Volume I of The Official History of the UK Strategic Nuclear Deterrent provides an authoritative and in-depth examination of the British Government’s strategy towards nuclear deterrent from 1945 to 1964. This volume, written with full access to the UK documentary record, examines the strategic nuclear policy of British governments after 1945 as they tried to build and then maintain an independent, nationally controlled strategic capability, while also attempting to forge a close nuclear relationship with the United States. This book will be of much interest to students of British politics, nuclear proliferation and international relations.

Having served opposite Warsaw Pact forces in the 1950s and on Embassy duty in the 70s in Europe, the author offers a reasoned assessment of Britain's role in the so-called "nuclear club". He asks whether Britain really needs to be a member.

This text focuses on the disagreements which existed in British political and military circles over nuclear strategy directly after World War II. Based on recently released documents, it argues that British policy in this important area was much more ambiguous than is commonly supposed.

In December 2003 the British government announced that within a few years it would need to take decisions about the future of Britain's strategic nuclear deterrent. Exactly three years later, its plans were revealed in a White Paper. The existing Trident system is to be given a life-extension, which includes building new submarines to carry the missiles, costing £15–20 billion. Britain has a substantial nuclear legacy, having owned nuclear weapons for over half a century. The strategic context for the deterrent has changed completely with the end of the Cold War, but nuclear weapons retain much of their salience. This Adelphi Paper argues that it makes sense to remain a nuclear power in an uncertain and nuclear-armed world. Given that deterrence needs are now less acute, but more complex than in the past, the paper asserts that deterrence also needs to be aligned with non-proliferation policies, which seek to reduce the scale of threats that need to be deterred. Somewhat overlooked in current policy are appropriate measures of defence, which can raise the nuclear threshold and, if required, mitigate the effects of deterrence failure. It concludes that the government's decisions about the future form of the deterrent are very sensible, but cautions that they still need to be integrated into a broader policy that embraces diplomacy, deterrence and defence to counter the risks posed by nuclear proliferation.

The United Kingdom was the first country to undertake atomic energy research and development for military purposes. In April 1940 the British government commissioned a group of scientists to study the possibilities of manufacturing a ‘uranium bomb’ in wartime. Originally published in 1984, this book traces the development of British nuclear weapons from those early times to the present. It examines the decisions of Atlee and the MacMillan governments in sustaining the nuclear deterrent through the hydrogen bomb and the Polaris programme, and discusses in detail the decision to proceed with Trident. Throughout the narrative is set against the background of British domestic politics and Anglo-American relations. The book demonstrates why for nearly forty years British governments remained committed to an independent nuclear deterrent as the last line of defence should NATO fail.

In this White Paper, the Government reaffirms its commitment to maintain Britain's independent nuclear capability by investing in a new generation of ballistic missile-carrying submarines and extending the life of the Trident D5 missile. However, in order to ensure the deterrent system is the minimum necessary to provide effective deterrence, there will be a further 20 per cent reduction in operationally available warheads. The Government believes this decision balances the interests of national security against its undertaking to work towards multilateral disarmament and to counter nuclear proliferation, and it is fully compatible with Britain's international legal obligations. The White Paper discusses the policy context and sets out the reasons why decisions on the future of the UK's nuclear deterrent system are needed now, as well as considering the various options and their costs, and the industrial aspects involved in building the new submarines in the UK.

The Government white paper (Cm 6994, ISBN 9780101699426) recommended the renewal of the Trident system, and wanted a decision made in 2007 as delay would imperil the UK's security. This report analyses the white paper's findings and conclusions, and explores the key issues and questions which should be addressed in the debate on the future of the deterrent. The Committee reports some disagreement with the Government's timetable for procurement of new submarines. The reduction in the total number of warheads is welcomed, but as the number deployed on submarines is not to change the Committee is uncertain of the operational significance of this measure. The Committee would also like clarification of the nature and geographical scope of what the Government considers the UK's "vital interests" for which the nuclear deterrent exists. There appears to be no legal consensus that the proposals are consistent with all of the UK's international obligations, in particular the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty, so political considerations will govern the renewal decision. Detailed estimates of the costs are vital to inform the debate. The Committee acknowledges the Government's efforts at openness on this matter.