The U.S. Army's Transition to the All-Volunteer Force is a compelling analysis of the process by which the Army responded to the requirements of creating an all-volunteer force, reestablished in the United States at midnight on 30 June 1973 when induction authority expired. That the transition from virtual dependency on the draft to a manpower system based on volunteerism was accomplished nearly simultaneously with the withdrawal from Vietnam is all the more remarkable. Robert K. Griffith Jr. takes us through the turbulent years of transition from 1968 to 1974, examining both the broad context in which the end of the draft occurred and the less well-known perspective that Army leaders brought to bear on the challenge they faced. In spite of an environment of fierce opposition, those charged with developing and implementing the Army's three-phased program to achieve all-volunteer status persevered and approached the task with a determination to succeed. Griffith's history shows the key role played by the Army staff and Army secretariat in shaping the Army as it underwent deep alterations in the very foundations of its structure. It provides both a glimpse into the dynamics of the reciprocal relationship between the Army and society, and is a useful case study of the successful management of fundamental organizational change.

The all-volunteer force, the historic norm in peacetime America, was reestablished in the U.S. on 30 June 1973, when induction authority expired. But never before had the U.S. attempted to field a standing Army in peacetime -- based on voluntary enlistments -- with the worldwide responsibilities that faced this force. Since the mid-1980s the ability of the armed forces to recruit and retain quality volunteers has not been seriously questioned. This book takes us through those years of transition, examining both the context in which the end of the draft occurred and the perspective which the Army's leaders brought to bear on the challenge they faced.

As U.S. military forces appear overcommitted and some ponder a possible return to the draft, the timing is ideal for a review of how the American military transformed itself over the past five decades, from a poorly disciplined force of conscripts and draft-motivated "volunteers" to a force of professionals revered throughout the world. Starting in the early 1960s, this account runs through the current war in Iraq, with alternating chapters on the history of the all-volunteer force and the analytic background that supported decisionmaking. The author participated as an analyst and government policymaker in many of the events covered in this book. His insider status and access offer a behind-the-scenes look at decisionmaking within the Pentagon and White House. The book includes a foreword by former Secretary of Defense Melvin R. Laird. The accompanying DVD contains more than 1,700 primary-source documents-government memoranda, Presidential memos and letters, staff papers, and reports-linked directly from citations in the electronic version of the book. This unique technology presents a treasure trove of materials for specialists, researchers, and students of military history, public administration, and government affairs to draw upon.

Having evolved over the past two and a quarter centuries to become the premier military force in the world, the U.S. Army has a heritage rich in history and tradition. This historical dictionary provides short, clear, authoritative entries on a broad cross section of military terms, concepts, arms and equipment, units and organizations, campaigns and battles, and people who have had a significant impact on Army. It includes over 900 entries written by some 100 scholars, providing a valuable resource for the interested reader, student, and researcher. For those interested in pursuing specific subjects further, the book provides sources at the end of each entry as well as a general bibliography. Appendixes provide a useful list of abbreviations and acronyms and a listing of ranks and grades in the U.S. Army.

During the 2 decades preceding the Persian Gulf War in 1991, the U.S. Army went through tremendous reform and rejuvenation. In explaining this important case of military change, this paper makes four central arguments. First, leaders within military organizations are essential; external developments most often have an indeterminate impact on military change. Second, military reform is about more than changing doctrine. To implement its doctrine, an organization must have appropriate training practices, personnel policies, organizations, equipment, and leader development programs. Third, the implementation of comprehensive change requires an organizational entity with broad authority able to craft, evaluate, and execute an integrated program of reforms. In the case of the U.S. Army in the 1970s and 1980s, this organization was the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC). To an unprecedented degree, TRADOC was able to ensure that changes in personnel policies, organizations, doctrine, training practices, and equipment were integrated and mutually reinforcing. Fourth and finally, the process of developing, implementing, and institutionalizing complementary reforms can take several decades. While today's demands differ from those of the past, this report suggests questions that may be useful in thinking about change today. Knowing the answers to these questions would enable informed judgment about the prospects for the successful implementation of a program of reforms. The consequences, for good or for ill, could be quite significant in terms of resources, lives, and the national interest.