Emissions trading systems have come to the fore as the most economically efficient mechanisms that can be employed to bring about an optimal greenhouse gas reduction goal. Even though much has been written about the advantages and disadvantages of these systems, one element of crucial importance and– emission allowance allocation and– has not been considered in adequate depth until the present study. Such an analysis takes on increased importance as it seems likely that market-based auctioning will become the default allocation method throughout the EU under a proposed amendment to the Emissions Trading System (ETS) established by Directive 2003/87/EC. Taking a law and economics approach and– that is, using a combined perspective of industrial economics and legal analysis and– this important book examines the potential for anticompetitive distortion that may result from auctioning emission allowances. Among the issues investigated in depth are the following: whether the current setup of the EU ETS fosters allocative efficiency or whether this allocative efficiency is hindered by legal impediments or constraints; whether EU competition law can serve to remedy anticompetitive effects stemming from Member State actions taken pursuant to Directive 2003/87/EC; which allocation formats are most desirable from an allocative efficiency and environmental effectiveness point of view; the importance of initial allocation and adjustment of out-of-equilibrium situations under the amended ETS; whether auctioning allowances serves the attainment of market equilibrium even in the continuing presence of and‘polluter havensand’; the effect of the ECJand’s so-called and‘joint application jurisprudenceand’ on the ETS; and the allocation of allowances from a state aid perspective. The book provides both a coherent typology of emission allowance allocation mechanisms and the main characteristics of the present emissions trading system, setting the gained insights into a broader perspective. It examines how various assignment mechanisms deal with issues such as price determination, allocative efficiency and environmental effectiveness. It considers how market-based allocation mechanisms compare with administrative allocation mechanisms, particularly those based on the widely applied grandfathering method. And perhaps most important and– and of especial value to practitioners and policymakers and– it identifies the auction design challenges that must be addressed by the Commission in its implementing regulation due by 30 June 2010.

This book provides a comprehensive introduction to modern auction theory and its important new applications. It is written by a leading economic theorist whose suggestions guided the creation of the new spectrum auction designs. Aimed at graduate students and professionals in economics, the book gives the most up-to-date treatments of both traditional theories of 'optimal auctions' and newer theories of multi-unit auctions and package auctions, and shows by example how these theories are used. The analysis explores the limitations of prominent older designs, such as the Vickrey auction design, and evaluates the practical responses to those limitations. It explores the tension between the traditional theory of auctions with a fixed set of bidders, in which the seller seeks to squeeze as much revenue as possible from the fixed set, and the theory of auctions with endogenous entry, in which bidder profits must be respected to encourage participation.

Volume 1. Prices, finance, and expert opinion -- Volume 2. Reputation, regulation, and market organization

'Ruth Towse is to be congratulated on assembling such a high quality range of writers on cultural economics and on orchestrating their contributions so expertly. From anthropology and auctions through copyright and superstars to visual arts and welfare economics, scholars and general readers alike will discover in this Handbook an absorbing compendium of entries covering the main themes of a fascinating sub-discipline.' - Martin Ricketts, University of Buckingham, UK 'The best collection on cultural economics, definitive. An invaluable, original, and important addition to the field. Ruth Towse is the perfect person to put such a book together. Unlikely to be surpassed anytime soon.' - Tyler Cowen, George Mason University, Mercatus Center and James Buchanan Center for Political Economy, US A Handbook of Cultural Economics includes over 60 eminently readable and concise articles by 50 expert contributors. This unique Handbook is both highly informative and readable; it covers a wide area of cultural economics and its closely related subjects. While being accessible to any reader with a basic knowledge of economics, it presents a comprehensive study at the fore-front of the field. Of the many subjects discussed, chapters include: Art (including auctions, markets, prices, anthropology), artists' labour markets, arts management and corporate sponsorship, globalization, the internet, media economics, museums, non-profit organisations, opera, performance indicators, performing arts, publishing, regulation, tax expenditures, value of culture and welfare economics.

This book constitutes the refereed proceedings of the 12th International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory, SAGT 2019, held in Athens, Greece, in September/October 2019. The 25 full papers presented together with 3 invited talks and one abstract paper were carefully reviewed and selected from 55 submissions. The papers are organized in topical sections named: Algorithmic Mechanism Design; Auctions and Markets; Computational Aspects of Games; Network Games and Congestion Games; Social Choice; and Matchings and Fair Division.