Operations in Afghanistan and Iraq have renewed interest in close air support and the integration of air and ground power. In particular situations, either might predominate, and their relationship is likely to shift over the course of a campaign. This report addresses three questions: (1) How should air attack and ground maneuver be integrated? (2) How should the terminal attack control function be executed? (3) How should ground maneuver/fires and air attack be deconflicted? It recommends that the Army and the Air Force work together to develop new concepts and technologies to improve the partnering of air and ground. It recommends new processes to effectively designate targets and improved control mechanisms to exploit the benefits of the digital battlefield.

En gennemgang af udviklingen inden for taktisk flystøtte

In war, defeating an enemy's force is often a necessary step on the path to victory. Defeating enemy armies is a difficult task that often comes with a high price tag in terms of blood and treasure. With its inherent speed, range, and flexibility, air and space power offers a way to lower that risk by providing commanders a synergistic tool that can provide a degree of control over the surface environment and render enemy forces ineffective before they meet friendly land forces. Modern air and space power directly affects an adversary's ability to initiate, conduct, and sustain ground combat.

This study examines the development and usefulness of US air attack theory and doctrine during the interwar period, 1919-1941. This period represents more than twenty years of development in US Air Corps attack theory and doctrine. It was the first peacetime period of such development. Attack aviation during this time was a branch of aviation used to provide direct and indirect combat support to ground forces in the form of machine gun strafing, light bombing, and chemical attacks. From the earliest origins, attack theory and doctrine evolved primarily along two paths direct and indirect support of ground and air force objectives. The direct support approach was based on fundamental beliefs by the Army that attack aviation was an auxiliary combat arm, to be used directly on the battlefield against ground forces and to further the ground campaign plan. The indirect support approach, or air interdiction, was derived from the fundamental beliefs by the Air Corps that attack aviation was best used beyond the battle line and artillery range, against targets more vulnerable and less heavily defended, to further both the Air Force mission and the ground support mission. As attack doctrine evolved, range and hardened targets became problematic for the single-engine attack plane. Thus, attack theory and doctrine in terms of the indirect support approach, was adequately developed to be useful at the start of WWII. The use of light and medium bombers in North Africa showed the effectiveness of air interdiction and the indirect approach. Attack aviation had, indeed, established itself before WWII. Attack aviation, in the form of close air support, would have to wait for the lessons of WWII.

Committee Serial No. 43.

This study traces the development of close air support tactics and operations in South Vietnam from 1961 through 1973. The early years (1961-64) witnessed the buildup of Farm Gate operations and introduction of the Tactical Air Control System (Barn Door). Tactics evolved for the 0-1 Bird Dog FAC and for such strike aircraft as the T-28 Trojan, B-26 Invader, and A-lE Skyraider. Ordnance problems were tackled and headway made. During the buildup (1965-68) the 0-2A Skymaster and OV-10 Bronco bolstered forward air control. Strike operations were strengthened by the F-100 Super Sabre, B-57 Canberra, F-4 Phantom, F-5 Freedom Fighter, and A-37 Dragonfly. Gunships (the AC-47 Spooky, AC-130 Spectre, AC-119G Shadow, and AC-119K Stinger) also gave excellent assistance to group troops. Support of Special Forces commenced. Inroads were made on problems of coordination, command, and control of tactical air power. Tactics were further refined to meet the changing needs of close air support. In the final period (1969-73) the OV-10 acted as an armed FAC. The A-7 Corsair II entered the war. In 1973 the pullout of American troops began. Lastly, the study discusses the A-10 close air support aircraft.