A “masterly account” of the juggernaut offensive that conquered France—but also marked the beginning of the end for Nazi Germany in World War II (Kirkus Reviews). In the spring of 1940, the German forces launched an attack on France that combined superb intelligence, cutting edge strategy, and new technology—the blitzkrieg, or “lightning war.” In just six weeks, it would achieve what their fathers had failed to do in all four years of the First World War. It was a stunning victory. But here, leading British military historian and academic Lloyd Clark argues that much of our understanding of this victory is based on myth. Far from being a foregone conclusion, Hitler’s plan could easily have failed had the Allies been even slightly less inept or the Germans less fortunate. The Germans recognized that success depended not only on surprise, but also avoiding a protracted struggle for which they were not prepared—making defeat a very real possibility. Their surprise victory proved the apex of their achievement; far from being undefeatable, Clark argues, the Battle of France revealed Germany and its armed forces to be highly vulnerable. And Hitler dismissed this fact as he planned his next move—and greatest blunder: the invasion of the Soviet Union. In this eye-opening reassessment, complete with maps and illustrations, Clark “presents a well-balanced narrative that highlights the knife-edge victory of the German forces” and reveals how very close the Nazi war machine came to catastrophe in the early days of World War II (New York Journal of Books).

In 1940, the German army fought and won an extraordinary battle with France in six weeks of lightning warfare. With the subtlety and compulsion of a novel, Horne’s narrative shifts from minor battlefield incidents to high military and political decisions, stepping far beyond the confines of military history to form a major contribution to our understanding of the crises of the Franco-German rivalry. To Lose a Battle is the third part of the trilogy beginning with The Fall of Paris and continuing with The Price of Glory (already available in Penguin).

This text examines why Rommel and his panzers were so successful and analyses the composition, tactics, doctrine, personnel and hardware of the panzer divisions, why they were so effective in the hands of master tacticians.

Hitler's decision to declare war on the United States has baffled generations of historians. In this revisionist new history of those fateful months, Klaus H. Schmider seeks to uncover the chain of events which would incite the German leader to declare war on the United States in December 1941. He provides new insights not just on the problems afflicting German strategy, foreign policy and war production but, crucially, how they were perceived at the time at the top levels of the Third Reich. Schmider sees the declaration of war on the United States not as an admission of defeat or a gesture of solidarity with Japan, but as an opportunistic gamble by the German leader. This move may have appeared an excellent bet at the time, but would ultimately doom the Third Reich.