"The U.S. Army before 1945 did not have and did not need a formal readiness reporting system. After World War II, however, it found itself committed to large-scale deployments in Europe and in the Pacific, commitments that with the Cold War would continue for the next 45 years. The demands of this war, along with the wars in Korea and Vietnam, made it vital that senior service leaders had accurate information on the readiness of units in the Regular Army, the Army National Guard, and the Army Reserve. The methods for measuring readiness, however, soon became and then remained a matter of contention. Equally contentious was the use of data generated by readiness reporting systems, both within the service and by others outside the service. The end of the Cold War did not end these disputes. Indeed, the years between that victory and the start of the second Iraq war in 2003 were a time of heightened concern over military readiness and how to assess it."--Provided by publisher.

What happens to the US Army after the battles are over, the citizen soldiers depart, and all that remains is the Regular Army? In this pathbreaking work, Brian Linn argues that in each decade following every major conflict since the War of 1812 the postwar army has undergone a long, painful, and remarkably consistent recovery process as it struggled to build a new model force to replace the “Old Army” that entered the conflict. Departing from the Washington-centric institutional histories of the past, Linn sets his focus on soldiering in the field, distilling the lived experiences of officers and troopers who were responsible for cleaning up the messes left in the wake of war. Real Soldiering provides the first comprehensive study of the US Army’s transition from war to peace. It is both a wide-ranging history of the army’s postwar experience and a work detailing the commonalities of American soldiering over almost two centuries. Linn challenges three common historical interpretations: confusing Washington policy with implementation in the field; conflating postwar armies with prewar armies; and describing certain postwar eras as distinct and transformational. Rather, Linn examines the postwar force as a distinct entity worthy of study as a unique and important part of US Army history. He identifies the common dilemmas faced by the service in the aftermath of every war. These problems included such military priorities as defense legislation, preparing for the next war, and adapting to new missions. But they also incorporated often overlooked—but for those who lived through them more important—consistencies such as officer acquisition and career management, personnel turbulence, insufficient personnel and equipment, and many others. Real Soldiering represents over four decades of research into the US Army and is deeply informed by Linn’s experiences teaching and working with soldiers. It breaks new ground in lifting out the similarities of each postwar army while still appreciating their individual complexities. It identifies the leaders and the methods the service employed to escape the inevitable postwar drawdowns. Insightful and entertaining, provocative and empathetic, and a work of history with immediate relevance, Real Soldiering will resonate with military historians, defense analysts, and those who have proudly worn the US Army uniform.

"Forging a Total Force traces the evolution of the Guard and reserve from the Revolutionary War-era militias to today's operational reserve, an integral part of the nation's total force. In the early republic, the ideal of a citizen-solider, capable of taking the field with little or no training, predominated. The realities of modern combat slowly made it clear that a more professional force was required, but policy changes failed to keep up with that changing necessity. The nation struggled to provide adequate training and equipment to the reserve component throughout the Cold War until the idea of a Total Force, which integrated regular and reserve components, emerged and was achieved. It wasn't until the defense buildup of the 1980s that the ideal of a combat-ready reserve became reality. The core of this book focuses on what came next, from 1990 to 2011, with particular emphasis on the decade after 9/11. The Persian Gulf War demonstrated both the effectiveness of the reserve and the challenges it continued to face. The post-Cold War drawdown during the 1990s made the smaller active component more dependent on the reserves than it had been since the nation's founding. The reserve component proved itself yet again in the wars following 9/11, but also became strained as it became clear just how much the nation depended on its Guard and reserve. Finally, the authors detail the policy changes made midstream in an attempt to address issues with the overextended force, such as balancing training and deployment with civilian lives and careers, providing health care to reservists, and integrating the active and reserve components. The authors conclude by detailing the issues policymakers will face as they forge ahead with citizen-soldiers serving as an operational force."--Provided by publisher.

"The Drillmaster of Valley Forge-Baron Von Steuben-correctly noted in his "Blue Book" how physical conditioning and health (which he found woefully missing when he joined Washington's camp) would always be directly linked to individual and unit discipline, courage in the fight, and victory on the battlefield. That remains true today. Even an amateur historian, choosing any study on the performance of units in combat, quickly discovers how the levels of conditioning and physical performance of Soldiers is directly proportional to success or failure in the field. In this monograph, Dr. Whitfield "Chip" East provides a pragmatic history of physical readiness training in our Army. He tells us we initially mirrored the professional Armies of Europe as they prepared their forces for war on the continent. Then he introduces us to some master trainers, and shows us how they initiated an American brand of physical conditioning when our forces were found lacking in the early wars of the last century. Finally, he shows us how we have and must incorporate science (even when there exists considerable debate!) to contribute to what we do-and how we do it-in shaping today's Army. Dr. East provides the history, the analysis, and the pragmatism, and all of it is geared to understanding how our Army has and must train Soldiers for the physical demands of combat. Our culture is becoming increasingly ''unfit," due to poor nutrition, a lack of adequate and formal exercise, and too much technology. Still, the Soldiers who come to our Army from our society will be asked to fight in increasingly complex and demanding conflicts, and they must be prepared through new, unique, and scientifically based techniques. So while Dr. East's monograph is a fascinating history, it is also a required call for all leaders to better understand the science and the art of physical preparation for the battlefield. It was and is important for us to get this area of training right, because getting it right means a better chance for success in combat.

Volume 5, Deep Maneuver: Historical Case Studies of Maneuver in Large-Scale Combat Operations, presents eleven case studies from World War II through Operation Iraqi Freedom focusing on deep maneuver in terms of time, space and purpose. Deep operations require boldness and audacity, and yet carry an element of risk of overextension - especially in light of the independent factors of geography and weather that are ever-present. As a result, the case studies address not only successes, but also failure and shortfalls that result when conducting deep operations. The final two chapters address these considerations for future Deep Maneuver.

The defense debate tends to treat Afghanistan as either a revolution or a fluke: either the "Afghan Model" of special operations forces (SOF) plus precision munitions plus an indigenous ally is a widely applicable template for American defense planning, or it is a nonreplicable product of local idiosyncrasies. In fact, it is neither. The Afghan campaign of last fall and winter was actually much closer to a typical 20th century mid-intensity conflict, albeit one with unusually heavy fire support for one side. And this view has very different implications than either proponents or skeptics of the Afghan Model now claim. Afghan Model skeptics often point to Afghanistan's unusual culture of defection or the Taliban's poor skill or motivation as grounds for doubting the war's relevance to the future. Afghanistan's culture is certainly unusual, and there were many defections. The great bulk, however, occurred after the military tide had turned not before-hand. They were effects, not causes. The Afghan Taliban were surely unskilled and ill-motivated. The non-Afghan al Qaeda, however, have proven resolute and capable fighters. Their host's collapse was not attributable to any al Qaeda shortage of commitment or training. Afghan Model proponents, by contrast, credit precision weapons with annihilating enemies at a distance before they could close with our commandos or indigenous allies. Hence the model's broad utility: with SOF-directed bombs doing the real killing, even ragtag local militias will suffice as allies. All they need do is screen U.S. commandos from the occasional hostile survivor and occupy the abandoned ground thereafter. Yet the actual fighting in Afghanistan involved substantial close combat. Al Qaeda counterattackers closed, unseen, to pointblank range of friendly forces in battles at Highway 4 and Sayed Slim Kalay.