Since early 2002, U.S. forces have provided training and intelligence support to members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) as a component of Operation ENDURING FREEDOM. The AFP have been engaged in combat with the Abu Sayyaf, a group previously known for its brutal, though hardly political, kidnappings. Though "Abu Sayyaf" is usually proceeded with the words the "al Qaeda-linked," there was little tangible evidence of such a link from the mid-1990s to 2002. From its founding in 1991 by Afghan veteran Abdurrajak Janjalani through Ramzi Yousef's Bojinka Plot in 1995, the links were clear and convincing. However, in 2002, the leaders of Jemaah Islamiyah (JI), al Qaeda's regional affiliate responsible for the bombings of the Sari Nightclub in Bali (October 2002), the J. W. Marriott Hotel (August 2003), and the Australian Embassy (September 2004), were reeling from a number of arrests and setbacks.

Abu Sayyaf (AS) emerged in 1990 as a splinter group composed of former MNLF fighters and Filipinos who had fought in Afghanistan. It resorted to terrorist tactics, including executions of civilians, bombings, and increasingly kidnappings for ransom. The AS leadership established links with Jeemah Islamiah, an Al Qaeda-affiliated group in SE Asia that used Mindanao for training and organizing terrorist strikes. Contents of this report: The Philippine Response to 9/11; Historic Muslim Insurgency; AS: Origins, Strength, and Operations; Connections to Al Qaeda and Jeemah Islamiah; Links to the MILF; Philippine Gov¿t. and AFP Policies and Oper.; The 2002 Balikatan Oper.: U.S. Support Role on Jolo Island and in W. Mindanao; U.S. Military Involvement.

The author warns that despite the regeneration of the ASG as a bona fide terrorist organization, the primary security threat confronting the GRP comes from the Communist Party of the Philippines and their armed wing, the New People's Army. To that end, the GRP will focus on the ASG and MILF in as much as they expect it to garner U.S. material support and assistance. He advises U.S. Defense department and policymakers regarding institutional frailties of the GRP and institutional corruption within the Philippine armed forces. While the author suggests that training continue, he cautions about being drawn into a quagmire. Despite the MILF's ties to the ASG and JIO, he also suggests that the U.S. should continue to support the peace process and to try to wean the MILF off their relationship with terrorist organizations.

The Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) has re-emerged as one of the more important terrorist groups confronting the Government of the Republic of the Philippines (GRP), the United States, and our allies in Southeast Asia. Founded in 1991 by Abdurrajak Janjalani, a veteran of the Afghan Mujiheddin and colleague of Osama bin Laden, the group quickly rose to prominence as a lethal terrorist organization committed to the establishment of an independent Islamic state. With funds from Saudi charities administered by bin Laden's brother-in-law, Mohammad Jamal Khalifa, the ASG grew quickly. The group focused its terrorist, assassination, and kidnapping efforts on sectarian targets. Yet, following the plot led by Ramzi Yousef and Khalid Sheikh Mohammed to blow up 11 U.S. jetliners and assassinate the Pope, Khalifa's and the ASG's roles were uncovered. Khalifa was unable to return to the Philippines, and while his charities remained open, they were unable to support the larger Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) and the ASG as they had in the past. The ASG was further weakened by a number of arrests and the death of their founder in December 1998. The group quickly degenerated into a number of violent, though hardly political, kidnappers. The group gained international notoriety in 2000 with high-profile raids on diving resorts in Palawan and Sipidan, Malaysia, which led to the deaths of several tourists, including Americans. The 2000 kidnapping of the Burnhams, along with the group's previous connections with al Qaeda, were the the cassus belli for the U.S. military to re-engage in the Philippines following the September 11, 2001, attacks by al Qaeda. Philippine President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo pledged close support for Operation ENDURING FREEDOM, and with that came considerable military assistance and training, beginning in early 2002. U.S. forces provided training and intelligence support for the Armed Forces of the Philippines, while U.S. naval engineers engaged in popular civic action campaign in Basilan. The ASG struck back in October 2002, detonating a bomb that killed a U.S. Special Forces Officer. Since then, it dramatically cut back on its kidnappings, while at the same time began to engage in a systematic campaign of terrorism. In February 2004, ASG operatives blew up a SuperFerry out of Manila, killing 194 people. On Valentine's Day, 2005, they executed a triple bombing across three cities. ASG members have engaged in a number of other attacks while several others have been disrupted. Why the shift back to terrorism? This author contends that it was the confluence of internal and external factors. Internally, there was a change in leadership within the organization. Abu Sabaya and Ghalib Andang, the leaders most responsible for the kidnappings, had been killed and captured, respectively. This allowed Khadaffy Janjalani, the younger brother of the group's founder, to consolidate his leadership and bring the organization back to its roots. The ASG was also trying to benefit from the ongoing peace process between the GRP and the MILF. The ASG began to search for hardline members of the MILF, who were sure to reject an autonomy agreement with the government.

Maria A Ressa has been interviewed by The Wall Street Journal ( High-Profile Journalist Reshapes Her Role in Terrorism Fight )The two most wanted terrorists in Southeast Asia OCo a Malaysian and a Singaporean OCo are on the run in the Philippines, but they manage to keep their friends and family updated on Facebook. Filipinos connect with al-Qaeda-linked groups in Somalia and Yemen. The black flag OCo embedded in al-Qaeda lore OCo pops up on websites and Facebook pages from around the world, including the Philippines, Indonesia, the Middle East, Afghanistan, Australia, and North Africa. The black flag is believed to herald an apocalypse that brings Islam's triumph. These are a few of the signs that define terrorism's new battleground: the Internet and social media.In this groundbreaking work of investigative journalism, Maria Ressa traces the spread of terrorism from the training camps of Afghanistan to Southeast Asia and the Philippines. Through research done at the International Center for Political Violence & Terrorism Research in Singapore and sociograms created by the CORE Lab at the Naval Postgraduate School, the book examines the social networks which spread the virulent ideology that powered terrorist attacks in the past 10 years.Many of the stories here have never been told before, including details about the 10 days during which Ressa led the crisis team in the Ces Drilon kidnapping case by the Abu Sayyaf in 2008. The book forms the powerful narrative that glues together the social networks OCo both physical and virtual OCo which spread the jihadi virus from bin Laden to Facebook.