China's entry into the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2001 was heralded as historic, and for good reason: the world's most populous nation was joining the rule-based system that has governed international commerce since World War II. But the full ramifications of that event are only now becoming apparent, as the Chinese economic juggernaut has evolved in unanticipated and profoundly troublesome ways. In this book, journalist Paul Blustein chronicles the contentious process resulting in China's WTO membership and the transformative changes that followed, both good and bad - for China, for its trading partners, and for the global trading system as a whole. The book recounts how China opened its markets and underwent far-reaching reforms that fuelled its economic takeoff, but then adopted policies - a cheap currency and heavy-handed state intervention - that unfairly disadvantaged foreign competitors and circumvented WTO rules. Events took a potentially catastrophic turn in 2018 with the eruption of a trade war between China and the United States, which has brought the trading system to a breaking point. Regardless of how the latest confrontation unfolds, the world will be grappling for decades with the challenges posed by China Inc.

"China's accession to the World Trade Organisation (WTO) in 2001 was hailed as the natural conclusion of a long march that started with the reforms introduced by Deng Xiaoping in the 1970s. However, China's participation in the WTO since joining has been anything but smooth, and its self-proclaimed "socialist market economy" system has alienated many of its global trading partners - as recent tensions with the United States exemplify. Prevailing diplomatic attitudes tend to focus on two diametrically opposing approaches to dealing with the emerging problems: the first is to demand that China completely overhaul its economic regime; the second is to stay idle and accept that the WTO must accommodate different economic regimes, no matter how idiosyncratic and incompatible. In this book, Mavroidis and Sapir propose a third approach. They point out that, while the WTO (as well as its predecessor, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade [GATT]) has previously managed the accession of socialist countries or of big trading nations, it has never before dealt with a country as large or as powerful as China. Therefore, in order to simultaneously uphold its core principles and accommodate China's unique geopolitical position, the authors argue that the WTO needs to translate some of its implicit legal understanding into explicit treaty language. Focusing on two core complaints - that Chinese state-owned enterprises (SOEs) benefit from unfair trade advantages, and that domestic companies (both private as well as SOEs) impose forced technology transfer on foreign companies as a condition for accessing the Chinese market - they lay out their specific proposals for successful legislative amendment"--.

Provides insight into U.S. and Chinese involvement in aid, trade, direct investment and strategic ties in Latin America In recent years, China has become the largest trading partner for more than half the countries in Latin America, and demonstrated major commitments in aid and direct investment in various parts of the region. China has also made a number of strategic commitments to countries like Nicaragua, Cuba, and Venezuela which have long-standing policies opposing U.S. influence in the region. China, the United States, and the Future of Latin America posits that this activity is a direct challenge to the role of the U.S. in Latin America and the Caribbean. Part of a three-volume series analyzing U.S.-China relations in parts of the world where neither country is dominant, this volume analyzes the interactions between the U.S., China, and Latin America. The book series has so far considered the differences in operating styles between China and the U.S. in Central Asia and Southeast Asia. This third volume unpacks the implications of competing U.S. and Chinese interests in countries such as Brazil and Argentina, and China’s commitments in Nicaragua and Venezuela. This volume draws upon a variety of policy experts, focusing on the viewpoints of South American and Caribbean scholars as well as scholars from outside states. China’s new global reach and its ambitions, as well as the U.S. response, are analyzed in detail.A nuanced examination of current complexities and future implications, China, the United States and the Future of Latin America provides readers with varied perspectives on the changing economic and strategic picture in Latin America and the Caribbean.

Despite apparently consistent statements in 4 decades, the U.S. ¿one China¿ policy concerning Taiwan remains somewhat ambiguous and subject to different interpretations. Apart from questions about what the ¿one China¿ policy entails, issues have arisen about whether U.S. Presidents have stated clear positions and have changed or should change policy, affecting U.S. interests in security and democracy. Contents of this report: (1) U.S. Policy on ¿One China¿: Has U.S. Policy Changed?; Overview of Policy Issues; (2) Highlights of Key Statements by Washington, Beijing, and Taipei: Statements During the Admin. of Nixon, Ford, Carter, Reagan, George H. W. Bush, Clinton, George W. Bush, Clinton, and Obama. A print on demand report.

Taiwan "is becoming the most dangerous flash point in the world for a possible war that involves the United States, China, and probably other major powers," warn Robert D. Blackwill, Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) Henry A. Kissinger senior fellow for U.S. foreign policy, and Philip Zelikow, University of Virginia White Burkett Miller professor of history. In a new Council Special Report, The United States, China, and Taiwan: A Strategy to Prevent War, the authors argue that the United States should change and clarify its strategy to prevent war over Taiwan. "The U.S. strategic objective regarding Taiwan should be to preserve its political and economic autonomy, its dynamism as a free society, and U.S.-allied deterrence-without triggering a Chinese attack on Taiwan." "We do not think it is politically or militarily realistic to count on a U.S. military defeat of various kinds of Chinese assaults on Taiwan, uncoordinated with allies. Nor is it realistic to presume that, after such a frustrating clash, the United States would or should simply escalate to some sort of wide-scale war against China with comprehensive blockades or strikes against targets on the Chinese mainland." "If U.S. campaign plans postulate such unrealistic scenarios," the authors add, "they will likely be rejected by an American president and by the U.S. Congress." But, they observe, "the resulting U.S. paralysis would not be the result of presidential weakness or timidity. It might arise because the most powerful country in the world did not have credible options prepared for the most dangerous military crisis looming in front of it." Proposing "a realistic strategic objective for Taiwan, and the associated policy prescriptions, to sustain the political balance that has kept the peace for the last fifty years," the authors urge the Joe Biden administration to affirm that it is not trying to change Taiwan's status; work with its allies, especially Japan, to prepare new plans that could challenge Chinese military moves against Taiwan and help Taiwan defend itself, yet put the burden of widening a war on China; and visibly plan, beforehand, for the disruption and mobilization that could follow a wider war, but without assuming that such a war would or should escalate to the Chinese, Japanese, or American homelands. "The horrendous global consequences of a war between the United States and China, most likely over Taiwan, should preoccupy the Biden team, beginning with the president," the authors conclude.

As the relationship between China and the United States becomes increasingly complex and interdependent, leaders in Beijing and Washington are struggling to establish a solid common foundation on which to expand and deepen bilateral relations. In order to examine the challenges facing U.S.-China relations, the National Bureau of Asian Research (NBR) and the Institute for Global Cooperation and Understanding (iGCU) at Peking University brought together a group of leading experts from China and the United States in Beijing and Honolulu to develop a conceptual foundation for U.S.-China relations into the future, tackling the issues in innovative ways under the banner of U.S.-China Relations in Strategic Domains. The resulting chapters assess U.S.-China relations in the maritime and nuclear sectors as well as in cyberspace and space and through the lens of P2P and mil-to-mil exchanges. Scholars and students in political science and international relations are thus presented with a diagnosis and prognosis of the relations between the two superpowers.