This book focuses bilateral cooperation between antitrust agencies, in particular the EC and the US agencies.

U.S. Antitrust Law and Enforcement provides readers with an updated unique and straight-forward introduction to United States antitrust law. This book delivers a one-stop introduction to the entire field of antitrust law and practice, allowing law firm and in-house practitioners who do not specialize in antitrust, foreign attorneys, newly-minted lawyers, and law students to quickly gain an understanding of the wide variety of issues and policies affected by U.S. antitrust laws. The Second Edition features new Supreme Court decisions as well as analyses of important revisions to the Merger Guidelines used by the federal antitrust enforcement agencies and to the Hart-Scott-Rodino Rules and the premerger notification report form. U.S. Antitrust Law and Enforcement helps attorneys develop the ability to spot and analyze antitrust law issues by providing an approachable overview of the statutes and regulations that make up the law, the leading Supreme Court decisions that create the framework for analysis found in lower court cases, the elements that must be proved to make out a claim under the various antitrust laws, and the guidelines and policy statements that describe antitrust enforcement at the federal agency level.

Eisner contends that Reagan's economic agenda, reinforced by limited prosecution of antitrust offenses, was an extension of well established trends. During the 1960s and 1970s, critical shifts in economic theory within the academic community were transmitted to the Antitrust Division and the FTC--shifts that were conservative and gave Reagan a background against which to operate. Annotation(c) 2003 Book News, Inc., Portland, OR (booknews.com)

Some of the chief aims of President Ronald Reagan's economic agenda were to reduce the "regulatory burden," minimize state intervention, and reinvigorate market mechanisms. Toward these ends, his administration limited antitrust enforcement to technical cases of price-fixing, invoking the doctrine of the Chicago school of economics. In Antitrust and the Triumph of Economics, Marc Eisner shows that the so-called "Reagan revolution" was but an extension of well-established trends. He examines organizational and procedural changes in the Antitrust Division of the Department of Jusice and the Federal Trade Commission that predated the 1980 election and forced the subsequent redefinition of policy. During their early years, the Antitrust Division and the FTC gave little attention to economic analysis. In the period following World War II, however, economic analysis assumed an increasingly important role in both agencies, and economists rose in status from being members of support staff to being pivotal decision makers who, in effect, shaped the policies for which elected officials were generally assumed to be responsible. In the 1960s and 1970s, critical shifts in prevailing economic theory within the academic community were transmitted into the agencies. This had a profound effect on how antitrust was conceptualized in the federal government. Thus, when Ronald Reagan became president in 1981, the antitrust agencies were already pursuing a conservative enforcement program. Eisner's study challenges dominant explanations of policy change through a focus on institutional evolution. It has important implications for current debates on the state, professionalization, and the delegation of authority. Originally published in 1991. A UNC Press Enduring Edition -- UNC Press Enduring Editions use the latest in digital technology to make available again books from our distinguished backlist that were previously out of print. These editions are published unaltered from the original, and are presented in affordable paperback formats, bringing readers both historical and cultural value.