This second Cambridge University Press collection of papers by Vernon L. Smith, a creator of the field of experimental economics, includes many of his primary authored and coauthored contributions on bargaining and market behavior between 1990 and 1998. The essays explore the use of laboratory experiments to test propositions derived from economics and game theory. They also investigate the relationship between experimental economics and psychology, particularly the field of evolutionary psychology, using the latter to broaden the perspective in which experimental results are interpreted. The volume complements Professor Smith's earlier work by demonstrating the importance of institutional features of markets in understanding behavior and market performance. Specific themes investigated include rational choice, the notion of fairness, game theory and extensive form experimental interactions, institutions and market behavior, and the study of laboratory stock markets.

The Art of Experimental Economics identifies and reviews twenty of the most important papers to have been published in experimental economics in order to highlight the power and methods of this area, and provides many examples of findings in behavioral economics that have extended knowledge in the economics discipline as a whole.

The formal theory of bargaining originated with John Nash's work in the early 1950s. This book discusses two recent developments in this theory. The first uses the tool of extensive games to construct theories of bargaining in which time is modeled explicitly. The second applies the theory of bargaining to the study of decentralized markets. Rather than surveying the field, the authors present a select number of models, each of which illustrates a key point. In addition, they give detailed proofs throughout the book.

From a pioneer in experimental economics, an expanded and updated edition of a textbook that brings economic experiments into the classroom Economics is rapidly becoming a more experimental science, and the best way to convey insights from this research is to engage students in classroom simulations that motivate subsequent discussions and reading. In this expanded and updated second edition of Markets, Games, and Strategic Behavior, Charles Holt, one of the leaders in experimental economics, provides an unparalleled introduction to the study of economic behavior, organized around risky decisions, games of strategy, and economic markets that can be simulated in class. Each chapter is based on a key experiment, presented with accessible examples and just enough theory. Featuring innovative applications from the lab and the field, the book introduces new research on a wide range of topics. Core chapters provide an introduction to the experimental analysis of markets and strategic decisions made in the shadow of risk or conflict. Instructors can then pick and choose among topics focused on bargaining, game theory, social preferences, industrial organization, public choice and voting, asset market bubbles, and auctions. Based on decades of teaching experience, this is the perfect book for any undergraduate course in experimental economics or behavioral game theory. New material on topics such as matching, belief elicitation, repeated games, prospect theory, probabilistic choice, macro experiments, and statistical analysis Participatory experiments that connect behavioral theory and laboratory research Largely self-contained chapters that can each be covered in a single class Guidance for instructors on setting up classroom experiments, with either hand-run procedures or free online software End-of-chapter problems, including some conceptual-design questions, with hints or partial solutions provided

In this book, Walton and McKersie attempt to describe a comprehensive theory of labor negotiation. The authors abstract and analyze four sets of systems of activities which they believe account for much of the behavior found in labor negotiations. The first system of activities, termed "distributive bargaining," comprises competitive behaviors that are intended to influence the division of limited resources. The second system is made up of activities that increase the joint gain available to the negotiating parties, referred to as "integrative bargaining." They are problem-solving behaviors and other activities which identify, enlarge and act upon the common interests of the parties. The third system includes activities that influence the attitudes of the parties toward each other and affect the basic relationship bonds between the social units involved. This process is referred to as "attitudinal structuring." The fourth system of activities, which occurs as an integral aspect of the inter-party negotiations, comprises the behaviors of a negotiator that are meant to achieve consensus within one's own organizations. This fourth process is called "intra-organizational bargaining." Each sub process has its own set of instrumental acts or tactics. Therefore, each of the four model chapters is followed by a chapter on the tactics which implement the process. These chapters translate the model into tactical assignments and include an abundance of supporting illustrations from actual negotiations. This study should be of interest to several audiences, including students and teachers of industrial relations, social scientists interested in the general field of conflict resolution, as well as practitioners of collective bargaining and other individuals directly involved in international negotiations. The overall theoretical framework has been derived by a mixture of inductive and deductive reasoning. Extensive fieldwork and several dozen printed case studies have provided the bulk of the empirical data. In terms of meaning, the study has three touchstones: the field of collective bargaining; the field of conflict resolutions; and the underlying disciplines of economics, psychology, and sociology.

This book provides a comprehensive picture of the new developments in bargaining theory.

This Edited Collection provides a rigorous and rich overview of current bargaining research in economics and related disciplines, as well as a discussion of future directions. The Editors create cross-disciplinary and cross-methodological synergies by bringing together bargaining researchers from various fields, including game theory, experimental economics, political economy, autonomous negotiations, artificial intelligence, environmental economics and behavioral operations management; as well as using various methods, including the strategic approach, axiomatic approach, empirical research, lab and field experiments, machine learning and decision support systems. Offering insights into the theoretical foundations of bargaining research, traditional applications to bargaining research and topics of growing importance due to new advances in technology and the changing political and physical landscape of the world, this book is a key tool for anyone working on or interested in bargaining.