A 2002 Department of Defense (DoD) report stated that the military services developed or adopted many innovative approaches to unit structures and organization as force size changed and operational tempo increased. The report suggested that organizational concepts leading to a more flexible, capable force must be implemented more broadly to better capitalize on the capabilities and strengths of the reserve components. In particular, such organizational concepts include blending active component (AC) and reserve component (RC) workforces in military units. We define blending as any arrangement or event that brings active and reserve manpower together within organizations for a common purpose. At the organizational level where mission work is actually done, there is interest in workforce integration between the components.

Currently, U.S. armed forces are facing a rapidly shifting environment. Even as the major combat operations in Afghanistan and Iraq that defined the last decade are coming to an end, a wide variety of new and evolving challenges, both abroad and at home, are confronting the nation’s military. The U.S. Army National Guard faces a unique set of dynamics, given its role in domestic as well as overseas operations. As the Army National Guard considers its future, it asked the CSIS Homeland Security and Counterterrorism Program to provide an independent analysis of the strategic-level issues facing the Guard, as well as its evolving roles and missions. This report provides policymakers and practitioners with objective insights and recommendations to assist in outlining potential future responsibilities for the Army National Guard.

The authors address one of the fundamental assumptions underlying the conduct of the War on Terrorism -- the nature of our enemy, whether perpetrators of terrorist activities are criminals or soldiers (combatants). Although the United States recognizes that terrorist acts are certainly illegal, it has chosen to treat perpetrators as combatants; but much of the world, including many of our traditional allies, have opted for a purely legalistic approach. Disagreement about assumptions is not the only basis for divergent policies for confronting terrorism, but certainly explains much of our inability to agree on strategies to overcome what we recognize as a serious common and persistent international problem. Their insights into how our respective cultures and histories influence our definitions, assumptions, and subsequent policy decisions can assist us to respect and learn from competing strategies. They correctly surmise that our current international struggle is too important for us to ignore assumptions underlying our own and competing ideas.

The Commission was chartered by Congress to assess the reserve component of the U.S. military and to recommend changes to ensure that the National Guard and other reserve components are organized, trained, equipped, compensated, and supported to best meet the needs of U.S. nat. security. Contents: Creating a Sustainable Operational Reserve; Enhancing the DoD¿s Role in the Homeland; Creating a Continuum of Service: Personnel Mgmt. for an Integrated Total Force; Developing a Ready, Capable, and Available Operational Reserve; Supporting Service Members, Families, and Employers; Reforming the Organizations and Institutions That Support an Operational Reserve; and Commission for the Total Operational Force. Illus.

The U.S. Navy wants to provide its shipbuilders with appropriate incentive to produce militarily effective vessels at minimum cost to the Navy. It can induce a shipbuilder to agree to any contractual arrangement by offering the shipbuilder a high enough price. But it is likely to be preferable, at least ex ante, for the Navy to dissipate risk external to its shipbuilder to pay less for the systems the Navy needs. The Navy uses external labor- and material-cost indexes to attempt to correct for significant cost risks outside its shipbuilders? control. Shipbuilder profits are greater when actual.