Al Qaeda's operational center of gravity is correctly identifiable by using operational warfare's principles and processes. The author uses the terrorist network, Al Qaeda, as an illustration of the process in correctly identifying a center of gravity for a terrorist force, a force not fitting the common definition of a conventional or unconventional operational force. In applying the principles and processes of operational warfare in this analysis, the author first needed to determine the war on terrorism's strategic enemy and that strategic enemy's objective, because it is from the national strategic, or political objective objectives, that operational objectives are derived. In analysis of the strategic enemy, the author postulates that radical Wahhabi Islamic terrorist groups, when viewed in holistically, comprise a "will of the people, more precisely defined as, radical Wahhabi Islamic fundamentalism." In conclusion, the author states that it turns out that defining Al Qaeda's center of gravity is "easy" relatively speaking, but it is the courses of action deriving from that center of gravity which are hard to define, develop, and execute in defeating not only Al Qaeda, but "Adversary."

Al Qaeda's operational center of gravity is correctly identifiable by using operational warfare's principles and processes. The author uses the terrorist network, Al Qaeda, as an illustration of the process in correctly identifying a center of gravity for a terrorist force, a force not fitting the common definition of a conventional or unconventional operational force. In applying the principles and processes of operational warfare in this analysis, the author first needed to determine the war on terrorism's strategic enemy and that strategic enemy's objective, because it is from the national strategic, or political objective objectives, that operational objectives are derived. In analysis of the strategic enemy, the author postulates that radical Wahhabi Islamic terrorist groups, when viewed in holistically, comprise a "will of the people, more precisely defined as, radical Wahhabi Islamic fundamentalism." In conclusion, the author states that it turns out that defining Al Qaeda's center of gravity is "easy" relatively speaking, but it is the courses of action deriving from that center of gravity which are hard to define, develop, and execute in defeating not only Al Qaeda, but "Adversary."

Today, Islamicist organizations are becoming more widespread and diffuse. They often lack a direct connection to al Qaeda's strategic leadership but are inspired by its ideology. Al Qaeda's operational role is subdued, but its ideological, propaganda, and support roles are critical to its affiliates. Many groups now adhere to the original goals and ideology of al Qaeda, which extends the scope of its influence well beyond that of the original organization, although al Qaeda itself is still considered the most dangerous of all transnational extremist groups and is America's principal enemy.

Essay from the year 2013 in the subject Politics - Topic: Peace and Conflict, Security, grade: 1,7, , language: English, abstract: The center of gravity paradigm created and published by Carl von Clausewitz in his famous study about the appearance of war is nowadays still widely used to describe the core incitements and driving factors of warring factions, political parties, militias and even terrorist groups. In a short summary this military term of a center of gravity is defined as the one or few main forces where a party in a conflict drives its willpower and its strength from. It is a common element amongst the members and supporters of this group and with reference to Clausewitz’s study, it is this key element the opponent needs to identify and to overcome in order to break the willpower of the party and to finally conquer them. For that reason various studies have been undertaken und research has been performed with regards to the center of gravity in warfare as well as the center of gravity for terrorist groups and esp. for Al Qaeda. In the case of Al Qaeda most completed studies and published documents agreed to the point that the ideology preached by the core leaders of the network is the key element, where their followers draw their support and willpower from. At the same time Al Qaeda these days transformed itself to a loose network with just a common brand name and ideology, but without much central guidance or command. Numerous groups throughout all parts of world emerge and entitle themselves with the name Al Qaeda or Al Qaeda affiliated. Often there are no or just minor links to the former core leadership of Al Qaeda. For that reason it seems, that the network called Al Qaeda with most of its global affiliates is not more a strict hierarchical structured group, nor is it a self-contained network anymore with its origin in the mountain region of the Afghan-Pakistan (AfPak) border area. Al Qaeda seems to have many different appearances. Therefore the underlying hypothesis of this essay is that beside the remaining core of Al Qaeda in the AfPak region, the name Al Qaeda is nowadays used as a corporate name of different local or regional acting terrorist groups in order to provide a powerful proof of their willingness and capability. In that line the outcome of the hypothesis argues that the CoG for Al Qaeda affiliates is derived from their own and individual domestic or regional issues and interests as well as their regional supremacy.

After ten years of global conflict with al Qaeda, the time has come to reassess the threat and determine the parameters within which it operates. Questions regarding its continued validity as a threat, its capability to employ synchronized tactical actions, and its ability to act as a learning organization all must be addressed to better understand this enemy of the United Sates.The purpose of this book is to examine al Qaeda's ability to employ its tactical actions to achieve its strategic goals. This book hypothesizes that al Qaeda practiced operational art in the pursuit of its objectives. The methodology of this book analyzed two case studies that affirm the findings of this book. The first case reviewed the campaign against the United States that began in 1993 with the attack of the World Trade Center. The second case analyzed the campaign al Qaeda undertook in 2004 to discourage allies of the United States from participating in the war with Iraq. Both case studies were compared by elements of operational art: lines of effort, center of gravity analysis, and operational reach, to determine if al Qaeda practiced operational art to improve its ability to meet the strategic objective.This book also provides a way to predict al Qaeda's future actions by applying US Army doctrine on operational art as a tool for planners to see through the complexity of the enemy and their goals through a familiar and already understood framework.

This paper postulates that Al Qaeda's center of gravity is Osama Bin Laden and his brand of Islamist extremism. Looking at Al Qaeda as a system the following characteristics emerge as COG candidates at the strategic level: its fighting force financial capacity external support leadership and extremist Muslim ideology. Each of these candidates is analyzed to include discussion of capabilities requirements and vulnerabilities. Clausewitz indicated that a center of gravity in a popular uprising is the personalities of the leaders and public opinion. Bin Laden fits the Clausewitzian definition of a personality leading a popular uprising. Only today this uprising is on a global scale with the objective of overthrowing the world order. Bin Laden rallies Muslim extremists. His charisma vision wealth and leadership abilities are the reasons Al Qaeda is an effective terrorist organization striking fear across the globe while winning admiration among many in the Muslim world.

This is the first academic analysis of the role of embedded media in the 2003 Iraq War, providing a concise history of US military public affairs management since Vietnam.In late summer 2002, the Pentagon considered giving the press an inside view of the upcoming invasion of Iraq. The decision was surprising, and the innovative "embedded media prog