In his work On Sense Perception, Aristotle discusses the material conditions of perception, starting with the sense organs and moving to the material basis of colour, flavour and odour. His Pythagorean account of hues as a ratio of dark to light was enthusiastically endorsed by Goethe against Newton as being true to the painter's experience. Aristotle finishes with three problems about continuity. First, in what sense are indefinitely small colour patches or colour variations perceptible? Secondly, which perceptible leap discontinuously like light to fill a whole space, which have to reach one point before another; and do observers of the latter perceive the same thing if they are at different distances? Thirdly, how does the central sense permit genuinely simultaneous, rather than staggered, perception of different objects? Alexander's highly explanatory commentary is most expansive on these problems of continuity. His battery of objections to vision involving travel, which would lead to collisions and interference by winds, inspired a tradition of grading the five senses in respect of degrees of immateriality and of intentionality. He also introduces us to paradoxes of Diodorus Cronus about the relations of the smallest perceptible to the largest perceptible size.

A translation of Alexander of Aphrodisias' philosophical commentary on Aristotle's work On Sense Perception, with extensive commentary notes, introduction and indexes.

"In his work On Sense Perception, Aristotle discusses the material conditions of perception, starting with the sense organs and moving to the material basis of colour, flavour and odour. His Pythagorean account of hues as a ratio of dark to light was enthusiastically endorsed by Goethe against Newton as being true to the painter's experience. Aristotle finishes with three problems about continuity. First, in what sense are indefinitely small colour patches or colour variations perceptible? Secondly, which perceptible leap discontinuously like light to fill a whole space, which have to reach one point before another; and do observers of the latter perceive the same thing if they are at different distances? Thirdly, how does the central sense permit genuinely simultaneous, rather than staggered, perception of different objects? Alexander's highly explanatory commentary is most expansive on these problems of continuity. His battery of objections to vision involving travel, which would lead to collisions and interference by winds, inspired a tradition of grading the five senses in respect of degrees of immateriality and of intentionality. He also introduces us to paradoxes of Diodorus Cronus about the relations of the smallest perceptible to the largest perceptible size."--Bloomsbury Publishing.

Alexander of Aphrodisias was the greatest exponent of Aristotelianism after Aristotle, and his commentary on Metaphysics 1-5 is the most substantial commentary on the Metaphysics to have survived from antiquity. The commentary on book 1 has the further interest that over half of it is devoted to Aristotle's discussion of Plato. Aristotle's battery of objectives to the theory of Ideas is spelled out with fragmentary quotations and paraphrases from four of Aristotle's lost works, and we are given an extended account of Plato's 'unwritten doctrines' according to which the Ideas are numbers, namely the One and Indefinite Dyad. The deliberations for and against the theory of Ideas recorded by Alexander are more detailed than anything in Plato's dialogues and tell us more than any other source how they were conceived in Plato's most developed theory.

Aristotle's Topics is about dialectic, which can be understood as a debate between two people or the inner debate of one thinker with himself. Its purposes range from philosophical training to discovering the first principles of thought. Its arguments concern the four predicables (definition, property, genus and accident). Aristotle explains how these four fit into his ten categories, and in Book 1 begins to outline strategies for debate, such as the definition of ambiguity. Alexander's commentary on Book 1 discusses how to define Aristotelian syllogistic argument, why it stands up against the rival Stoic theory of interference, and what is the character of inductive interference and of rhetorical argument. He distinguishes inseparable accidents such as the whiteness of snow from defining differentiae such as its being frozen, and considers how these fit into the scheme of categories. He speaks of dialectic as a stochastic discipline in which success is to be judged not by victory but by skill in argument, a view parallel to that sometimes taken in antiquity of medical practice. And he investigates the subject of ambiguity which had also been richly developed since Aristotle by the rival Stoic school.

"Simplicius and Priscian were two of the seven Neoplatonists who left Athens when the Christian Emperor Justinian closed the paganschool there in A.D. 529. The commentaries ascribed to them on works on sense-perception, one by Aristotle and one by his successor Theophrastus, are translated here in this single volume. Both commentaries give a highly Neoplatonic reading to their Aristotelian subjects and tell us much about late Neoplatonist psychology. This volume is also designed to enable readers to assess a recent major controversy: it has been argued by Carlos Steel and Fernand Bossier that the commentary ascribed to Simplicius is in fact by Priscian, and their article, hitherto only available in Dutch, is here published in revised form and in English for the first time. This book therefore contains all the evidence necessary for readers to judge this intriguing question for themselves."--Bloomsbury Publishing

Simplicius and Priscian were two of the seven Neoplatonists who left Athens when the Christian Emperor Justinian closed the paganschool there in A.D. 529. The commentaries ascribed to them on works on sense-perception, one by Aristotle and one by his successor Theophrastus, are translated here in this single volume. Both commentaries give a highly Neoplatonic reading to their Aristotelian subjects and tell us much about late Neoplatonist psychology. This volume is also designed to enable readers to assess a recent major controversy: it has been argued by Carlos Steel and Fernand Bossier that the commentary ascribed to Simplicius is in fact by Priscian, and their article, hitherto only available in Dutch, is here published in revised form and in English for the first time. This book therefore contains all the evidence necessary for readers to judge this intriguing question for themselves.