Paul Rookes and Jane Willson explain perception and perceptual processes in a way that almost anyone can understand. The study of perception, or how the brain processes information from the senses , has fascinated psychologists and philosophers for a long time. Perception takes the key research areas and presents the arguments and findings in a clear, concise form, enabling the reader to have a quick working knowledge of the area. This clear and informative text discusses sensation and perception then looks at theories and explanations of perception. The way visual perception is structured is examined, followed by an analysis of the development of perceptual processes. The authors then consider individual social and cultural variations in perceptual organisation. Perception will be particularly useful to students new to higher-level study. With its helpful textbook features to assist in examination and learning techniques, it should interest all introductory psychology students.

This book provides a comprehensive account of the intentionality of perceptual experience. With special emphasis on vision Searle explains how the raw phenomenology of perception sets the content and the conditions of satisfaction of experience. The central question concerns the relation between the subjective conscious perceptual field and the objective perceptual field. Everything in the objective field is either perceived or can be perceived. Nothing in the subjective field is perceived nor can be perceived precisely because the events in the subjective field consist of the perceivings, whether veridical or not, of the events in the objective field. Searle begins by criticizing the classical theories of perception and identifies a single fallacy, what he calls the Bad Argument, as the source of nearly all of the confusions in the history of the philosophy of perception. He next justifies the claim that perceptual experiences have presentational intentionality and shows how this justifies the direct realism of his account. In the central theoretical chapters, he shows how it is possible that the raw phenomenology must necessarily determine certain form of intentionality. Searle introduces, in detail, the distinction between different levels of perception from the basic level to the higher levels and shows the internal relation between the features of the experience and the states of affairs presented by the experience. The account applies not just to language possessing human beings but to infants and conscious animals. He also discusses how the account relates to certain traditional puzzles about spectrum inversion, color and size constancy and the brain-in-the-vat thought experiments. In the final chapters he explains and refutes Disjunctivist theories of perception, explains the role of unconscious perception, and concludes by discussing traditional problems of perception such as skepticism.

With originality and clarity, Harold Brown outlines first the logical empiricist tradition and then the more historical and process-oriented approach he calls the “new philosophy of science.” Examining the two together, he describes the very transition between them as an example of the kind of change in historical tradition with which the new philosophy of science concerns itself. “I would recommend it to every historian of science and to every philosopher of science. . . . I found it clear, readable, accurate, cogent, insightful, perceptive, judicious, and full of original ideas.” —Maurice A. Finocchiaro, Isis “The best and most original aspect of the book is its overall conception.” —Thomas S. Kuhn Harold I. Brown is professor of philosophy at Northern Illinois University.

Observer Mechanics: A Formal Theory of Perception provides information pertinent to the fundamental aspects of perception. This book provides an approach to the study of perception that attempts to be both general and rigorous. Organized into 10 chapters, this book begins with an overview of the structure of perceptual capacity. This text then presents the relationship between observers and Turing machines. Other chapters provide a formal framework in which to describe an observer and its objects of perception, and then develop from this framework a perceptual dynamics. This book discusses as well the conditions in which an observer may be said to perceive truly and discusses how stabilities in perceptual dynamics might permit the genesis of higher level observers. The final chapter deals with the relationship between the formalisms of quantum mechanics and observer mechanics. This book is a valuable resource for physicists, psychophysicists, philosophers, cognitive scientists, and perceptual psychologists.

This posthumous volume, the culmination of a long and distinguished career, brings together an original essay by the author together with a careful selection of previously published articles (most by Rock) on the theory that perception is an indirect process in which visual experience is derived by inference, rather than being directly and independently determined by retinal stimulation.

Brian J. Rogers analyses the psychological and philosophical aspects of perception, and argues that what we see is not what we perceive. He investigates recent insights gained from the use of imaging techniques, and the attempts to model perceptual processes in AI systems.

What is the nature of, and what is the relationship between, external objects and our visual perceptual experience of them? In this book, Frank Jackson defends the answers provided by the traditional Representative theory of perception. He argues, among other things that we are never immediately aware of external objects, that they are the causes of our perceptual experiences and that they have only the primary qualities. In the course of the argument, sense data and the distinction between mediate and immediate perception receive detailed defences and the author criticises attempts to reduce perceiving the believing and to show that the Representative theory makes the external world unknowable. Jackson recognises that his views are unfashionable but argues in detail that they are to be preferred to their currently favoured competitors. It will become an obvious point of reference for all future work on the philosophy of perception.