Despatches in this volume include that on operations in Burma and North-East India between November 1943 and June 1944, by General Sir George J. Giffard; the despatch on operations in Assam and Burma between June 1944 June and November 1944, by General Sir George J. Giffard, Commander-in-Chief; the despatch on Naval operations in the Ramree Island area (Burma) in January and February 1945 by Vice-Admiral Sir Arthur J. Power, Commander-in-Chief, East Indies Station; and the despatch on operations in Burma between November 1944 and August 1945 by Lieutenant-General Sir Oliver Leese. This unique collection of original documents will prove to be an invaluable resource for historians, students and all those interested in what was one of the most significant periods in British military history.

Winston Churchill enjoyed two stints as First Lord of the Admiralty, at the start of the First World War and at the start of the Second. He retained close interest in naval matters, especially as the defeat of the U-boat menace was so vital in both wars to maintain the vital supplies so necessary for Britain's war efforts. Indeed, Churchill later said that this was the only thing that had threatened the ultimate Allied victory.

The Anglo-American relationship from 1941-1945 proved to be the most effective military alliance in history. Yet there were also constant tensions and disagreements that threatened to pull the alliance apart. Based on considerable archival research on both sides of the Atlantic, Eisenhower's Armies considers the breadth and depth of the relationship from high-level strategic decisions, the rivalries and personalities of the commanders to the ordinary British and American soldiers who fought alongside one another.This is the story of two very different armies learning to live, work, and fight together even in the face of serious strategic disagreements, and a very human story about the efforts of many individuals—famous or otherwise—who worked and argued together to defeat Hitler’s Germany. This dynamic new history provides a fresh perspective on many of the controversies and critical strategic decisions of World War II, providing expert analysis of the Anglo-American military alliance as well as new insights into the "special relationship" of the mid-twentieth century.

The struggle of British, Commonwealth and American-Chinese troops against the Japanese in Burma was one of the decisive campaigns of the Second World War. British India was threatened by the Japanese advance, the fate of the British Empire in the East hung in the balance. The tropical climate – dense malarial jungle infested with vermin and swept by monsoon rains – made the fighting, for both sides, a remarkable feat of arms. Yet the war in Burma rarely receives the attention it deserves. Roy C. Nesbit, in this highly illustrated account, traces the entire course of the campaign. In vivid detail he describes the British retreat and humiliation at the hands of the Japanese invaders in 1942. The Japanese were fanatical and trained in jungle warfare, well-equipped and backed with an overwhelming air power. The Allied response was to build up their forces on a massive scale – eventually over 1,300,000 personnel were involved – and to train them to fight in the jungle conditions. Their counter-offensive, launched in 1944, culminated in the battles at Imphal and Kohima which turned the course of the conflict, and the reconquest of Burma was achieved just before the atom bomb was dropped.

Some sixty years after the Far Eastern War ended, this innovative new collection brings together five distinguished UK-based scholars and five from Japan to reappraise their respective country's leadership in the Malaya and Burma campaigns. This leadership is analyzed on various levels, ranging from the grand strategic to operational. The Japanese contributors examine the reasons for their forces, brilliant advances in 1941-42, whereas the British writers have to account for the disastrous defeat, characterized by the poor leadership of senior commanders such as Bennett and Percival. Between 1943 and 1945, the tables were turned dramatically, so the failure of Japanese command decisions then comes under critical scrutiny and the British have to explain how defeat was transformed into victory. Above all, this volume should stimulate interest in different methods and styles of military leadership in view of the contrasting approaches of the British and Japanese in the Second World War.