Questions about the causes of events, from terrorist attacks to mass shootings to economic and public health crises dominate conversations across the US. Recent research in social psychology outlines the process we use to identify the causes of such events, reveals how we determine who is responsible or to blame, and documents the far-reaching consequences of these determinations for our emotions, our actions, and our attitudes. Current approaches to political opinions posit a direct path from a person’s worldview (liberal or conservative) to their attitudes toward specific political issues like abortion and welfare. This book argues that blame is the missing link between the two. Gail Sahar demonstrates that the current emphasis on value differences, whether between conservatives and liberals in the U.S. or between religious and secular countries on a global level, ignores commonalities in the way people think about issues. She proposes that focusing on perceived causes of social problems is a much more promising avenue for dialog than trying to reconcile fundamental belief systems. Informed by the latest psychological science, this new take on how to change attitudes has implications for anyone seeking to influence the viewpoints of others, from politicians and activists to ordinary people talking about current events at a dinner party.

How often do we hear that Americans are so ignorant about politics that their civic competence is impaired, and that the media are to blame because they do a dismal job of informing the public? Processing Politics shows that average Americans are far smarter than the critics believe. Integrating a broad range of current research on how people learn (from political science, social psychology, communication, physiology, and artificial intelligence), Doris Graber shows that televised presentations—at their best—actually excel at transmitting information and facilitating learning. She critiques current political offerings in terms of their compatibility with our learning capacities and interests, and she considers the obstacles, both economic and political, that affect the content we receive on the air, on cable, or on the Internet. More and more people rely on information from television and the Internet to make important decisions. Processing Politics offers a sound, well-researched defense of these remarkably versatile media, and challenges us to make them work for us in our democracy.

The growing ideological gulf between Democrats and Republicans is one of the biggest issues in American politics today. Our legislatures, composed of members from two sharply disagreeing parties, are struggling to function as the founders intended them to. If we want to reduce the ideological gulf in our legislatures, we must first understand what has caused it to widen so much over the past forty years. Andrew B. Hall argues that we have missed one of the most important reasons for this ideological gulf: the increasing reluctance of moderate citizens to run for office. While political scientists, journalists, and pundits have largely focused on voters, worried that they may be too partisan, too uninformed to vote for moderate candidates, or simply too extreme in their own political views, Hall argues that our political system discourages moderate candidates from seeking office in the first place. Running for office has rarely been harder than it is in America today, and the costs dissuade moderates more than extremists. Candidates have to wage ceaseless campaigns, dialing for dollars for most of their waking hours while enduring relentless news and social media coverage. When moderate candidates are unwilling to run, voters do not even have the opportunity to send them to office. To understand what is wrong with our legislatures, then, we need to ask ourselves the question: who wants to run? If we want more moderate legislators, we need to make them a better job offer.

First published in 1992, this volume follows on from the programme for studying risk and blame that was implied in Purity and Danger. The first half of the book Douglas argues that the study of risk needs a systematic framework of political and cultural comparison. In the latter half she examines questions in cultural theory. Through the eleven essays contained in Risk and Blame, Douglas argues that the prominence of risk discourse will force upon the social sciences a programme of rethinking and consolidation that will include anthropological approaches.

From coping with Covid-19 through to manging climate change, from Brexit through to the barricading of Congress, from democratic disaffection to populist pressures, from historical injustices to contemporary social inequalities, and from scapegoating through to sacrificial lambs... the common thread linking each of these themes and many more is an emphasis on blame. But how do we know who or what is to blame? How do politicians engage in blame-avoidance strategies? How can blaming backfire or boomerang? Are there situations in which politicians might want to be blamed? What is the relationship between avoiding blame and claiming credit? How do developments in relation to machine learning and algorithmic governance affect blame-based assumptions? By focusing on the politics and governance of blame from a range of disciplines, perspectives, and standpoints this volume engages with all these questions and many more. Distinctive contributions include an emphasis on peacekeeping and public diplomacy, on source-credibility and anthropological explanations, on cultural bias and on expert opinions, on polarisation and (de)politicisation, and on trust and post-truth politics. With contributions from the world's leading scholars and emerging research leaders, this volume not only develops the theoretical, disciplinary, empirical, and normative boundaries of blame-based analyses but it also identifies new research agendas and asks distinctive and original questions about the politics and governance of blame.

In 2005, US Marines killed 24 unarmed Iraqi civilians in the town of Haditha, including several children. How should we assess the perpetrators of this and other war crimes? Is it unfair to blame the Marines because they were subject to situational pressures such as combat stress (and had lost one of their own in combat)? Or should they be held responsible for their actions, since they intentionally chose to kill civilians? In this book, Matthew Talbert and Jessica Wolfendale take up these moral questions and propose an original theory of the causes of war crimes and the responsibility of war crimes perpetrators. In the first half of the book, they challenge accounts that explain war crimes by reference to the situational pressures endured by military personnel, including peer pressure, combat stress, and propaganda. The authors propose an alternative theory that explains how military personnel make sense of their participation in war crimes through their self-conceptions, goals, and values. In the second half of the book, the authors consider and reject theories of responsibility that excuse perpetrators on the grounds that situational pressures often encourage them to believe that their behavior is permissible. Such theories of responsibility are unacceptably exculpatory, implying it is unreasonable for victims of war crimes to blame their attackers. By contrast, Talbert and Wolfendale argue that perpetrators of war crimes may be blameworthy if their actions express objectionable attitudes towards their victims, even if they sincerely believe that what they are doing is right.