According to the final declaration of the 1954 Geneva Conference regarding Vietnam, general elections were to be held in July 1956 that would lead to the reunification of North and South Vietnam. The Geneva Agreement, however, was doomed from the start, as the South Vietnamese leaders did not suscribe to it and the leaders of the Communist North saw its value as primarily a propaganda tool. By 1956 it was obvious to all that reunification in accordance with the agreement was impossible, and the North Vietnamese looked to China for advice and assistance. Based on Vietnamese, Chinese, American and British sources--many only recently made available--this work examines Sino-Vietnamese relations in the early stages of the second Indochina conflict. The progression of the Vietnamese Communists' goals from primarily political to essentially military is traced. The book shows that the Hanoi government was remarkably in control of its own decision-making.

Why the world’s most resilient dictatorships are products of violent revolution Revolution and Dictatorship explores why dictatorships born of social revolution—such as those in China, Cuba, Iran, the Soviet Union, and Vietnam—are extraordinarily durable, even in the face of economic crisis, large-scale policy failure, mass discontent, and intense external pressure. Few other modern autocracies have survived in the face of such extreme challenges. Drawing on comparative historical analysis, Steven Levitsky and Lucan Way argue that radical efforts to transform the social and geopolitical order trigger intense counterrevolutionary conflict, which initially threatens regime survival, but ultimately fosters the unity and state-building that supports authoritarianism. Although most revolutionary governments begin weak, they challenge powerful domestic and foreign actors, often bringing about civil or external wars. These counterrevolutionary wars pose a threat that can destroy new regimes, as in the cases of Afghanistan and Cambodia. Among regimes that survive, however, prolonged conflicts give rise to a cohesive ruling elite and a powerful and loyal coercive apparatus. This leads to the downfall of rival organizations and alternative centers of power, such as armies, churches, monarchies, and landowners, and helps to inoculate revolutionary regimes against elite defection, military coups, and mass protest—three principal sources of authoritarian breakdown. Looking at a range of revolutionary and nonrevolutionary regimes from across the globe, Revolution and Dictatorship shows why governments that emerge from violent conflict endure.

Consists of an indepth analysis of the regularization of the party-military command relationship in Vietnam since 1975. It examines the system of leaders and analyses the effects of Soviet aid and the third Indochina War on the new system. Finally, it examines the rise in the VPA's professionalism and decline in its party values.

This book, first published in 1989, examines the creation and implementation of Communist policy in Vietnam during the crucial period between the 1954 Geneva Conference and the establishment of the National Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam in December 1960. This study challenges long-held views about the origins and nature of the Viet Cong. It carefully examines the various stages in the struggle for ‘national liberation’ during this period, reviews the consequences of the failure of purely political means to achieve reunification and then focuses on the struggle between the Diem regime and the Communists.

Existing studies of the Vietnam War have been written mostly from an American perspective, using western sources, and viewing the conflict through western eyes. This book, based on extensive original research, including Vietnamese, Chinese and former Soviet sources, presents a history of the war from the perspective of the Vietnamese communists. It charts relations with Moscow and Beijing, showing how the involvement of the two major communist powers changed over time, and how the Vietnamese, despite their huge dependence on the Chinese and the Soviets, were most definitely in charge of their own decision making. Overall, it provides an important corrective to the many one-sided studies of the war, and presents a very interesting new perspective.