The primary objective of this book is to demonstrate that a firm's financing decisions depend among other things on bargaining power considerations, and to illustrate potential causes for this dependency. Based on a principal-agent analysis where a lender (principal) and a firm (agent) bargain over the financing of the firm’s risky project, the author illustrates and analyzes the importance of bargaining power on finance decisions.

Abstract: China is often mentioned as a counterexample to the findings in the finance and growth literature since, despite the weaknesses in its banking system, it is one of the fastest growing economies in the world. The fast growth of Chinese private sector firms is taken as evidence that it is alternative financing and governance mechanisms that support China's growth. This paper takes a closer look at firm financing patterns and growth using a database of 2,400 Chinese firms. The authors find that a relatively small percentage of firms in the sample utilize formal bank finance with a much greater reliance on informal sources. However, the results suggest that despite its weaknesses, financing from the formal financial system is associated with faster firm growth, whereas fund raising from alternative channels is not. Using a selection model, the authors find no evidence that these results arise because of the selection of firms that have access to the formal financial system. Although firms report bank corruption, there is no evidence that it significantly affects the allocation of credit or the performance of firms that receive the credit. The findings suggest that the role of reputation and relationship based financing and governance mechanisms in financing the fastest growing firms in China is likely to be overestimated.

The primary objective of this book is to demonstrate that a firm's financing decisions depend among other things on bargaining power considerations, and to illustrate potential causes for this dependency. Based on a principal-agent analysis where a lender (principal) and a firm (agent) bargain over the financing of the firm’s risky project, the author illustrates and analyzes the importance of bargaining power on finance decisions.

Where do firms turn for financing in countries with poorly developed financial markets? One source is trade credit. And where formal financial intermediaries are deficient, industries that rely more on this source of financing grow faster.

This book presents in detail methodologies for the Bayesian estimation of sing- regime and regime-switching GARCH models. These models are widespread and essential tools in n ancial econometrics and have, until recently, mainly been estimated using the classical Maximum Likelihood technique. As this study aims to demonstrate, the Bayesian approach o ers an attractive alternative which enables small sample results, robust estimation, model discrimination and probabilistic statements on nonlinear functions of the model parameters. The author is indebted to numerous individuals for help in the preparation of this study. Primarily, I owe a great debt to Prof. Dr. Philippe J. Deschamps who inspired me to study Bayesian econometrics, suggested the subject, guided me under his supervision and encouraged my research. I would also like to thank Prof. Dr. Martin Wallmeier and my colleagues of the Department of Quantitative Economics, in particular Michael Beer, Roberto Cerratti and Gilles Kaltenrieder, for their useful comments and discussions. I am very indebted to my friends Carlos Ord as Criado, Julien A. Straubhaar, J er ^ ome Ph. A. Taillard and Mathieu Vuilleumier, for their support in the elds of economics, mathematics and statistics. Thanks also to my friend Kevin Barnes who helped with my English in this work. Finally, I am greatly indebted to my parents and grandparents for their support and encouragement while I was struggling with the writing of this thesis.

Why our workplaces are authoritarian private governments—and why we can’t see it One in four American workers says their workplace is a “dictatorship.” Yet that number almost certainly would be higher if we recognized employers for what they are—private governments with sweeping authoritarian power over our lives. Many employers minutely regulate workers’ speech, clothing, and manners on the job, and employers often extend their authority to the off-duty lives of workers, who can be fired for their political speech, recreational activities, diet, and almost anything else employers care to govern. In this compelling book, Elizabeth Anderson examines why, despite all this, we continue to talk as if free markets make workers free, and she proposes a better way to think about the workplace, opening up space for discovering how workers can enjoy real freedom.