Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) carries a complicated history of terrorist violence in Northern Africa. The colonial influences on Africa are a long-standing cause of the focus of organizations such as AQIM on Western and European interests. Abu Musab Abdul Wadud, AQIM's current leader, has not only published threats against citizens and countries outside of Algeria, but has carried out attacks in seven countries, targeting citizens of Europe and Africa, causing more than 5,000 fatalities, injuries, and kidnappings. Unlike other Salafi jihadist organizations allied with al Qaeda, AQIM interacts with criminal organizations in activities such as drug smuggling for South American drug cartels. Using equipment, weapons, uniforms, passports, and vehicles captured from attacks in conjunction with vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices and suicide bombers, the AQIM threat continues to gather momentum. AQIM is also known to have SA-7 man-portable air-defense systems and anti-tank guided missiles. From drug trade funds and kidnap ransoms, it is estimated that AQIM has an annual operating budget of $10 million. AQIM has become the wealthiest of al Qaeda affiliates, using that wealth in a hearts-and-minds campaign among the residents of the Sahara-Sahel region. In terms of revenue, that places AQIM between a small pharmaceutical company and a steel manufacturer, and within the top 1,000 for employment opportunities. Generations of discontent youth in the Maghreb combined with warlords and criminal networks provides an ideal environment from which AQIM can recruit, indoctrinate, and train as well as establish numerous criminal allies. Counterterrorist organizations and other international resources must synchronize and focus efforts that detour recruitment efforts of AQIM, prevent further expansion, capture its resources and leadership, and ultimately dissolve the organization.

Essay from the year 2013 in the subject Politics - Topic: Peace and Conflict, Security, grade: 1,7, , language: English, abstract: The center of gravity paradigm created and published by Carl von Clausewitz in his famous study about the appearance of war is nowadays still widely used to describe the core incitements and driving factors of warring factions, political parties, militias and even terrorist groups. In a short summary this military term of a center of gravity is defined as the one or few main forces where a party in a conflict drives its willpower and its strength from. It is a common element amongst the members and supporters of this group and with reference to Clausewitz’s study, it is this key element the opponent needs to identify and to overcome in order to break the willpower of the party and to finally conquer them. For that reason various studies have been undertaken und research has been performed with regards to the center of gravity in warfare as well as the center of gravity for terrorist groups and esp. for Al Qaeda. In the case of Al Qaeda most completed studies and published documents agreed to the point that the ideology preached by the core leaders of the network is the key element, where their followers draw their support and willpower from. At the same time Al Qaeda these days transformed itself to a loose network with just a common brand name and ideology, but without much central guidance or command. Numerous groups throughout all parts of world emerge and entitle themselves with the name Al Qaeda or Al Qaeda affiliated. Often there are no or just minor links to the former core leadership of Al Qaeda. For that reason it seems, that the network called Al Qaeda with most of its global affiliates is not more a strict hierarchical structured group, nor is it a self-contained network anymore with its origin in the mountain region of the Afghan-Pakistan (AfPak) border area. Al Qaeda seems to have many different appearances. Therefore the underlying hypothesis of this essay is that beside the remaining core of Al Qaeda in the AfPak region, the name Al Qaeda is nowadays used as a corporate name of different local or regional acting terrorist groups in order to provide a powerful proof of their willingness and capability. In that line the outcome of the hypothesis argues that the CoG for Al Qaeda affiliates is derived from their own and individual domestic or regional issues and interests as well as their regional supremacy.

Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb emerged from a group started in the late 1990s by radical Algerian Islamists, who in 2007 pledged allegiance to Osama Bin Laden's Al-Qaeda network. Abu Musab Abdul Wadud, AQIM's current leader, has not only published threats against citizens and countries outside of Algeria, but has carried out attacks in seven countries, targeting citizens of Europe and Africa, causing more than 5,000 fatalities, injuries, and kidnappings. AQIM interacts with criminal organizations in activities such as drug smuggling for South American drug cartels. Using equipment, weapons, uniforms, passports, and vehicles captured from attacks in conjunction with vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices and suicide bombers. AQIM is also known to have SA-7 man-portable air-defense systems and anti-tank guided missiles. Generations of discontent youth in the Maghreb combined with warlords and criminal networks provide an ideal environment from which AQIM can recruit, indoctrinate, and train as well as establish numerous criminal allies. Counterterrorist organizations and other international resources must synchronize and focus efforts that detour recruitment efforts of AQIM, prevent further expansion, capture its resources and leadership, and ultimately dissolve the organization.

Rebranded in 2007, Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) is the latest incarnation of Algerian radical Islamism. Initially focused on attacks with great political resonance against Algerian governmental and military targets, the group has progressively shifted its priorities, alongside its geographical and operational features. In the past few years, the countries of the Sahel region (Mauritania, Malì, Niger, Chad) have been increasingly affected by AQIM's actions. This geographical shift was the result both of a weakening of AQIM within Algeria, due to the tough counter-terrorist measures adopted by the regime, and of the "business opportunities" and the wider operational freedom offered by the Sahelian environment. The aim of this paper is to briefly address a series of questions concerning AQIM's "Sahelization" and its consequences for Algerian foreign policy.

Al Qaeda (AQ) has evolved into a significantly different terrorist org. than the one that perpetrated the 9/11 attacks. The pre-9/11 AQ was akin to a corp., with Osama Bin Laden acting as a CEO issuing orders and soliciting ideas from subordinates. It has transformed into a diffuse global network and philosophical movement composed of dispersed nodes with varying degrees of independence. Contents of this report: (1) Background; (2) AQ Origins; (3) Afghanistan; (4) Pakistan; (5) Arabian Peninsula; (6) Iraq; (7) North Africa/Sahel: Islamic Maghreb; Algeria; The Sahel; (8) Somalia; The Islamic Courts Union, Al Shabaab; (9) Radical Islamist Groups in SE Asia: Jemaah Islamiya; Abu Sayyaf Group; (10) AQ¿s Global Strategy and Long Term Policy Implications.

How terrorist groups end -- Policing and Japan's Aum Shinrikyo -- Politics and the FMLN in El Salvador -- Military force and Al Qa'ida in Iraq -- The limits of America's Al Qa'ida strategy -- Ending the 'war' on terrorism.