A century after ‘On Denoting’ was published, the debate it initiated continues to rage. On the one hand, there is a mass of new historical scholarship, about both Russell and Meinong, which has not circulated very far beyond specialist scholars. On the other hand, there are continuing problems and controversies concerning contemporary Russellian and Meinongian theories, many of them involving issues that simply did not occur to the original protagonists. This work provides an overview of the latest historical scholarship on the two philosophers as well as detailed accounts of some of the problems facing the current incarnations of their theories.

The study aims at exposing Meinong's ideas that may be of interest to analytic philosophers. It contains all the basic information concerning Meinong's theory of objects with a special focus upon 'objectives', which are Meinong's propositions. Meinong's theory of meaning and his epistemological views are discussed in detail. An outline of his conception of truth, which is classified as firmly realistic, is followed by a review of the critical works touching upon Meinong's epistemological ideas. Finally, Meinong's theory of objects is presented as inspiring the development of Meinongian logics, with his Aussersein as the prototype of an all-inclusive semantic domain. The issues considered include reference of terms and sentences as well as the general features of a Meinongian-style semantics.

This systematic and historical treatment of Russell's contributions to analytic philosophy, from his embrace of analysis in 1898 to his landmark theory of descriptions in 1905, draws important connections between his philosophically motivated conception of analysis and the technical apparatus he devised to facilitate analyses in mathematics

Russell's On Denoting and Frege's On Sense and Reference are now widely held to be two of the founding papers of twentieth century philosophy and form the heart of the famous "linguistic turn". The Metaphysicians of Meaning is the first book to challenge the accepted secondary work on these two seminal papers, forcing us to reconsider the interpretation of these two vitally important works on meaning.

Although there has been a significant revival in interest in Bertrand Russell's work in recent years, most professional philosophers would still argue that Russell was not interested in language. Here, in the first full-length study of Russell's work on language throughout his long career, Keith Green shows that this is in fact not the case. In examining Russell's work, particularly from 1900 to 1950, Green exposes a repeated emphasis on, and turn to, linguistic considerations. Green considers how 'linguistics' and 'philosophy' were struggling in the twentieth century to define themselves and to create appropriate contemporary disciplines. They had much in common during certain periods, yet seemed to continue in almost total ignorance of one another. This negative relation has been noted in the past by Roy Harris, whose work provides some of the inspiration for the present book. Taking those two aspects, Green's aim here is to provide the first full-length consideration of Russell's varied work in language, and to read it in the context of developing contemporary (i.e. with Russell's work) linguistic theory. The main aims of this important new book, in focusing exclusively on Russell's work on language throughout his career, are to place Russell within the changing contexts of contemporary linguistic thought; to read Russell's language-theories against the grain of his own linguistic practice; to assess the relationship between linguistic and philosophical thought during Russell's career, and to reassess his place in the history of linguistic thought in the twentieth century. As such, this fascinating study will make a vital contribution to Russell studies and to the study of the relationship between philosophy and linguistics.