It is not very surprising that it was no less true in antiquity than it is today that adult human beings are held to be responsible for most of their actions. Indeed, virtually all cultures in all historical periods seem to have had some conception of human agency which, in the absence of certain responsibility-defeating conditions, entails such responsibility. Few philosophers have had the temerity to maintain that this entailment is trivial because such responsibility-defeating conditions are always present. Another not very surprising fact is that ancient thinkers tended to ascribe integrality to "what is" (to on). That is, they typically regarded "what is" as a cosmos or whole with distinguishable parts that fit together in some coherent or cohesive manner, rather than either as a "unity" with no parts or as a collection containing members (ta onta or "things that are") standing in no "natural" relations to one another. 1 The philoso phical problem of determinism and responsibility may, I think, best be characterized as follows: it is the problem of preserving the phenomenon of human agency (which would seem to require a certain separateness of individual human beings from the rest of the cosmos) when one sets about the philosophical or scientific task of explaining the integrality of "what is" by means of the development of a theory of causation or explanation ( concepts that came to be lumped together by the Greeks under the term "aitia") .

The problem of determinism arises in all the major areas of philosophy. The first part of this book, first published in 1991, is a critical and historical exposition of the problem and the most important ideas and arguments which have arisen over the many years of debate. The second part considers the various forms of determinism and the implications that they engender.

The 23 papers that were prepared for a 1991 symposium that was cancelled beneath the weight of public and professional protests at some of the speakers invited, particularly Peter Singer. They analyze the application of theoretical considerations arising from philosophical reflection to particular concrete cases and situations of moral conflict in such fields as the environment, biology and medicine, business and professions, politics, law, and society. Among the topics are a philosophical critique of legal rights for natural objects, comparing the value of human and nonhuman life, business ethics as a goal-rights system, liberal society and planned morality, and moral philosophy and its function. No subject index. Annotation copyrighted by Book News, Inc., Portland, OR

The notion of what someone says is, perhaps surprisingly, some what less clear than we might be entitled to expect. Suppose that I utter to my class the sentence 'I want you to write a paper reconciling the things Russell claims about propositions in The Philosophy of Mathematics for next week'. A student who was unable to get up in time for class that day asks another what I said about the assignment. Several replies are in the offing. One, an oratio recta or direct speech report, is 'He said, "I want you to write a paper reconciling the things Russell claims about propositions in The Philosophy of Mathematics for next week. '" Another, an oratio obliqua or indirect speech report, consists in the response 'He said that he wants us to write a paper reconciling . . . '. Yet another, reflecting a perhaps accurate estimate of the task involved, editorializes: 'He said he wants us to do the impossible'. Or, aware of both this and my quaint custom of barring those who have not successfully completed the assignment from the classroom, one might retort 'He said he doesn't want to meet next week'. Since 'says' is construable in these various ways, it is at best unhelpful to write something like 'Alice said "Your paper is two days late", thereby saying that Tom's paper was two days late.

Who am I? Or, even more curiously, who are you? These are questions about the self – that aspect of who we are that we believe defines, or at least describes, each of us. The self is not merely an internal creation, however. Family, friends, colleagues, and acquaintances all contribute to who we are, and more importantly, they help to shape who we think we are. In this innovative and thought-provoking book, the various social aspects of the self and its construction are imaginatively explored. Such explorations can seem abstractly academic, but they carry great significance. Knowledge of how the self is constructed has many implications for most social processes, for example, understanding the volatility of the notion of self that can provide the basis for terrorist radicalisation, can generate destructive suicidal tendencies, or can foment aggressive national identities. This interdisciplinary collection is relevant not only for theoretical and methodological elaborations, but also for more practical considerations. The chapters in this book were originally published as a special issue of Contemporary Social Science, and two articles from Self and Identity.

Many contemporary philosophers are interested in the scotistic notion of haecceity or `thisness' because it is relevant to important problems concerning identity and individuation, reference, modality, and propositional attitudes. Haecceity is the only book-length work devoted to this topic. The author develops a novel defense of Platonism, arguing, first, that abstracta - nonqualitative haecceities - are needed to explain concreta's being diverse at a time; and second, that unexemplified haecceities are then required to accommodate the full range of cases in which there are possible worlds containing individuals not present in the actual world. In the cognitive area, an original epistemic argument is presented which implies that certain haecceities can be grasped by a person: his own, those of certain of his mental states, and those of various abstracta, but not those of external things. It is argued that in consequence there is a clear sense in which one is directly acquainted with the former entities, but not with external things.

The larger project of which this volume forms part is an attempt to craft a coherent doctrine of divine eternity and God's relationship to time. Central to this project is the integration of the concerns of theology with the concept of time in relativity theory. This volume provides an accessible and philosophically informed examination of the concept of time in relativity, the ultimate aim being the achievement of a tenable theological synthesis.