Examines the capabilities and costs of the fighter force fielded under the DOD's FY 2009 plans.

The U.S. Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps are in the process of replacing the bulk of today¿s fighter aircraft ¿ most of which were purchased in the 1980s ¿ with new F/A-18E/F, F-22, and F-35 (Joint Strike Fighter) aircraft. Although current procurement plans call for the purchase of about 2,500 aircraft over the next 25 years, the services are projecting that those purchases will not keep pace with the need to retire today¿s aircraft as they reach the limit of their service life. This study examines the capabilities and costs of the fighter force under DoD plans and the potential implications for DoD¿s long-term budget and inventory levels if planned purchases of new aircraft are insufficient to maintain fighter inventories called for by current service requirements.

This report explores the near-term modernization choices now facing the Department of Defense (DoD) in fixed-wing air power. Presently, the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) program is the largest programmatic element in the Pentagon's plans for modernizing US air power. At $242 billion (fiscal year 2008 dollars) for 2,443 aircraft, the F-35 program, if executed as currently constituted, would be the most costly single aircraft prgoram in DoD history. As such, the focus of this report is on the need for and affordability of the three JSF variants now planned: 1) a conventional take-off landing (CTOL) variant (the F-35A) for the Air Force; 2) a short take-off, vertical-landing (STOVL) variant (F-35B) for the Marine Corps; and 3) the F-35C carrier variant (CV) for the Navy's aircraft carriers.

Fighter aircraft in the Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps represent a major part of U.S. combat capability. But maintaining that capability will be costly. DoD plans to purchase more than 3,700 new tactical fighters over the next 27 years at a combined cost of almost $340 billion, according to Congressional Budget Office (CBO) estimates. My testimony today addresses the following questions: (1) How balanced are DoD's tactical aviation plans? Do they purchase aircraft in sufficient quantities to halt fleet aging? Will DoD need to reduce the numbers of its tactical fighter forces or to equip them less generously in the future? (2) Are the plans affordable, or does it appear that funds for tactical aviation could squeeze out other priority programs absent significantly increased funding for purchases? (3) How do this year's budget submission out-year assumptions and estimates affect the execution of the tactical aviation modernization plan? (4) Do DoD's plans for tactical fighters and other strike assets represent the best and most efficient resource mix? (5) What is your assessment of the attempts to reconcile the differences in cost estimating methodologies that have led CBO and DoD to reach different conclusions about overall affordability of the tactical aviation modernization program? My statement focuses on the costs and affordability of DoD's current plans and whether those plans, if carried out, would buy enough aircraft to meet requirements and keep fleets from growing older. However, CBO has not attempted to construct or analyze alternatives to those plans.