Auction Theory, Second Edition improves upon his 2002 bestseller with a new chapter on package and position auctions as well as end-of-chapter questions and chapter notes. Complete proofs and new material about collusion complement Krishna’s ability to reveal the basic facts of each theory in a style that is clear, concise, and easy to follow. With the addition of a solutions manual and other teaching aids, the 2e continues to serve as the doorway to relevant theory for most students doing empirical work on auctions. Focuses on key auction types and serves as the doorway to relevant theory for those doing empirical work on auctions New chapter on combinatorial auctions and new analyses of theory-informed applications New chapter-ending exercises and problems of varying difficulties support and reinforce key points

Access to the radio spectrum is vital for modern digital communication. It is an essential component for smartphone capabilities, the Cloud, the Internet of Things, autonomous vehicles, and multiple other new technologies. Governments use spectrum auctions to decide which companies should use what parts of the radio spectrum. Successful auctions can fuel rapid innovation in products and services, unlock substantial economic benefits, build comparative advantage across all regions, and create billions of dollars of government revenues. Poor auction strategies can leave bandwidth unsold and delay innovation, sell national assets to firms too cheaply, or create uncompetitive markets with high mobile prices and patchy coverage that stifles economic growth. Corporate bidders regularly complain that auctions raise their costs, while government critics argue that insufficient revenues are raised. The cross-national record shows many examples of both highly successful auctions and miserable failures. Drawing on experience from the UK and other countries, senior regulator Geoffrey Myers explains how to optimise the regulatory design of auctions, from initial planning to final implementation. Spectrum Auctions offers unrivalled expertise for regulators and economists engaged in practical auction design or company executives planning bidding strategies. For applied economists, teachers, and advanced students this book provides unrivalled insights in market design and public management. Providing clear analytical frameworks, case studies of auctions, and stage-by-stage advice, it is essential reading for anyone interested in designing public-interested and successful spectrum auctions.

Online auctions have undergone many transformations and continue to attract millions of customers worldwide. However these popular platforms remain understudied by legal scholars and misunderstood by legislators. This book explores the legal classification of online auction sites across a range of countries in Europe. Including empirical studies conducted on 28 online auction websites in the UK, the research focusses on the protection of consumers’ economic rights and highlights the shortcomings that the law struggles to control. With examinations into important developments, including the Consumer Rights Directive and the latest case law from the CJEU on the liability of intermediaries, Riefa anticipates changes in the law, and points out further changes that are needed to create a safe legal environment for consumers, whilst preserving the varied business model adopted by online auction sites. The study provides insights into how technical measures as well as a tighter legislative framework or enforcement pattern could provide consumers with better protection, in turn reinforcing trust, and ultimately benefiting the online auction platforms themselves.