First Published in 2004. Throughout the half-century between the Crimean War and the outbreak of the First World War, few countries confronted successive British governments with the complexity of problems posed by the Ottoman Empire. This study attempts to attain three main objectives. The first is an analysis of the growth and development of British policy at two levels: the Embassy and the Foreign Office. The second is an assessment of the influence of various embassies on decision-making in the Foreign Office. The third is an estimate of the influence of European and Imperial considerations upon the formulation of Britain's policy towards the Ottoman Empire.

The final weeks of World War I saw a revolutionary upheaval in Europe, as old empires collapsed and new, self-proclaimed 'nation-states' emerged in their place. For its advocates, the Yugoslav state created in 1918 represented a largely uniform culture and identity. But as its official name - the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes - suggested, its population was by no means homogeneous. Too late, the British - who had been instrumental in the birth of the state at Versailles - as well as other Europeans and the Americans came to appreciate that divisions of religious affiliation and historical tradition continued to override linguistic unity. James Evans analyses British ideas and assumptions about the region's history and culture and assesses how these were reshaped by newly prevalent ideas about Yugoslav nationality. Attitudes and preconceptions first formed during this period would prove remarkably enduring, making their mark on British responses to events in Yugoslavia throughout the country's troubled history. "Great Britain and the Creation of Yugoslavia" sheds valuable light not only on attitudes to Yugoslav nationality in the early 20th century, but also on western responses to the violent demise of the Yugoslav state at the century's close.

This collection of essays by international experts in military history reassesses the war plans of 1914 in a broad diplomatic, military, and political setting.

This unique and comprehensive account describes the interplay of internal and external factors in the emergence of the Austro-Hungarian Navy from a coastal defence force in 1904 to a respectable battle force capable of the joint operations with other Triple Alliance fleets in the Mediterranean by the eve of World War I. By 1914 the Austro-Hungarian Navy was the sixth largest navy in the world and the quality of its officers and men was widely recognised by most European naval observers at the time. The book describes the relationships between naval leaders, the heir to the throne Archduke Francis Ferdinand, and the Parliament in shaping the dual Monarchy's naval policy. It also shows how the changes in foreign policy in Italy and underlying animosities between Rome and Vienna led to a naval race in the Adriatic that eventually bolstered Germany's naval position in respect to Great Britain in the North Sea.

This professor's great work is possibly the most important book of any sort, probably the most important historical book, certainly the most controversial book to come out of Germany since the war. It had already forced the revision of widely held views in Germany's responsibility for beginning and continuing World War 1, and of supposed divergence of aim between business and the military on one side and labor and intellectuals on the other.

By training his eye on the ways that people outside the halls of power reacted to the rapid onset and escalation of the fighting in 1914, Neiberg dispels the notion that Europeans were rabid nationalists intent on mass slaughter. He reveals instead a complex set of allegiances that cut across national boundaries.

This book gives a clear chronological account of the campaigns on the Western and Eastern Fronts and then moves on to investigate areas that many studies ignore - the war poets, the diplomacy of war-aims and peace moves, logistics, and 'the experience of the war'.