V. 1. Introduction to American constitutionalism -- The colonial era : before 1776 -- The funding era : 1776-1788 -- The early national era : 1789-1828 -- The Jacksonian era : 1829-1860 -- Secession, Civil War, and Reconstruction : 1861-1876 -- The Republican era : 1877-1932 -- The New Deal and Great Society era : 1933-1968 -- Liberalism divided : 1969-1980 -- The Reagan era : 1981-1993 -- The contemporary era : 1994-present.

"Constitutionalism in the United States is not determined solely by decisions made by the Supreme Court. Rather, a robust and meaningful understanding of American Constitutionalism requires a consideration of the historical and political context in which the Supreme Court delivers its rulings. With this premise as a point of departure, renowned legal scholars Howard Gillman, Mark A. Graber, and Keith E. Whittington move beyond traditional casebooks and take a refreshingly innovative approach to the study of Constitutional Law in American Constitutionalism Volumes I and II. Organized according to the standard two-semester Constitutional Law sequence, Volume I covers "Structures of Government" and Volume II covers "Rights and Liberties." Moreover, this text is offers a unique approach to its subject matter organizing the material within each volume according to historical era instead of the typical issues-based approach. Given the rapid pace of Supreme Court decisions, the landscape of Constitutionalism in the United States remains dynamic and fluid. As such, the new edition of American Constitutionalism Volumes I and II will include full coverage of major Supreme Court cases, decisions, and their political contexts through 2020, including coverage of the Obama and Trump administrations"--

Federalists vision of the Constitution; an interdisciplinary investigation.

Constitutionalism in the United States is not determined solely by decisions made by the Supreme Court. Moving beyond traditional casebooks, renowned scholars Howard Gillman, Mark A. Graber, and Keith E. Whittington take a refreshingly innovative approach in American Constitutionalism by presenting the material in a historical organization instead of the typical issues-based one. A single-volume edition of the authors' acclaimed two-volume text, this book is ideal for courses that cover the structures of government and civil rights and liberties in one semester or for two-semester courses that are organized historically. FEATURES * Covers all important debates in U.S. constitutionalism, organized by historical era * Incorporates readings from all of the prominent participants in those debates * Clearly lays out the political and legal contexts in chapter introductions * Integrates more documents and cases than other texts, including decisions made by elected officials and state courts * Offers numerous pedagogical features, including topical sections within each historical chapter, bulleted lists of major developments, explanatory headnotes for the readings, questions on court cases, illustrations and political cartoons, tables, and suggested readings

“American republicans,” notes Forrest McDonald, “regarded selected doctrines of Montesquieu’s as being virtually on par with Holy Writ.” But exactly how the French jurist’s labyrinthian work, The Spirit of the Laws, with was published in 1748, influenced the eighteenth-century conception of the republic is not well understood by historians or theorists. Anne M. Cohler undertakes to show the importance of Montequieu’s teaching for modern legislation and for modern political prudence generally, with specific reference to his impact on the Federalist and Tocqueville. In so doing, she delineates Montequieu’s contribution to political philosophy and suggests new ways to think about the formation of the American Constitution. To analyze the comparative politics found in the Spirit of the Laws, Cohler focuses on four fundamental principles underlying Montesquieu’s view of government: spirit, moderation, liberty, and legislation. In this endeavor she is guided by the conviction that the philosopher hews to the spirit of the laws rather than to the laws themselves—that is, to internal rather than external principles. Montesquieu, in Cohler’s argument, addresses the problem posed by the tendency to see human beings in light o universal abstractions at the expense of particular relationships, distinctions, and forms. To counter this tendency, which can be fostered by religion, Montesquieu develops a theory of prudence designed to support the world of politics an dpolitical life, necessarily an intermediate world occupying a space between universal abstractions and individual particularities. Cohler suggest that the Federalists and Tocqueville were most influenced by this preoccupation with spirit and moderation. James Madison and other Federalists, for example, were not drawn to limited government as a principled notion but rather as a consequence of understanding the context within which a moderate government must act not to become despotic. Similarly, Tocqueville extols democracy as self-government as an antidote to the dangers of democracy as a rule; the character of the governed shapes the nature of the governors. These and other conclusions will prove valuable to intellectual historians, political theorists, and students of religion.

Constitutional law's central narrative in the 20th century has been one of radical reinterpretation--Brown v. Board of Education, Roe v. Wade, Bush v. Gore. What justifies this phenomenon? How does it work doctrinally? What structures it or limits it? Rubenfeld finds a pattern in constitutional interpretation that answers these questions.

Dred Scott and the Problem of Constitutional Evil , first published in 2006, concerns what is entailed by pledging allegiance to a constitutional text and tradition saturated with concessions to evil. The Constitution of the United States was originally understood as an effort to mediate controversies between persons who disputed fundamental values, and did not offer a vision of the good society. In order to form a 'more perfect union' with slaveholders, late-eighteenth-century citizens fashioned a constitution that plainly compelled some injustices and was silent or ambiguous on other questions of fundamental right. This constitutional relationship could survive only as long as a bisectional consensus was required to resolve all constitutional questions not settled in 1787. Dred Scott challenges persons committed to human freedom to determine whether antislavery northerners should have provided more accommodations for slavery than were constitutionally strictly necessary or risked the enormous destruction of life and property that preceded Lincoln's new birth of freedom.