The paper presents estimates of devaluation expectations for six EMS currencies relative to the Deutsche mark, for the period March 1979-May 1990. The estimation method is simple and operational, and consistently generates sensible results. The estimates are constructed by the adjusting interest rate differentials by subtracting estimated expected rates of depreciation within the exchange rate band. The adjustment is nontrivial because exchange rates within the ERM bands display mean reversion rather than random walk (unit root) behavior. The adjustment is essential since the expected rates of depreciation are usually of about the same magnitude as the interest rate differentials.

The paper presents estimates of devaluation expectations for six EMS currencies relative to the Deutsche mark, for the period March 1979-May 1990. The estimation method is simple and operational, and consistently generates sensible results. The estimates are constructed by the adjusting interest rate differentials by subtracting estimated expected rates of depreciation within the exchange rate band. The adjustment is nontrivial because exchange rates within ERM bands display mean reversion rather than random walk (unit root) behavior. The adjustment is essential since expected rates of depreciation within the band are usually of about the same magnitude as interest rate differentials.

Inhaltsangabe:Zusammenfassung: Währungskrisen, wie die des Europäischen Währungssystems (EWS) 1992, können noch immer nur unzureichend vorausgesagt werden. Es wird jedoch anerkannt, dass die Glaubwürdigkeit eines jeden Währungssystems ausschließlich endogen bestimmt wird, d.h. durch Interaktion der einzelnen Akteure an den Wechselkursmärkten. Die vorliegende Arbeit untersucht, ob ein bestimmtes Glaubwürdigkeitsmaß, eingeführt von Avesani, Gallo und Salmon (1995), geeignet ist, die große EWS Krise 1992 vorauszusagen. Dabei handelt es sich um ein dynamisches Spiel, in dem die beiden Akteure (Zentralbank und Finanzmarkt) miteinander interagieren und damit die Glaubwürdigkeit des Systems aushandeln . Es wird gezeigt, dass o.g. Glaubwürdigkeitsmaß ein geeigneter Indikator für Währungskrisen darstellt, was empirisch anhand des französischen Francs, der italienischen Lira und des niederländischen Guldens nachgewiesen wird. Introduction: The objective of the present study is to present the literature of exchange rate target zones and to explore empirically the Avesani-Gallo-Salmon credibility measure for selected currencies belonging to the Exchange-Rate Mechanism (ERM) of the European Monetary System (EMS). In the past decade the empirical literature on real world target zones mushroomed considerably, but still, its overall significance in explaining strains in the relevant foreign exchange markets remains relatively low. In this context, I will explore whether the Avesani-Gallo-Salmon (1995) credibility measure demonstrates more power than earlier studies in the analysis of the 1992/3 EMS crisis. It is not my intention to pursue a normative analysis whether flexible or fixed exchange rates or intermediate regimes are superior to one another in terms of their economic implications. This question is beyond the scope of my analysis.1 Given that target zones are applied frequently in the real world, I purely want to figure out, whether their application is sensible on grounds of a firm commitment of the policy-makers. Exchange rate bands have been discussed widely after the breakdown of the Bretton Woods System in 1973. Although experiences with the fixed exchange rate regime were disappointing in the 1960s, increased volatility and/or overshooting of the exchange rates in the 1970s let economists doubt the famous argument by Friedman (1953) that speculation would stabilize exchange rate movements in the floating system. McKinnon (1976) reckoned that [...]

Why do currency crises happen? What conditions set the stage for such a crisis? How severe will it be? When will it happen? This book answers these questions, illustrating the points by examining the exchange rate realignments of the European Monetary System. It also shows how balancing the tension between domestic and international politics plays a vital part in a government's willingness to uphold its exchange rate commitments. Michele Chang pays particular attention to the role of domestic elections, since these may prevent governments from credibly committing to a fixed exchange rate and from responding quickly and coherently to market instability, thus encouraging speculation.

The stability of the EMS depends crucially on realignment expectations of the market participants. In this paper we discuss how to measure such expectations and how to relate them to economic fundamentals, central bank reputation, and institutional arrangements of the EMS. We find the following empirical regularities for FF/DM and IL/DM exchange rates: (1) expected devaluations are positively related to the current exchange rate deviation from the central parity; (2) expected devaluations are negatively related to the length of time since last realignment in the short and medium run; (3) the Basle-Nyborg agreements seem to have a stabilizing effect for both currencies examined, albeit through different channels; (4) large revaluation expectations occur immediately after devaluations. (1) and (4) are not inconsistent with the hypothesis of over-speculation or market inefficiency.

Evaluations of European monetary integration using model simulations have given conflicting results, and the paper attempts to elucidate the reasons for the differences. Several features stand out: how to model realignments; how monetary policy is set for individual countries or for Europe; and how large are risk premium shocks in exchange markets. We quantify the effects of different assumptions relating to these features using MULTIMOD.