This article examines critically the three asymmetries related to the place and role of corporations in the project of sustainable good governance. The first asymmetry is between the potential and policies of corporations vis-a-vis the goal of sustainable good governance. It is argued that although the engagement of corporations is critical to accomplish sustainable good governance, many corporations are still not willing or able to do what they could and should do. Regulatory initiatives are abound to bridge this gap between corporate potential and policies. However, as actions of corporations do not generally match with the expectations of these regulatory regimes, this creates a second asymmetry: the divergence between expectations from and actions of corporations. The third asymmetry is between corporate hesitation to assume responsibilities as good corporate citizens and their willingness to assume such responsibilities. This article contends that this final asymmetry arises because the economic reasons justifying corporate contribution to sustainable good governance (goodwill-nomics) do not remedy the hesitation that some corporations might have in taking the plunge towards sustainable good governance (prisoner's dilemma).

In studies of corporate governance by default, information asymmetry is assumed, based on the principle-agent theory, between investors and executives, and also by default it is assumed that executives have superior information over investors. In this paper I apply the more rich theory of information from cybernetics, compared to the mathematical theory to this assumed information asymmetry in combination with the theory of decision making, especially with respect to producing eidetic information. The quality of eidetic information turns out to be more critical as is the management or pragmatic information, with respect to the longer-term success of a firm and subsequently its value over the longer term. Due to e.g. psychological phenomena like dominant logic or belief conservation, executives not always produce good quality eidetic information and subsequently decide poor strategies. More in general it can be concluded that the assumption of information asymmetry needs to be understood per type of information and per each phase in decision-making. The resulting model provides a more precise insight in what value investors and non-executives may contribute to improve the quality of the information in a system of corporate governance and thus its effectiveness.

This edited volume examines the link between constitutional asymmetry and multinationalism in multi-tiered systems through a comprehensive and rigorous comparative analysis, covering countries in Europe, Africa and Asia. Constitutional asymmetry means that the component units of a federation do not have equal relationships with each other and with the federal authority. In traditional federal theories, this is considered an anomaly. The degree of symmetry and asymmetry is seen as an indicator of the degree of harmony or conflict within each system. Therefore symmetrisation processes tend to be encouraged to secure the stability of the political system. However, scholars have linked asymmetry with multinational federalism, presenting federalism and asymmetry as forms of ethnical conflict management. This book offers insights into the different types of constitutional asymmetry, the factors that stimulate symmetrisation and asymmetrisation processes, and the ways in which constitutional asymmetry is linked with multinationalism.

Since the end of the Second World War, a set of democratic European countries have established a decentralized system of government based on federal or regional patterns. Some of these systems initially displayed an asymmetrical trend, however, some democracies have implemented a subsequent process of re-symmetrization that changes the structure and the legitimization of the previous political agreements. Charting the evolution of decentralization processes and asymmetries implemented in Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Italy, Portugal, Russia, Spain, Ukraine and the United Kingdom, leading international scholars illustrate which countries have evolved more symmetrically, why this is so and what the role of political actors in these processes have been. In doing so, each case study: – Examines the causes of the legal and constitutional asymmetries and the main political cleavages. – Analyses the main institutions, actors and factors that influence the political dynamics of the territorial debate. – Questions whether there is such a process of re-symmetrization – Presents the main actors in favour of the process of re-symmetrization and of maintaining the constitutional and legal asymmetries Written accessibly and contributing to key debates on federalism and asymmetry, Federalism beyond Federations appeals to academics, politicians, decision-makers and all those interested in the political problems facing modern democracies.

Why are carefully designed, sensible policies too often not adopted or implemented? When they are, why do they often fail to generate development outcomes such as security, growth, and equity? And why do some bad policies endure? World Development Report 2017: Governance and the Law addresses these fundamental questions, which are at the heart of development. Policy making and policy implementation do not occur in a vacuum. Rather, they take place in complex political and social settings, in which individuals and groups with unequal power interact within changing rules as they pursue conflicting interests. The process of these interactions is what this Report calls governance, and the space in which these interactions take place, the policy arena. The capacity of actors to commit and their willingness to cooperate and coordinate to achieve socially desirable goals are what matter for effectiveness. However, who bargains, who is excluded, and what barriers block entry to the policy arena determine the selection and implementation of policies and, consequently, their impact on development outcomes. Exclusion, capture, and clientelism are manifestations of power asymmetries that lead to failures to achieve security, growth, and equity. The distribution of power in society is partly determined by history. Yet, there is room for positive change. This Report reveals that governance can mitigate, even overcome, power asymmetries to bring about more effective policy interventions that achieve sustainable improvements in security, growth, and equity. This happens by shifting the incentives of those with power, reshaping their preferences in favor of good outcomes, and taking into account the interests of previously excluded participants. These changes can come about through bargains among elites and greater citizen engagement, as well as by international actors supporting rules that strengthen coalitions for reform.

We examine the impact of a firm's asymmetric information on its choice of three mechanisms of corporate governance: the intensity of board monitoring, the exposure to market discipline, and CEO pay-for-performance sensitivity. We find that firms facing greater asymmetric information tend to use less intensive board monitoring but rely more on market discipline and CEO incentive alignment. These results are consistent with the monitoring cost hypothesis. In addition, we find that high information-asymmetry firms that have to substantially increase board monitoring intensity after Sarbanes-Oxley Act suffer poor stock performance. Our evidence therefore suggests that regulators should use caution when imposing uniform corporate governance requirements on all firms.

This book examines why authoritarian governments are willing to address environmental problems that have an international impact, such as CO2 emissions, but are reluctant to address problems that have only a domestic impact. In a case study of Azerbaijani oil politics, it demonstrates how the incumbent Azerbaijani regime has taken important measures trying to address CO2 emissions while ignoring the damage caused by oil pollution on the Caspian coast. The book argues that resource-rich authoritarian governments are eager to join international environmental initiatives to improve their image, but they address domestic environmental issues mainly if they threaten their hold on power. This book is an important contribution to scholarship on environmental governance in the post-Soviet space, an area that is poorly researched. Therefore, it is a must-read for researchers and scholars interested in post-Soviet studies, as well as in the nexus between mineral-rich regions and how social policy is created, e.g., environment, education, and healthcare. In addition, this book will be of tremendous importance for policymakers and international organizations as it looks into the motivation of authoritarian states in the post-Soviet space for environmental measures.