ATTP 3-21.50 provides perspective on Infantry company missions in an operational environment characterized by high-altitudes, rapidly changing climatic conditions, and rugged terrain. It also provides the small-unit leader with guidance on how company-sized units and below can conduct these operations. The mountain environment challenges all warfighting functions. Infantry units are full spectrum organizations, not specifically designed for mountain terrain but are well-suited for mountain operations. Successful units combine the basic doctrine described in FM 3-21.10 and augment with specialized equipment and predeployment training. The tactics and techniques specific to conducting operations in mountain terrain provide added operational capability. Table 6-3 in this manual depicts where Soldiers may obtain specialized mountaineering and cold weather operational skills. This manual focuses on company and below operations in mountain operational terrain levels II and III as described in FM 3-97.6, specifically, where the influence of increasingly steep and rugged terrain dictates the use of dismounted operations. For mountain operations in level I (lower, less rugged valleys and flatter terrain) refer to FM 3-21.10. The concepts discussed in this publication are useful in most mountain environments. This publication applies to the Active Army, the Army National Guard (ARNG)/Army National Guard of the United States (ARNGUS), and the United States Army Reserve (USAR) unless otherwise stated. The proponent of this publication is the United States Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC). The preparing agency is the US Army Maneuver Center of Excellence (MCoE).

The U.S. Marine Corps' war in Vietnam was a mixtureof large-scale conventional battles against mainViet Cong and North Vietnamese Army (NVA)units and smaller pacification operations designed to securethe South Vietnamese population from Communist insurgents.During the latter half of 1965, Marine forces foughtrepeated engagements against large Viet Cong units, mostnotably the 1st Viet Cong Regiment. The first battle, a fight inAugust to secure the area around Chu Lai called OperationStarlite, inflicted significant casualties upon this force. However,within just a few months, the Communist unit reconstituteditself, forcing the Marines to launch another operationto destroy the formation in December. The Marines codenamedthis action Operation Harvest Moon.Operation Harvest Moon has largely been overlooked inhistories of the Vietnam War. While Operation Starlite wasconsidered a major success and a clear demonstration of thesuperiority of America's conventional military forces comparedto the Viet Cong, Harvest Moon was less decisive.The following year, the Marine Corps' attention also beganto shift north toward the demilitarized zone (DMZ) as moreregular North Vietnamese combat forces put pressure on theMarines' area of operations. Consequently, the battle wasovershadowed by larger engagements.Nevertheless, the operation was important for a numberof reasons. Harvest Moon was the Marines' last large-scale,conventional operation of 1965 in Vietnam. Fought in thevalleys and hills between the city of Tam Ky and the inlandoutpost of Hiep Duc, it was the largest combined operationbetween Marine units and the South Vietnamese militaryto that date. Perhaps most importantly, the battle demonstratedmany of the frustrations and problems faced by allthe American forces in South Vietnam as they tried to defeatthe Viet Cong-led insurgency. The disparity in the fightingabilities between the Marines and South Vietnamese Armyunits hindered combat effectiveness. The lack of coordinationbetween the two forces, and between the Marine Corpsand U.S. Air Force, also led to heavy losses on the allied side.Enjoying logistical support from North Vietnam, the 1st VietCong Regiment was able to defeat South Vietnamese forceswhile largely evading American units.

Examines how American military power was employed during Operation Just Cause, including the planning process and joint efforts of the U.S. Army and U.S. Marine Corps during major combat operations. Also details post-combat stability and nation-building operations.

This Army tactics, techniques, and procedures (ATTP)/Marine Corps reference publication (MCRP) is the Army's doctrinal publication for operations in the cold region environment. Marines can utilize this publication as an operational reference with the 3-35 doctrinal series. It provides doctrinal guidance and direction for how United States (U.S.) forces conduct cold region operations. The purpose of ATTP 3-97.11/MCRP 3-35.1D is to arm leaders, Soldiers, and Marines with the necessary knowledge on how to operate in cold region environments. The information contained in this manual applies to all Soldiers and Marines, regardless of rank or job specialty. This manual is designed to work with and complement field manual (FM) 3-97.6, Mountain Operations, and FM 3-97.61, Military Mountaineering. This manual will enable leaders, Soldiers, and Marines to accurately describe cold region environments, their effects on military equipment, impacts these environments have on personnel, and most importantly, how to employ the elements of combat power in cold region environments. This ATTP provides the conceptual framework for conventional forces to conduct cold region operations within the construct of full spectrum operations, across the spectrum of conflict. It addresses cold region operations at operational and tactical levels. Chapter 1 discusses the characteristics of the cold region environment. Chapter 2 discusses the operations process. Chapter 3 identifies and discusses special considerations for operations in a cold region environment. Chapter 4 discusses how to conduct movement and maneuver in a cold region environment. Chapter 5 discusses how to apply sustainment principles unique to cold regions. Chapter 6 discusses how to apply combat power in the cold region environment. The two appendixes detail the special uniform, equipment, and heaters necessary in the cold region environment. This publication applies to the Active Army, the Army National Guard (ARNG)/Army National Guard of the United States (ARNGUS), United States Army Reserve (USAR), Marine Corps, and Marine Corps Reserve unless otherwise stated. Note for Marines: This manual is intended as an operational-level reference only. Some differences apply in clothing, equipment, vehicles, and aircraft (items the Marine Corps has that the Army does not and vice versa). These Marine Corps-specific differences and tactical-level differences (arising from the employment of heavy vice light infantry) are covered in MCRP 3-35.1A, Small-Unit Leader's Guide to Cold Weather Operations. The clothing, equipment, and tactics, techniques, and procedures for cold weather warfighting by Marines are covered in MCRP 3-35.1B, Instructor's Guide to Combat Skiing. By December 2011, the Marine Corps will update these publications and change the titles. The United States Marine Corps (USMC) lead agency and doctrinal proponent for mountain and cold region operations is the Marine Corps Mountain Warfare Training Center (MCMWTC) in Bridgeport, California. Contact MCMWTC, Operations and Training for further information. The proponent of this publication is the United States Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC). The preparing agency is the Combined Arms Doctrine Directorate, U.S. Army Combined Arms Center.

ADP 3-0, Operations, constitutes the Army's view of how to conduct prompt and sustained operations across multiple domains, and it sets the foundation for developing other principles, tactics, techniques, and procedures detailed in subordinate doctrine publications. It articulates the Army's operational doctrine for unified land operations. ADP 3-0 accounts for the uncertainty of operations and recognizes that a military operation is a human undertaking. Additionally, this publication is the foundation for training and Army education system curricula related to unified land operations. The principal audience for ADP 3-0 is all members of the profession of arms. Commanders and staffs of Army headquarters serving as joint task force (JTF) or multinational headquarters should also refer to applicable joint or multinational doctrine concerning the range of military operations and joint or multinational forces. Trainers and educators throughout the Army will use this publication as well.

This is a practical and easily accessible guide for those new to the joint environment and staff assignments. With input from serving action officers and senior leaders, here are the competencies and behaviors of highly effective and successful joint staff officers which provide a roadmap for career self development. This is the most current joint information available for managing staff activities.