Action, Intention, and Reason
Title | Action, Intention, and Reason PDF eBook |
Author | Robert Audi |
Publisher | Cornell University Press |
Pages | 381 |
Release | 2019-01-24 |
Genre | Philosophy |
ISBN | 1501733265 |
For the first time, Robert Audi presents in Action, Intention, and Reason a full version of his theory of the nature, explanation, freedom, and rationality of human action. Ove the years Audi has set out in journal articles different aspects of a unified theory of action. This volume offers the unity of a single, seamless book with thirteen self-contained chapters, two of them previously unpublished, and a new overview of action theory and the book's contribution to it. The book is divided into four parts, each addressing a major problem area. The chapters in Part One describe the motivational grounds of action, explicate desire, belief, intention, and volition, and give a distinctive account of their interconnections. In the second part, Audi sets out a theory of the explanation of action and argues that actions can be both law-governed and performed for reasons. The third part provides an account of free action and its relation to causation and responsibility. Chapters in the fourth and final part construct an account of rational action and its connections with practical reasoning, self-deception, and weakness of will.
Action, Intention, and Reason
Title | Action, Intention, and Reason PDF eBook |
Author | Robert Audi |
Publisher | Cornell University Press |
Pages | 376 |
Release | 1993 |
Genre | Act (Philosophy) |
ISBN | 9780801481055 |
Three new essays and 11 others published since 1971 develop and defend a general position on action theory that is intentionalist about the nature of action, causal and nomic about explanations of action, compatibilist about free action and moral responsibility, internalist about the grounds of rational actions, and holistic about the nature of rationality. Paper edition (8105-8), $17.95. Annotation copyright by Book News, Inc., Portland, OR
Essays on Anscombe’s Intention
Title | Essays on Anscombe’s Intention PDF eBook |
Author | Anton Ford |
Publisher | Harvard University Press |
Pages | 324 |
Release | 2011-06-01 |
Genre | Philosophy |
ISBN | 0674060911 |
G. E. M. Anscombe's Intention, firmly established the philosophy of action as a distinctive field of inquiry. Donald Davidson called this 94-page book "the most important treatment of action since Aristotle." But until quite recently, few scholars recognized the magnitude of Anscombe's philosophical achievement. This collection of ten essays elucidates some of the more challenging aspects of Anscombe's work and affirms her reputation as one of our most original philosophers. Born in 1919, Anscombe studied at St. Hugh's College, Oxford, where she later held a research fellowship. In 1941 she married philosopher Peter Geach, with whom she had seven children. A close friend of Wittgenstein, in 1946 she joined Oxford's Somerville College and spent the next twenty-four years there before being appointed to the Chair of Philosophy at Cambridge that Wittgenstein had held. She died in 2001 after her long career as a highly regarded analytic philosopher. This volume brings together fresh interpretations of Intention written by some of today's leading philosophers of action. It will enlighten Anscombe's readers who struggle with concepts they find puzzling or obscure, while providing a bracing corrective to doubts about Intention's significance and the gravity of what is at stake.
Intention, Plans, and Practical Reason
Title | Intention, Plans, and Practical Reason PDF eBook |
Author | Michael Bratman |
Publisher | |
Pages | 226 |
Release | 1987 |
Genre | Philosophy |
ISBN |
Action, Decision, and Intention
Title | Action, Decision, and Intention PDF eBook |
Author | Robert Audi |
Publisher | Springer |
Pages | 148 |
Release | 1986-05-31 |
Genre | Philosophy |
ISBN | 9027722749 |
Most of the papers in this collection are contributions to action theory intended to be of some relevance to one or another concern of decision theory, particularly to its application to concrete human behavior. Some of the papers touch only indirectly on problems of interest to decision theorists, but taken together they should be of use to both decision theorists and philosophers of action. Robert Audi's paper indicates how a number of questions in action theory might bear on problems in decision theory, and it suggests how some action-theoretic results may help in the construction or interpretation of theories of decision, both normative and empirical. Carl Ginet's essay lays foundations for the conception of action. His volitional framework roots actions internally and conceives them as irreducibly connected with intentionality. Hugh McCann's essay is also foundational, but stresses intention more than volition and lays some of the groundwork for assessing the rationality of intention and intentional action. In William Alston's paper, the notion of a plan as underlying (intentional) action is central, and we are given both a con ception of the structure of intentional action and a set of implicit goals and beliefs - those whose content is represented in the plan - which form an indispensable part of the basis on which the rationality of the action is to be judged.
Action, Knowledge, and Will
Title | Action, Knowledge, and Will PDF eBook |
Author | John Hyman |
Publisher | Oxford University Press, USA |
Pages | 270 |
Release | 2015 |
Genre | Body, Mind & Spirit |
ISBN | 0198735774 |
John Hyman explores central problems in philosophy of action and the theory of knowledge, and connects these areas of enquiry in a new way. His approach to the dimensions of human action culminates in an original analysis of the relation between knowledge and rational behaviour, which provides the foundation for a new theory of knowledge itself.
Humean Nature
Title | Humean Nature PDF eBook |
Author | Neil Sinhababu |
Publisher | Oxford University Press |
Pages | 314 |
Release | 2017-03-16 |
Genre | Philosophy |
ISBN | 0191086479 |
Neil Sinhababu defends the Humean Theory of Motivation, according to which desire drives all human action and practical reasoning. Desire motivates us to pursue its object, makes thoughts of its object pleasant or unpleasant, focuses attention on its object, and is amplified by vivid representations of its object. These aspects of desire explain a vast range of psychological phenomena - why motivation often accompanies moral belief, how intentions shape our planning, how we exercise willpower, what it is to be a human self, how we express our emotions in action, why we procrastinate, and what we daydream about. Some philosophers regard such phenomena as troublesome for the Humean Theory, but the properties of desire help Humeans provide simpler and better explanations of these phenomena than their opponents can. The success of the Humean Theory in explaining a wide range of folk-psychological and experimental data, including those that its opponents cite in counterexamples, suggest that it is true. And the Humean Theory has revolutionary consequences for ethics, suggesting that moral judgments are beliefs about what feelings like guilt, admiration, and hope accurately represent in objective reality.