The catastrophic crisis of late 2001 and early 2002 marks the tragic end to Argentina's initially successful, decade-long experiment with sound money and market-oriented economic reform. The IMF consistently Supported Argentina's stabilization and reform efforts in the decade leading up to the current crisis and often pointed to many of Argentina's policies as examples for other emerging-market economies to emulate. In this policy analysis, former IMF Chief Economist Michael Mussa addresses the obvious question: What went wrong in Argentina and what important errors did the IMF make in either supporting inappropriate policies or in failing to press for alternatives that might have avoided catastrophe? He emphasizes that the persistent inability of the Argentine authorities at all levels to run a responsible fiscal policy--even when the Argentine economy was performing very well--was the primary avoidable cause of the country's catastrophic financial collapse. The IMF failed to press aggressively for a more responsible fiscal policy. Mussa also addresses the role of the Convertibility Plan, which linked the Argentine peso rigidly at parity with the US dollar and played a central role in both the initial success and ultimate collapse of Argentina's stabilization and reform efforts. While the IMF accepted this plan as a basic policy choice of the Argentine authorities so long as it remained viable, it erred in the summer of 2001 by extending further massive support for unsustainable policies, rather than insisting on a new policy strategy that might have mitigated some of the damage from a crisis that had become unavoidable. Mussa lays out what needs to be done to restore economic andfinancial stability in Argentina and begin the process of recovery, including the proper role of the IMF and the international community. He also examines what the IMF can do to avoid repeating the types of mistakes it made in t

The International Monetary Fund (IMF) has played a critical role in the global economy since the postwar era. But, claims Claudia Kedar, behind the strictly economic aspects of the IMF’s intervention, there are influential interactions between IMF technocrats and local economists—even when countries are not borrowing money. In The International Monetary Fund and Latin America, Kedar seeks to expose the motivations and constraints of the operations of both the IMF and borrowers. With access to never-before-seen archive materials, Kedar reveals both the routine and behind-the-scenes practices that have depicted International Monetary Fund–Latin American relations in general and the asymmetrical IMF-Argentina relations in particular. Kedar also analyzes the “routine of dependency” that characterizes IMF-borrower relations with several Latin American countries such as Chile, Peru, and Brazil. The International Monetary Fund and Latin America shows how debtor countries have adopted IMF’s policies during past decades and why Latin American leaders today largely refrain from knocking at the IMF’s doors again.

In 2001- 02, Argentina experienced one of the worst economic crises in its history. A default on government debt, which occurred against the backdrop of a prolonged recession, sent the Argentine currency and economy into a tailspin. Although the economy has since recovered from the worst, the crisis has imposed hardships on the people of Argentina, and the road back to sustained growth and stability is long. The crisis was all the more troubling in light of the fact that Argentina was widely considered a model reformer and was engaged in a succession of IMF-supported programs through much of the 1990s. This Occasional Paper examines the origins of the crisis and its evolution up to early 2002 and draws general policy lessons, both for countries’ efforts to prevent crises and for the IMF’s surveillance and use of its financial resources.

The author of "The Chastening" returns with this definitive account of the most spectacular economic meltdown of modern times as he exposes dangerous flaws of the global financial system.

A sweeping critical account of the financial crises that rocked East Asia and other parts of the world beginning with the collapse of the Thai baht in 1997. Padma Desai retraces the story of Asia's "Crisis Five"--Indonesia, Malaysia, South Korea, the Philippines and Thailand.

This book examines the causes of the economic and political crisis in Argentina in 2001 and the process of strong economic recovery. It poses the question of how a country which defaulted on its external loans and was widely criticized by international observers could have succeeded in its growth and development despite this decision in 2002. It examines this process in terms of the impact of neo-liberal policies on the economy and the role of development strategy and the state in recovering from the crisis