This book in welfare economics covers concepts such as Pareto optimality in a market economy, the compensation criterion and the social welfare function.

This is the first book in welfare economics to be primarily intended for undergraduates and non-specialists. Concepts such as Pareto optimality in a market economy, the compensation criterion, and the social welfare function are explored in detail. Market failures are analysed by using different ways of measuring welfare changes. The book also examines public choice, and the issues of provision of public goods, median voter equilibrium, government failures, efficient and optimal taxation, and intergenerational equity. The three final chapters are devoted to applied welfare economics: methods for revealing people's preferences, cost-benefit analysis, and project evaluation in a risky world. The book is intended for introductory and intermediate courses in welfare economics, microeconomics, and public economics. It will also be suitable for courses in health economics, environmental economics, and cost-benefit analysis, as well as those undertaking project evaluations in government agencies and private firms.

This book could not have been possible without collaborative efforts and support of my colleagues at Dronacharya Govt. College Gurugram, Haryana, India. My special thanks to Prof. Bhup Singh, Head of the Dept., Sociology who always inspires me to do research work, papers presentation in seminars and writing of books/articles/papers etc. I am also very thankful to my colleagues and friends Dr. Sudhir Samantrai, Dr. Mool Chand, Ms. Nitasha Joon, Shri Sandeep Yadav, Dr. Sushil K. Saini, Dr. Karamvir, Dr. Garima Yadav, Sachin, Dr. Sunita who helped me directly or indirectly at many occasions in the college.

This clear and balanced introduction to welfare economics reflects the most recent advances in the field. Designed for third-year undergraduate and graduate courses, it offers an extensive treatment of both the theory of welfare economics and the techniques for applying that theory to real problems. The first part of the book presents a synthesis of the theory. Starting from the premise that the purpose of theory is to provide criteria for ordering alternative economic states, the authors analyse the relationship between individual and social orderings. They discuss the conditions of Pareto efficiency and optimality as well as the ways in which market economies may fail to achieve a Pareto optimal allocation of resources. They go on to evaluate the theory of social welfare functions, paying particular attention to recent developments. The second part of the book considers the principles of applied welfare economics. Developing the use of the compensating variation as their main tool, the authors discuss welfare change measurement in single-person and many-person economies. In the final chapter they survey the recent literature on cost-benefit analysis.

This innovative history of welfare economics challenges the view that welfare economics can be discussed without taking ethical values into account. Whatever their theoretical commitments, when economists have considered practical problems relating to public policy, they have adopted a wider range of ethical values, whether equality, justice, freedom, or democracy. Even canonical authors in the history of welfare economics are shown to have adopted ethical positions different from those with which they are commonly associated. Welfare Theory, Public Action, and Ethical Values explores the reasons and implications of this, drawing on concepts of welfarism and non-welfarism developed in modern welfare economics. The authors exemplify how economic theory, public affairs and political philosophy interact, challenging the status quo in order to push economists and historians to reconsider the nature and meaning of welfare economics.

This book covers the main topics of welfare economics — general equilibrium models of exchange and production, Pareto optimality, un certainty, externalities and public goods — and some of the major topics of social choice theory — compensation criteria, fairness, voting. Arrow's Theorem, and the theory of implementation. The underlying question is this: "Is a particular economic or voting mechanism good or bad for society?" Welfare economics is mainly about whether the market mechanism is good or bad; social choice is largely about whether voting mechanisms, or other more abstract mechanisms, can improve upon the results of the market. This second edition updates the material of the first, written by Allan Feldman. It incorporates new sections to existing first-edition chapters, and it includes several new ones. Chapters 4, 6, 11, 15 and 16 are new, added in this edition. The first edition of the book grew out of an undergraduate welfare economics course at Brown University. The book is intended for the undergraduate student who has some prior familiarity with microeconomics. However, the book is also useful for graduate students and professionals, economists and non-economists, who want an overview of welfare and social choice results unburdened by detail and mathematical complexity. Welfare economics and social choice both probably suffer from ex cessively technical treatments in professional journals and monographs.