This paper examines outsourcing and its potential impact on the operational commander. The author attempts to show the reader that outsourcing may not be in the best interest of either the operational commander or the Department of Defense (DoD). Additionally, the author makes an assertion that outsourcing may not be producing the vast returns that DoD has touted over recent years. In the eyes of the author, outsourcing simply moves funds from one account to another in order to pay contractors for the same services previously performed by military members or government civilians. This paper advocates that by outsourcing services, the government ultimately surrenders a significant amount of control over DoD operations. American corporations (to include the powerful small business Political Action Committees or PACs) vigorously lobby members of congress to open up DoD jobs for outsourcing. DoD obliges congress by continuing to outsource military services which in-turn shifts significant control over to DoD contracting officers and away from commanding officers. Is this smart business for the operation commander?

Since the Cold War, the United States and United Kingdom (UK) armed services have undergone significant transformation in response to the radically altered threat environment, new operational demands, and reduced defense budgets. Central to this transformation in both states is an expanded role for private contractors in providing deployed support functions traditionally conducted by uniformed personnel. Despite the similar direction of military reform, the U.S. armed services' approach to battlefield outsourcing has undergone extensive public scrutiny and debate, whereas UK Ministry of Defence (MoD) initiatives have hitherto attracted comparatively little independent assessment. Close U.S.-UK military cooperation over recent years in Afghanistan and Iraq, and the likelihood that both states will remain close allies in future interventions, suggest that the UK MoD's approach to deployed contractor support is a salient issue for U.S. military planners. This monograph analyzes the MoD's outsourcing strategy and identifies those aspects of UK policy and doctrine that warrant consideration by the Department of Defense (DoD) and U.S. armed services. Evaluation of the performance of MoD outsourcing policy and doctrine against measures of cost effectiveness and operational effectiveness reveals two broad observations. The MoD has developed a number of novel command and control mechanisms that have succeeded in rationalizing and removing the risk in commercial battlefield support. But the data necessary to evaluate the real impact of deployed outsourcing have yet to enter the public domain. Similarly, questions remain about the relative cost-effectiveness of organic military provision and contractor alternatives. Comparative analysis indicates that there are no fundamental differences in overarching MoD and DoD outsourcing philosophy, but there are specific MoD initiatives that could enhance the U.S. armed services' ability to manage their deployed contractor support. 7.

The DoD relies extensively on contractors to support deployed forces for services that range from food and housing services to intelligence analysis. Since 1997, there have been reports on DoD¿s shortcomings in managing and overseeing its use of contractor support. Part of the difficulty attributed to these shortcomings is that no one person or entity made the decision to send 129,000 contractors to Iraq. Rather, numerous DoD activities were involved, thus adding to the complexity of the problems. This testimony focuses on the problems that DoD has faced, & future challenges, in managing & overseeing its contractor support to deployed forces. Charts & tables.

The Department of Defense (DoD) is implementing a Revolution in Business Affairs (RBA) with the purpose of freeing resources for the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA). The goal of the RBA is to transform how DoD conducts business. As part of this RBA, DoD has undertaken outsourcing studies using the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) Circular A-76 and related initiatives. The objective of these initiatives is to generate the cost savings needed to fuel the RMA. Survey responses indicated a high degree of dissatisfaction with A-76 and other cost-based outsourcing initiatives. However, it should be noted the sample population was quite small and was skewed toward installation commanders, the executors of current outsourcing policies. Thirteen hundred surveys were sent out and 234 responses were received. Of these 234 responses, 111 identified themselves as being in a position of command (30 Army, 63 Air Force, and 18 Navy/ Marine Corps). The nature of the responses received indicates that there are significant issues the Department must address. In the course of their research, the authors have noted that DoD focuses almost exclusively on efficiency when conducting business operations. Almost no emphasis is given to devising effective business strategies or examining efficiencies in terms of a value proposition. This drive to the "bottom line" assumes DoD already has an effective business strategy and it merely needs to fine-tune the operation. Rather, DoD should garner the most performance for every dollar spent rather than spending the least amount of dollars. In complex integrated systems, aggregate and not isolated efficiencies must be the focus. By ignoring this, there is an inherent risk that tactical pursuit of cost reductions at the business unit level will drive adverse strategic outcomes.

Contractors provide a broad range of support to U.S. forces deployed to Afghanistan and Iraq, with the number of contractors at times exceeding the number of military personnel in each country. The DoD has acknowledged shortcomings in how the role of contractors was addressed in its planning for Iraq and Afghanistan. This report assesses DoD's development of contract support plans. It examines: (1) what progress DoD has made in developing operational contract support annexes for its operation plans; (2) the extent to which contract requirements are included in other sections of operation plans; and (3) DoD's progress in establishing a long-term capability to include operational contract support requirements in operation plans. Charts and tables.

For decades, the DoD has relied on contractors to support contingency operations and recognizes them as part of the total force. In Iraq and Afghanistan contractor personnel now outnumber deployed troops. In Iraq more than 95,000 DoD contractors support 92,000 troops, and in Afghanistan more than 112,000 DoD contractors support approx. 94,000 troops. DoD anticipates that the number of contractors will grow in Afghanistan as the dept. increases its troop presence in that country. Several long-standing challenges have hindered DoD¿s ability to manage and oversee contractors at deployed locations. This testimony addresses the extent to which DoD has institutionalized operational contract support. Illustrations.