In this engrossing book, Hollis Clayson provides the first description and analysis of French artistic interest in women prostitutes, examining how the subject was treated in the art of the 1870s and 1880s by such avant-garde painters as Cézanne, Degas, Manet, and Renoir, as well as by the academic and low-brow painters who were their contemporaries. Clayson not only illuminates the imagery of prostitution-with its contradictory connotations of disgust and fascination-but also tackles the issues and problems relevant to women and men in a patriarchal society. She discusses the conspicuous sexual commerce during this era and the resulting public panic about the deterioration of social life and civilized mores. She describes the system that evolved out of regulating prostitutes and the subsequent rise of clandestine prostitutes who escaped police regulation and who were condemned both for blurring social boundaries and for spreading sexual licentiousness among their moral and social superiors. Clayson argues that the subject of covert prostitution was especially attractive to vanguard painters because it exemplified the commercialization and the ambiguity of modern life.

Japan’s decision to attack the United States in 1941 is widely regarded as irrational to the point of suicidal. How could Japan hope to survive a war with, much less defeat, an enemy possessing an invulnerable homeland and an industrial base 10 times that of Japan? The Pacific War was one that Japan was always going to lose, so how does one explain Tokyo’s decision? Did the Japanese recognize the odds against them? Did they have a concept of victory, or at least of avoiding defeat? Or did the Japanese prefer a lost war to an unacceptable peace? Dr. Jeffrey Record takes a fresh look at Japan’s decision for war, and concludes that it was dictated by Japanese pride and the threatened economic destruction of Japan by the United States. He believes that Japanese aggression in East Asia was the root cause of the Pacific War, but argues that the road to war in 1941 was built on American as well as Japanese miscalculations and that both sides suffered from cultural ignorance and racial arrogance. Record finds that the Americans underestimated the role of fear and honor in Japanese calculations and overestimated the effectiveness of economic sanctions as a deterrent to war, whereas the Japanese underestimated the cohesion and resolve of an aroused American society and overestimated their own martial prowess as a means of defeating U.S. material superiority. He believes that the failure of deterrence was mutual, and that the descent of the United States and Japan into war contains lessons of great and continuing relevance to American foreign policy and defense decision-makers.

A broad-ranging study of the relationship between alliances and the conduct of grand strategy, examined through historical case studies.

The Berlin newspaper Der Angriff (The Attack), founded by Joseph Goebbels in 1927, was a significant instrument for arousing support for Nazi ideas. Berlin was the center of the political life of the Weimar Republic, and Goebbels became an actor upon this frenetic stage in 1926, becoming Gauleiter of Berlin's Nazis. Focusing on the period from 1927 to 1933, a time the Nazis later called "the blood years," Russel Lemmons examines how Der Angriff was used to promote support for Nazism. Some of the most important propaganda motifs of the Third Reich first appeared in the pages of Der Angriff. Horst Wessel, murdered by the German Communist Party in 1930, became the archetypal Nazi hero; much of his legend began on the pages of Der Angriff. Other Nazi propaganda themes—the "Unknown SA man" and the "myth of resurrection and return"—made their first appearances in this newspaper. How could the Germans, seemingly among the most cultured people in Europe, hand over their fate to the Nazis? As this book demonstrates, Der Angriff had much to do with the rise of National Socialism in Berlin and the cataclysmic results.