Intercollegiate sports is an enterprise that annually grosses over $1 billion in income. Some schools may receive more than $20 million from athletic programs, perhaps as much as $10 million simply from the sale of football tickets. Drawing on nontechnical economic data, the authors present a persuasive case that the premier sports organization of colleges and universities in the United States--the NCAA--is a cartel, its members engaged in classically defined restrictive practices for the sole purpose of jointly maximizing their profits. This fresh perspective on the NCAA offers explanations of why illicit payments to athletes persist, why non-NCAA organizations have not flourished, and why members have readily agreed on certain suspect rules. Tracing the historical development of this institutional behavior, the authors argue that the major football powers in the early 1950s were able to gain control of the internal processes of NCAA enforcement. Over time--as other schools' teams improved and began to win on the playing field--the more powerful institutions applied pressure to bring the newcomers under NCAA investigation and, ultimately, to place them on probation. By carefully managing NCAA enforcement regulations, major schools blunted the threat to their continued growth presented by other teams. Offering a valuable case study for sports analysts and students of economics and cartel behavior, this book is a revealing glimpse inside the embattled NCAA.