Although military power is only one component of the portfolio of instruments that can be brought to bear in the fight against terrorist groups, military capabilities play unique and crucial roles in the overall strategy. These capabilities will call for a mix of forces somewhat different from those fielded today as well as new concepts and technologies. Equally challenging will be the tasks of training/advising friendly forces and protecting forces and interests around the world.

U.S. counterterrorism operations rely on authorizations established in 2001 and 2002. This report surveys the debate over the requirements for a new congressional authorization for the use of military force against terrorist groups and examines the current terrorist challenge, the purposes and key elements of such legislation, and options for Congress.

Contents: (1) The Rise of Islamist Militancy in Southeast Asia: Overview; The Rise of Al Qaeda in Southeast Asia; (2) The Jemaah Islamiya (JI) Network: History of JI; JI¿s Relationship to Al Qaeda; JI¿s Size and Structure; (3) Indonesia: Recent Events; The Bali Bombings and Other JI attacks in Indonesia; The Trial and Release of Baasyir; (4) The Philippines: Abu Sayyaf; The MILF; The Philippine Communist Party; (5) Thailand: Southern Insurgency; Current Government¿s Approach; Little Evidence of Transnational Elements; (6) Malaysia: Recent Events; A Muslim Voice of Moderation; Maritime Concerns; Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism in Malaysia; Terrorist Groups in Malaysia; Malaysia¿s Counter-Terrorism Efforts; (7) Singapore: U.S.-Singapore Coop.

In this paper, Michael Schmitt explores the legality of the attacks against Al Qaeda and the Taliban under the "jus ad bellum," that component of international law that governs when a State may resort to force as an instrument of national policy. Although States have conducted military counterterrorist operations in the past, the scale and scope of Operation Enduring Freedom may signal a sea change in strategies to defend against terrorism. This paper explores the normative limit on counterterrorist operations. Specifically, under what circumstances can a victim State react forcibly to an act of terrorism? Against whom? When? With what degree of severity? And for how long? The author contends that the attacks against Al Qaeda were legitimate exercises of the rights of individual and collective defense. They were necessary and proportional, and once the Taliban refused to comply with U.S. and United Nations demands to turn over the terrorists located in Afghanistan, it was legally appropriate for coalition forces to enter the country for the purpose of ending the ongoing Al Qaeda terrorist campaign. However, the attacks on the Taliban were less well grounded in traditional understandings of international law. Although the Taliban were clearly in violation of their legal obligation not to allow their territory to be used as a terrorist sanctuary, the author suggests that the degree and nature of the relationship between the Taliban and Al Qaeda may not have been such that the September 11 attacks could be attributed to the Taliban, thereby disallowing strikes against them in self-defense under traditional understandings of international law. Were the attacks, therefore, illegal? Not necessarily. Over the past half-century the international community's understanding of the international law governing the use of force by States has been continuously evolving. The author presents criteria likely to drive future assessments of the legality of counterterrorist operatio7.

For this new edition, Louis Fisher has updated his arguments to include critiques of the Clinton & Bush presidencies, particularly the Use of Force Act, the Iraq Resolution of 2002, the 'preemption doctrine' of the current U.S. administration, & the order authorizing military tribunals.

This is a print on demand edition of a hard to find publication. Examines terrorists¿ involvement in a variety of crimes ranging from motor vehicle violations, immigration fraud, and mfg. illegal firearms to counterfeiting, armed bank robbery, and smuggling weapons of mass destruction. There are 3 parts: (1) Compares the criminality of internat. jihad groups with domestic right-wing groups. (2) Six case studies of crimes includes trial transcripts, official reports, previous scholarship, and interviews with law enforce. officials and former terrorists are used to explore skills that made crimes possible; or events and lack of skill that the prevented crimes. Includes brief bio. of the terrorists along with descriptions of their org., strategies, and plots. (3) Analysis of the themes in closing arguments of the transcripts in Part 2. Illus.

Pulitzer Prize-winning journalist Charlie Savage's penetrating investigation of the Obama presidency and the national security state. Barack Obama campaigned on changing George W. Bush's "global war on terror" but ended up entrenching extraordinary executive powers, from warrantless surveillance and indefinite detention to military commissions and targeted killings. Then Obama found himself bequeathing those authorities to Donald Trump. How did the United States get here? In Power Wars, Charlie Savage reveals high-level national security legal and policy deliberations in a way no one has done before. He tells inside stories of how Obama came to order the drone killing of an American citizen, preside over an unprecendented crackdown on leaks, and keep a then-secret program that logged every American's phone calls. Encompassing the first comprehensive history of NSA surveillance over the past forty years as well as new information about the Osama bin Laden raid, Power Wars equips readers to understand the legacy of Bush's and Obama's post-9/11 presidencies in the Trump era.