This is a clear guide to the German financial system. It begins by outlining its historical development, emphasising the growth of close ties between the banking system and industry, and goes on to describe in details the nature of the credit institutions in general and the money and capital markets. The book emphasizes the crucial role played by the autonomy of the Bundesbank and it explains with clear illustrations the instruments available to it to conduct monetary policy. It analyses the type of monetary target adopted by the Bundesbank in the early 1970s and deals with the ‘transferability’ of the West German financial system to other countries. Wherever relevant, parallels and differences between that system and the ones operating in the US and UK are pointed out.

This is a clear guide to the German financial system. It begins by outlining its historical development, emphasising the growth of close ties between the banking system and industry, and goes on to describe in details the nature of the credit institutions in general and the money and capital markets. The book emphasizes the crucial role played by the autonomy of the Bundesbank and it explains with clear illustrations the instruments available to it to conduct monetary policy. It analyses the type of monetary target adopted by the Bundesbank in the early 1970s and deals with the 'transferability' of the West German financial system to other countries. Wherever relevant, parallels and differences between that system and the ones operating in the US and UK are pointed out.

This book analyses the widely-held view of the merits of the 'bank-based' German system of finance for investment, and shows that this view is not supported by evidence from the post-war period. The institutional features of the German system are such that universal banks have control of voting rights at shareholders' meetings due to proxy votes, and they also have representation on companies' supervisory boards. These features are claimed to have two main benefits. One is that the German system reduces asymmetric information problems, enabling banks to supply more external finance to firms at a lower cost, and thus increasing investment. The other is that German banks are able to mould and control managements of firms on behalf of shareholders, and thus ensure that firms are run efficiently. This book assesses whether empirical evidence backs up these claims, and shows that the merits of the German system are largely myths.

The 2008 financial crisis led to more and more frequent political attacks on central banks. The recent spotlight on central bank independence is reminiscent of the fiery debates amongst Germany's political elites in 1949 on the same issue; debates that were sparked by the establishment of West Germany in that year. Simon Mee shows how, with the establishment of West Germany's central bank - today's Deutsche Bundesbank - the country's monetary history became a political football, as central bankers, politicians, industrialists and trade unionists all vied for influence over the legal provisions that set out the remit of the future monetary authority. The author reveals how a specific version of inter-war history, one that stresses the lessons learned from Germany's periods of inflation, was weaponised and attached to a political, contemporary argument for an independent central bank. The book challenges assumptions around the evolution of central bank independence with continued relevance today.

Written by a team of scholars, predominantly from the Centre for Financial Studies in Frankfurt, this volume provides a descriptive survey of the present state of the German financial system and a new analytical framework to explain its workings.

Why stable banking systems are so rare Why are banking systems unstable in so many countries—but not in others? The United States has had twelve systemic banking crises since 1840, while Canada has had none. The banking systems of Mexico and Brazil have not only been crisis prone but have provided miniscule amounts of credit to business enterprises and households. Analyzing the political and banking history of the United Kingdom, the United States, Canada, Mexico, and Brazil through several centuries, Fragile by Design demonstrates that chronic banking crises and scarce credit are not accidents. Calomiris and Haber combine political history and economics to examine how coalitions of politicians, bankers, and other interest groups form, why they endure, and how they generate policies that determine who gets to be a banker, who has access to credit, and who pays for bank bailouts and rescues. Fragile by Design is a revealing exploration of the ways that politics inevitably intrudes into bank regulation.