In this book, Walton and McKersie attempt to describe a comprehensive theory of labor negotiation. The authors abstract and analyze four sets of systems of activities which they believe account for much of the behavior found in labor negotiations. The first system of activities, termed "distributive bargaining," comprises competitive behaviors that are intended to influence the division of limited resources. The second system is made up of activities that increase the joint gain available to the negotiating parties, referred to as "integrative bargaining." They are problem-solving behaviors and other activities which identify, enlarge and act upon the common interests of the parties. The third system includes activities that influence the attitudes of the parties toward each other and affect the basic relationship bonds between the social units involved. This process is referred to as "attitudinal structuring." The fourth system of activities, which occurs as an integral aspect of the inter-party negotiations, comprises the behaviors of a negotiator that are meant to achieve consensus within one's own organizations. This fourth process is called "intra-organizational bargaining." Each sub process has its own set of instrumental acts or tactics. Therefore, each of the four model chapters is followed by a chapter on the tactics which implement the process. These chapters translate the model into tactical assignments and include an abundance of supporting illustrations from actual negotiations. This study should be of interest to several audiences, including students and teachers of industrial relations, social scientists interested in the general field of conflict resolution, as well as practitioners of collective bargaining and other individuals directly involved in international negotiations. The overall theoretical framework has been derived by a mixture of inductive and deductive reasoning. Extensive fieldwork and several dozen printed case studies have provided the bulk of the empirical data. In terms of meaning, the study has three touchstones: the field of collective bargaining; the field of conflict resolutions; and the underlying disciplines of economics, psychology, and sociology.

Explores four recent US-Japanese negotiations - two over trade and two over security-related issues - looking for patterns in Japan's approach and behaviour. Each study explains the cultural, as well as the political, institutional and personal factors, and assesses their influence.

Whether bargaining for strategic arms reductions, rights to drill Siberian oil fields, or an apartment in Moscow, Americans are faced across the table by a distinct Russian negotiating style. What are its chief characteristics, and how can U.S. diplomats and businesspeople best deal with it as they pursue their own objectives? Jerrold Schecter explores these questions with a wealth of personal experience as a former government official, journalist, and corporate executive. His insights, deepened by his working knowledge of the Russian language, also draw on the testimony of U.S. and former Soviet diplomats and negotiators. As he examines the historical and cultural underpinnings of contemporary Russian negotiating behavior, Schecter finds that the Bolshevik legacy remains largely intact despite the Soviet Union's demise. A step-by-step examination of the negotiating process, based on unique inside accounts from retired Soviet officials, exposes the areas of greatest continuity in Russian interests and style, as well as areas of change. Russian Negotiating Behavior also identifies counterstrategies that western negotiators can use to protect their interests, and it outlines the requirements for doing business in Russia's nascent market economy.

This is a paperback edition of a major contribution to the field, first published in hard covers in 1977. The book outlines a general theory of rational behaviour consisting of individual decision theory, ethics, and game theory as its main branches. Decision theory deals with a rational pursuit of individual utility; ethics with a rational pursuit of the common interests of society; and game theory with an interaction of two or more rational individuals, each pursuing his own interests in a rational manner.

Even before it led opposition to the recent war on Iraq, France was considered the most difficult of the United States' major European allies. Each side tends to irritate the other, not least at the negotiating table, where Americans complain of French pretensions and arrogance, and the French fulminate against U.S. hegemonisme and egoisme. But, whether they like it or not, the two nations are going to have to deal with one another for a long time to come. Charles Cogan's timely and insightful study can't guarantee to make those encounters more fruitful, but it will help France's negotiating counterparts understand how and why French officials behave as they do. With impressive objectivity and authority, Cogan first explores the cultural and historical factors that have shaped the French approach and then dissects its key elements. Mixing rationalism and nationalism, rhetoric and brio, self-importance and embattled vulnerability, French negotiators often seem more interested in asserting their country's "universal" mission than in reaching agreement. Three recent case studies illustrate this distinctively French mélange. Yet agreement is by no means always elusive. Cogan offers practical suggestions for making negotiations more cooperative and productive--although he also emphasizes the long-term damage inflicted by the crisis over Iraq. Drawing on candid interviews with many of today's leading players on the French, American, British, and German sides, this engaging volume will inform and stimulate both seasoned practitioners and academics as well as students of France and the negotiating process. This book is the recipient of the Prix Ernest Lémonon from L'Académie des Sciences Morales et Politiques, 2006

Describes a method of negotiation that isolates problems, focuses on interests, creates new options, and uses objective criteria to help two parties reach an agreement.

Negotiation Behavior is a theoretical synthesis of what is known about negotiation as a general phenomenon. The principles presented are illustrated with examples of negotiation from many specific realms. A great deal of attention is devoted to the motives, perceptions, and other microprocesses underlying the behavior of negotiators and to the results of laboratory experiments on negotiation. Comprised of seven chapters, this book begins by defining negotiation and contrasting it with other forms of multiparty decision making, along with its significance and the nature of research on the subject. Two fundamental theoretical notions are presented: the strategic choice model and the goal/expectation hypothesis. Subsequent chapters focus on where bargainers place their demands as well as the strategies they use to foster their interests while moving toward agreement. The reader is introduced to key concepts such as demand level and concession rate, competitive tactics, and coordinative behavior, together with integrative agreements and third-party intervention in negotiation (mediation and arbitration). This monograph will be of value to practitioners in the fields of organizational and occupational psychology, social psychology, economics, industrial relations, and international relations.