Regulatory reforms are transforming bank funding and its seniority structures, with hard to gauge impact on funding costs. Basel III requires higher equity, while some bank resolution tools, such as depositor preference and bail-in power, can reduce the seniority ranking of senior unsecured debt. Moreover, tight market funding conditions during a crisis typically force banks to rely more on secured debt and repo from central banks, increasing asset encumbrance, which reduces the recovery rate for other debt. We use extensions of simple option price models for pricing various debts and find that asset encumbrance and the introduction of new bank resolution tools only increases senior unsecured debt yields modestly for existing banks under distressed market conditions in 2013. Moreover, if properly designed, bail-in debt could improve financial stability.

This technical note and manual (TNM) addresses the following issues: advantages and disadvantages of different types of depositor preference, international best practice and experience in adopting depositor preference, and introducing depositor preference in jurisdictions with or without deposit insurance.

The crisis in Europe has underscored the vulnerability of European bank funding models compared to international peers. This paper studies the drivers behind this fragility and examines the future of bank funding, primarily wholesale, in Europe. We argue that cyclical and structural factors have altered the structure, cost, and composition of funding for European banks. The paper discusses the consequences of shifting funding patterns and investor preferences and presents possible policy options and bank actions to enhance European bank funding models’ robustness.

Staff Discussion Notes showcase the latest policy-related analysis and research being developed by individual IMF staff and are published to elicit comment and to further debate. These papers are generally brief and written in nontechnical language, and so are aimed at a broad audience interested in economic policy issues. This Web-only series replaced Staff Position Notes in January 2011.

Since 2008, many countries across the globe have witnessed the introduction of new recovery and resolution regimes for banks. Whereas much may have been achieved on regional levels, this has not been perfect, and many global challenges remain unsolved. The Research Handbook on Cross-Border Bank Resolution analyses the strengths and weaknesses of the current regulatory framework for cross-border bank crises with contributions from eminent experts from the US, EU, Japan and China. The topic is addressed from both economic, and legal perspectives, with a special section devoted to real-life cases.

Developing an effective framework for cross-border resolution is a key priority in international regulatory reform. Large bank failures during the global financial crisis brought home the lack of adequate tools for resolving “too-big-to-fail” institutions. In cross-border cases, misaligned incentives and lack of robust mechanisms for resolution and cross-border cooperation left some country authorities with little choice but to take unilateral actions, which contributed to the high fiscal costs of the crisis and resulted in disorderly resolution in some cases

This paper updates the IMF’s work on general principles, strategies, and techniques from an operational perspective in preparing for and managing systemic banking crises in light of the experiences and challenges faced during and since the global financial crisis. It summarizes IMF advice concerning these areas from staff of the IMF Monetary and Capital Markets Department (MCM), drawing on Executive Board Papers, IMF staff publications, and country documents (including program documents and technical assistance reports). Unless stated otherwise, the guidance is generally applicable across the IMF membership.