Photo chronicle of the German invasion of France in the spring of 1940.

The German victory of 1940 stunned the world. France, thought to be a major European power with one of the world's largest armies, collapsed in less than seven weeks. The secret of the Wehrmacht's success lay in its revolutionary new tactics of blitzkrieg: lightning war. Fast-moving tank divisions supported by armored, mobile infantry swept over opposition, helped by both conventional bombers and deadly Stuka dive-bombers. Alan Shepperd's highly detailed text examines the tactics, organization, and equipment of the Allied and German forces, and provides a daily account of the most crucial period of the battle. The German victory of 1940 stunned the world. France, thought to be a major European power with one of the world's largest armies, collapsed in less than seven weeks. The secret of the Wehrmacht's success lay in its revolutionary new tactics of blitzkrieg: lightning war. Fast-moving tank divisions supported by armored, mobile infantry swept over opposition, helped by both conventional bombers and deadly Stuka dive-bombers. Alan Shepperd's highly detailed text examines the tactics, organization, and equipment of the Allied and German forces, and provides a daily account of the most crucial period of the battle. The tank marks as great a revolution in land warfare as an armored steamship would have marked had it appeared amongst the toilsome triremes of Actium. So said General Heinz Guderian, architect of the stunning German victory over France in 1940. Alan Shepperd examines tactics and the German's application of them to their 1940 French campaign, as he looks at the differing organization and equipment of both Allied and German forces. He gives a daily account of the most crucial period of the battle, that of May 10-17, and also examines the evacuation of Dunkirk, in which 337,000 troops, mostly British, were taken out of the Germans' clutches at the last moment by the Royal Navy supported by a vast armada of privately owned vessels. Not only are German strengths looked at but Allied weaknesses are also examined: their ineffective use of tanks, the obsolete French defensive strategy, and, possibly most importantly, the political splits within France that demoralized her army and combined with the German's speedy advance to bring collapse about so quickly.

A “masterly account” of the juggernaut offensive that conquered France—but also marked the beginning of the end for Nazi Germany in World War II (Kirkus Reviews). In the spring of 1940, the German forces launched an attack on France that combined superb intelligence, cutting edge strategy, and new technology—the blitzkrieg, or “lightning war.” In just six weeks, it would achieve what their fathers had failed to do in all four years of the First World War. It was a stunning victory. But here, leading British military historian and academic Lloyd Clark argues that much of our understanding of this victory is based on myth. Far from being a foregone conclusion, Hitler’s plan could easily have failed had the Allies been even slightly less inept or the Germans less fortunate. The Germans recognized that success depended not only on surprise, but also avoiding a protracted struggle for which they were not prepared—making defeat a very real possibility. Their surprise victory proved the apex of their achievement; far from being undefeatable, Clark argues, the Battle of France revealed Germany and its armed forces to be highly vulnerable. And Hitler dismissed this fact as he planned his next move—and greatest blunder: the invasion of the Soviet Union. In this eye-opening reassessment, complete with maps and illustrations, Clark “presents a well-balanced narrative that highlights the knife-edge victory of the German forces” and reveals how very close the Nazi war machine came to catastrophe in the early days of World War II (New York Journal of Books).

Frankrigs fald i løbet af kun 6 uger i maj/juni 1940, hvor den ellers så mægtige franske hær måtte opgive overfor tyskernes sejrrige Blitzkrieg-taktik, kapitulationen, våbenstilstanden og Hitlers sejrsindtogsmach i Paris. Bogen er i Ballantines kendte serier, relativ kortfattet og letlæst og en udmærket introduktion til det komplekse forløb helt fra den Fransk-tyske krig i 1870-71, over 1. Verdenskrig og Mellemkrigsårene og hele Frankrigs politiske og militære historie under den 3. Republik, som i høj grad hører med til baggrunden for forståelsen af det totale kollaps og sammenbrud i juni 1940. Bogen er rigt illustreret, sort/hvide fotos.

In 1940, the German army fought and won an extraordinary battle with France in six weeks of lightning warfare. With the subtlety and compulsion of a novel, Horne’s narrative shifts from minor battlefield incidents to high military and political decisions, stepping far beyond the confines of military history to form a major contribution to our understanding of the crises of the Franco-German rivalry. To Lose a Battle is the third part of the trilogy beginning with The Fall of Paris and continuing with The Price of Glory (already available in Penguin).

Here, for the first time in English, is an illuminating German perspective on the decisive blitzkrieg campaign. The account, written by the German historian Karl-Heinz Frieser and edited by American historian John T. Greenwood, provides the definitive explanation for Germany’s startling success and the equally surprising military collapse of France and Britain on the European continent in 1940. In a little over a month, Germany defeated the Allies in battle, a task that had not been achieved in four years of brutal fighting during World War I. First published in 1995 as the official German history of the 1940 campaign, this book goes beyond standard explanations to show that the German victory was not inevitable and that French defeat was not preordained. Contrary to most accounts of the campaign, Frieser’s illustrates that the military systems of both Germany and France were solid and that their campaign plans were sound. The key to victory or defeat, Frieser argues, was the execution of operational plans—both preplanned and ad hoc—amid the eternal Clausewitzian combat factors of friction and the fog of war. He shows why, on the eve of the campaign, the British and French leaders had good cause to be confident and why many German generals were understandably concerned that disaster was looming for them. This study explodes many of the myths concerning German blitzkrieg warfare and the planning for the 1940 campaign. Frieser’s groundbreaking interpretation of the topic has been the subject of discussion since the German edition first appeared. This English translation is published in cooperation with the Association of the United States Army.