, include Britain's role in the Entente armed intervention against the Bolshevik regime as well as a series of reciprocate attempts to avoid political controversies, and London's contribution to humanitarian aid and the economic recovery of post-revolutionary Russia. Special consideration is also given to the impact of British diplomacy on the recognition of the USSR by other great powers like France, Italy, and Japan in the mid-1920s.

Analysing three cases of British colonial violence that occurred in the latter half of the 19th century, this book argues that all three share commonalities, including the role of racial prejudices in justifying the perpetration of extreme colonial violence. Exploring the connections and comparisons between the Perak War (1875–76), the 'Hut Tax' Revolt in Sierra Leone (1898–99) and the Anglo-Egyptian War of Reconquest in the Sudan (1896–99), Gordon highlights the significance of decision-making processes, communication between London and the periphery and the influence of individual colonial administrators in outbreaks of violence. This study reveals the ways in which racial prejudices, the advocacy of a British 'civilising mission' and British racial 'superiority' informed colonial administrators' decisions on the ground, as well as the rationalisation of extreme violence. Responding to a neglect of British colonial atrocities within the historiography of colonial violence, this work demonstrates the ways in which Britain was just as willing and able as other European Empires to resort to extreme measures in the face of indigenous resistance or threats to the British imperial project.